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Introduction

With this twelfth installment *Quest* offers its readers a miscellaneous issue. It is the second time we choose to publish in the *Focus* section a series of articles not tied together by a unifying theme, the first time was with [issue n. 7 in July 2014](#). While we will return to publishing mostly monographic volumes in the near future, from time to time this journal will be open to the publication of single articles in miscellaneous issues.

The *Focus* section hosts six research articles, covering diverse topics and time periods, with contributions both from experienced scholars and from a younger generation of researchers. We open the issue with two different contributions in the field of intellectual history: Abensour offers a critical reflection on the influence of Spinoza on Elijah Benamozegh's peculiar philosophical and theological arguments, shedding light on his notion of tolerance; Treves proposes a critical reappraisal of Freud's *Moses and Monotheism*, considering - through de Certau and Barthes - the rhetorical construction of his historical discourse, and pondering on the affinities between aspects of Freud's approach and the contemporary innovations of the *Annales* school. We then move on to contributions dedicated to the field of Holocaust studies: Van Camp considers, with lexicometric and qualitative analysis, the social dynamics within Nazi camps and the development of stereotypical representations of the small and peculiar group of Italian Jews who suffered deportation; Renzo instead reconstructs, through a rich archival investigation, the life of Jewish Displaced Persons present in various camps in Italy (1943-1948) and the intricate network of agencies and organizations active in offering relief and support to those survivors of the Holocaust. We close the issue with two articles by more seasoned scholars. Sarfatti analyzes Italian memory policies and in particular the genesis of the law promoting 'Holocaust Remembrance Day,' its implementation and its effects on Italian society and culture. Giladi and Goldstein study, mainly through the use of the periodical press of the time, the attitudes towards death and the sacrificial cultures of Zionist settlers under Ottoman and later British rule.

As usual, the issue also contains the discussion of a major book – in this instance Raffaella Perin and Paolo Zanini offer their insight on David Kertzer's *The Pope and Mussolini: The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*

– and several book reviews covering various areas of research and debate in the field of Jewish history.

The Editors of *Quest*

**God's Plurality within Unity:
Spinoza's influence on Benamozegh's Thought**

by Gabriel Abensour

Abstract

Elijah Benamozegh (Livorno, 1823-1900) was a highly-respected Italian rabbi of Moroccan heritage. He was well-versed in Kabbalah, the study of Jewish mysticism and, in his works, connected Kabbalistic and philosophic sources to delineate his conception of God. He argued, inter alia, that Torah and science are in complete harmony, and his religiously tolerant model called for the legitimacy of diversity of faiths and worships.

In this paper, I aim to show that Benamozegh's conception of the Divine – and thus his philosophy and theology – was based on a reading of Kabbalistic sources about God that was heavily influenced by Baruch Spinoza's philosophy on the nature of the Divine, and in particular, by the Spinozist-inspired concept of "God's attributes." This comparison between Benamozegh and Spinoza will enable us to better understand Benamozegh's bold argument in favor of religious tolerance, but also how and why he succeeded in challenging the traditional concept of heresy, all while using terminology provided by traditional Jewish sources and from within the rabbinic paradigm.

Introduction

Spinoza and Judaism in the 19th Century

Background to Benamozegh's Position

Benamozegh on Spinoza

Benamozegh's Model of Religious Tolerance

Idolatry: Misconception or Heresy?

Challenging Rabbinic Authority from Within

Conclusion

*La kabbale a chanté ses dogmes, tandis que Spinoza les a démontrés...
La première a révélé des pensées à la manière des poètes,
avec leurs libres allures, leurs élans et leurs hardiesses,
et la seconde les a exposées à la manière des géomètres.¹*

Introduction²

Elijah Benamozegh (Livorno, 1823-1900) was an Italian rabbi of Moroccan heritage who taught theology at Livorno's rabbinical school. Alongside a strong secular and religious education, Benamozegh was initiated while still a teenager into the mysteries of the Kabbalah by his uncle, Rabbi Yehuda Coriat.³ This early initiation influenced the entirety of Benamozegh's theology.⁴

In his works, Benamozegh connected Kabbalistic and philosophic sources to delineate his conception of God. He argued, inter alia, that Torah and science are in complete harmony, and his religiously tolerant model called for the legitimacy of diversity of faiths and worships. In this paper, I aim to show that Benamozegh's conception of the Divine – and thus his philosophy and theology – was based on a reading of Kabbalistic sources about God that was heavily influenced by Baruch Spinoza's philosophy on the nature of the Divine, and, in particular, by the Spinozist-inspired concept of "God's attributes."

The diversity of Benamozegh's writings has aroused interest among a number of scholars. Alessandro Guetta has published a captivating book on Benamozegh's thought⁵ and, more recently, Clémence Bouloque devoted her PhD thesis to Benamozegh's intellectual biography.⁶ Spinoza barely features in such works, although Guetta does discuss – rather briefly – the connection between

¹ Elijah Benamozegh, "Spinoza et la Kabbale," *L'Univers Israélite* 19 (1864): 373.

² I am deeply grateful to Prof. Mareen Niehoff, the Max Cooper Professor of Jewish Thought at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who prompted me to write this paper and provided me good advices and generous help.

³ Clémence Boulouque, *Elia Benamozegh (1823–1900): Kabbalah, Tradition, and the Challenges of Interfaith Encounters*, (Diss. New York University, 2014), 25-32.

⁴ Moshe Idel, "Kabbalah in Elijah Benamozegh's Thought" (Hebrew), *Pe'amim: Studies in Oriental Jewry* 74 (1998): 87-96.

⁵ Alessandro Guetta, *Philosophie et Cabbale: Essai sur la pensée d'Elie Benamozegh*, (Paris: Editions L'Harmattan, 1999).

⁶ Boulouque, *Elia Benamozegh*.

Benamozegh and Spinoza, focusing on Benamozegh's rejection of Spinoza's pantheism.⁷ To date, Leonardo Amoroso appears to be the only scholar who has discussed the connection between Spinoza and Kabbalah in Benamozegh's works.⁸ Additionally, several researchers have each turned their attention to one particular aspect of Benamozegh's multifaceted thought, writing on: Kabbalah in Benamozegh's works;⁹ his approach to other faiths¹⁰; his vision of nationalism and universalism¹¹; and his tendency towards the conciliation of traditional Judaism and modernity.¹²

Besides his article "Spinoza et la Kabbale,"¹³ published in *l'Univers Israélite* in 1864, this paper will focus mainly on three writings of Benamozegh: his commentary of the Pentateuch *Em Lamikra* ("Matrix of Scripture"),¹⁴ his pamphlet *Tzori Gilaad* ("The Balm of Gilead")¹⁵ and his signature work, *Israël et l'Humanité* ("Israel and Humanity"). The first was published in 1863 and

⁷ Guetta, *Philosophie et Cabbale*, 55-9.

⁸ Leonardo Amoroso, *Scintille Ebraiche*, (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2004), 123-36.

⁹ Idel, "Kabbalah in Elijah Benamozegh's Thought," 87-96.

¹⁰ Alessandro Guetta, "Qabbalà e Cristianesimo nella filosofia di Elia Benamozegh," *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 63/3 (1997): 21-8; Yehoyada Amir, "New Paths Towards Christianity and Islam in the Thought of Nachman Krochmal and Elijah Benamozegh," in *Die Entdeckung des Christentums in der Wissenschaft des Judentums*, ed. Görge Hasselhoff (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2010), 227-38; Meir Seidler, "A Nineteenth Century Jewish Attempt at Integrativeness: Rabbi Eliahu Benamozegh's Multicultural Approach to Polytheism," *Yosef Da'at; Studies in Modern Jewish History in Honor of Yosef Salmon*, ed. Yossi Goldstein (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2010), 11-23.

¹¹ Gitit Holzman, "Universalism and Nationalism, Jews and Gentiles in the Thought of Elijah Benamozegh" (Hebrew), *Pe'amim: Studies in Oriental Jewry* 74 (1998): 104-30; Clara Kraus, "Elementi Di Una Religione Universale Nell'Ebraismo Secondo 'Israël et l'Humanité' di Elia Benamozegh," *La rassegna mensile di Israel*, 22/2 (1956): 65-71.

¹² Alessandro Guetta, "Un kabbaliste à l'heure du progrès: le cas d'Elie Benamozegh," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 208/4 (1991): 415-36; Eliahu Zini, "Due Maestri del Nostro Tempo: I Rabbini Elia Benamozegh e Avraham Itzhak Hacoheh Kuk," *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 63/3 (1997): 67-78; José Faur, "The Hebrew Species Concept and the Origin of Evolution: R. Benamozegh's Response to Darwin," *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 63/3 (1997): 43-66.

¹³ Elijah Benamozegh, "Spinoza et la Kabbale," *L'Univers Israélite* 19 (1864): 36-42, 130-8, 181-7, 274-81, 364-74.

¹⁴ Elijah Benamozegh, *Em Lamikra – Commentary on the Pentateuch*, (Livorno: Benamozegh & Co. Publications, 1862).

¹⁵ Elijah Benamozegh, "Tzori Gilaad," *Kvod Halevanon*, supplement to *Halevanon* (1871). Issues 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 32, 36, 42, 43. This pamphlet was published in different parts. Therefore, in order to simplify the notes, I will refer to the most recent edition of the pamphlet, published by Itshak Shouraqui in *Jewish Heritage in Modern Times* (Hebrew), (Tel-Aviv: Maskil, 2009), 25-46.

combined traditional and scientific approaches. Not everyone appreciated it, thus the conservative Sages of Aleppo condemned his commentary for applying critical tools to the Torah and burned his books.¹⁶ In response, Benamozegh published the pamphlet *Tzori Gilaad*, in which he discussed the connection between theology and philosophy, and argued in favor of religious tolerance. Likewise, *Israël et l'Humanité*, released posthumously in 1914, further clarifies these ideas in a deeper and more philosophical manner.

Spinoza and Judaism in the 19th Century

In this paper, I argue that Benamozegh's philosophical approach is based on a Spinoza-inspired reading of Kabbalistic sources. By this I mean that Benamozegh was familiar with Spinoza's thought, adhered to his conception of God, and tried to adapt and attribute this conception to Jewish mystical thought. But above all, Benamozegh's interest in Spinoza's thought has to be apprehended as a part of the new reception of Spinoza's thought within the European Jewish and non-Jewish intellectual milieus of his time.

Although the immediate post-Spinoza period was marked by a Jewish tendency towards de-Judaizing and distancing Spinoza, the end of the 18th century signaled his comeback within the very core of the European Jewish intellectual world. In the first instance, a multi-confessional debate in Germany raged between Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Moses Mendelssohn, and other prominent scholars on the question of pantheism and Enlightenment.¹⁷ Although this debate, known as "the pantheism controversy," involved many prominent Jewish scholars, the main point of contention was not an internal religious-theological one, but rather a general philosophical one. A few decades later, a similar controversy set up in opposition to each other two

¹⁶ Among the rabbis' objections was their accusation that Benamozegh contested the divine origins of some biblical customs by attributing them to pre-Mosaic peoples. Likewise, the rabbis condemned Benamozegh's comparison between some mythological stories and Kabbalah. This notwithstanding, auto-da-fé was an exceptional act among oriental Rabbis. In order to explain the fanatic reaction of the Aleppo rabbis to Benamozegh's books, Yaron Harel pointed out that during an earlier incident, in 1862, a reform community, led by Rafael Katsin, tried to emerge in Aleppo. In this sensitive climate, Benamozegh's book acted as a trigger to awaken the rabbis' zealotry. See Yaron Harel, "The Edict to Destroy *Em Lamikra* – Aleppo 1865" (Hebrew), *Hebrew Union College Annual* 64 (1993): xxvii-xxxvi.

¹⁷ Pierre-Henri Tavoillot, *Le crépuscule des Lumières: les documents de la "querelle du panthéisme" (1780–1789)*, (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1995).

prominent Italian Christian theologians: Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855) and Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-1850)¹⁸ (Benamozegh esteemed the latter, making no secret in his *Israël et l'Humanité* of his admiration for “the powerful Italian thinker” Gioberti and his thought).¹⁹ In a time of *risorgimento*, both Rosmini and Gioberti were convinced of the necessity of a confrontation with Spinoza’s thought, in order to rethink the relationship between philosophy and religion. Unfortunately, both accused each other of adhering to the very pantheism they aimed to fight.²⁰

However, in the middle of the 19th century, a Jewish internal discussion emerged among the circle of the *maskilim*, the enlightened Jews. In 1845, poet and Galician *maskil* Max Letteris published a laudatory biography of Spinoza, in the *Bikurei ha-‘Tzim ha-Hadashim* journal. In his text, Letteris claimed *inter alia* that Spinoza’s thought was “not heretical” and “in accordance with the pure faith.” In a note following Letteris’s article, Isaac Samuel Reggio, a famous Italian Rabbi and the journal’s editor, explicitly noted his disagreement with Letteris.²¹

Samuel David Luzzatto, a contemporary and colleague of Reggio’s, teacher at the rabbinical college at Padua and Benamozegh’s greatest interlocutor and opponent,²² offered a more complete and harsher critique of Spinoza’s philosophy. In his commentary on the Torah, *ha-Mishtadel*, published in 1846, Luzzatto accused Spinoza of being an entirely unemotional philosopher, devoid of pity and compassion. For him, this personality trait corrupted all of Spinoza’s

¹⁸ Guetta has already stressed the influence of Gioberti on Benamozegh’s thought. See his “Un kabbaliste à l’heure du progrès,” 421-429. See also Boulouque, *Elia Benamozegh*, 80-83.

¹⁹ Elijah Benamozegh, *Israël et l’Humanité : Étude sur le Problème de la Religion Universelle et sa Solution*, (Paris: E. Leroux, 1914), 405. See also *Ibid.*, 354, 525; Boulouque, *Elia Benamozegh*, 80-82.

²⁰ Cristina Santinelli, “Rosmini et Gioberti, lecteurs de Spinoza: Considérations en marge d’une polémique,” in *Spinoza au XIXe siècle: Actes des journées d’études organisées à la Sorbonne les 9 et 16 mars, 23 et 30 novembre 1997*, eds. André Tosel, Pierre-François Moreau, Jean Salem (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2007), 363-76. For an extensive discussion on the reception of Spinoza’s works by modern Italian scholars, see Cristina Santinelli, *Spinoza in Italia: Bibliografia degli Scritti Italiani su Spinoza dal 1675 al 1982*, (Urbino: Università degli Studi di Urbino, 1983).

²¹ Fischel Lachover, *Between Old and New*, (Jerusalem: Bialik Foundation, 1951), 113-114. There is no proof that Benamozegh read Letteris’s article. However, we know that Benamozegh was aware of Reggio’s publications and even printed Haviv Toledano’s pamphlet voicing strident opposition to Reggio’s works. See Haviv Toledano, *Troumat Hakodesh*, (Livorno: Benamozegh & co Press, 1861).

²² Benamozegh published his correspondence with Luzzatto in 1890. See Elijah Benamozegh, *Lettere dirette a S. D. Luzzatto da Elia Benamozegh*, (Livorno: Benamozegh & co Press, 1890).

philosophical work, especially its ethical part. More importantly, for Luzzatto, Spinoza's ethical project stood in direct contradiction to Jewish ethics; hence Spinoza's thought and Judaism were not reconcilable.²³ Notwithstanding, Luzzatto's critique did not succeed in stemming the Haskalah's growing passion for Spinoza. In 1849, Russian *maskil* Senior Sachs provided an important contribution regarding the Jewish roots of Spinoza's thought,²⁴ followed in 1856 by Solomon Rubin's first Hebrew translation of Spinoza's texts.²⁵ With this, the processes within the Haskalah movement of Spinoza's reintegration into Judaism reached a point of no return.²⁶

Background to Benamozegh's Position

In positing a connection between Spinoza and Kabbalah, Benamozegh was preceded by several philosophers, Christian and Jewish alike. For example, in 1699, German philosopher Johann Georg Wachter wrote his *Der Spinozismus im Judenthumb*, arguing that Spinoza was a secret kabbalist whose pernicious influence represented a threat to philosophy. He maintained his claim in a second book, *Elucidarius Calisticus sive Reconditae Hebraeorum Philosophiae Brevis et Succincta Recencio*, published in 1706. A few years later, in 1710, the notion of kabbalistic inspiration for Spinoza's metaphysics was accepted by the great Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in his *Theodicy*.²⁷

²³ Samuel David Luzzatto, *ha-Mishtadel*, (Vienna: Francesco Nobile di Schmid, 1847), Introduction. Cited by Lachover, *ibid.*, 115-117.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 118-120.

²⁵ Solomon Rubin, *Moreh nevukhim he-hadash*, (Vienna: Joseph Haltsvarta Press, 1856).

²⁶ For further developments on Spinoza and Haskalah see: Nahum Sokolow, *Baruch Spinoza and His Time*, (Paris: Voltaire, 1928), 86-99; Meir Seidler, "Baruch Spinoza: The Designer of the Image of Judaism in European Enlightenment" (Hebrew), *Daat* 54 (2004): 20-45; Svetlana Natkovich, "Ben Abuya, Spinoza and Acosta. From Liminal Figures to Exemplary Heroes of Jewish Enlightenment" (Hebrew), *Zehuyot* 2 (2012): 55-71; Elhanan Yakira, "La pensée politique juive face à Spinoza," in *Spinoza au XIXe siècle: Actes des journées d'études organisées à la Sorbonne les 9 et 16 mars, 23 et 30 novembre 1997*, eds. André Tosel, Pierre-François Moreau, Jean Salem (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2007), 473-487.

²⁷ See Henry Walter Brann, "Spinoza and the Kabbalah," in *Spinoza: Context, Sources, and the Early Writings*, ed. Genevieve Lloyd (London: Routledge, 2001), 185-8. See also Miquel Beltrán, *The Influence of Abraham Cohen de Herrera's Kabbalah on Spinoza's Metaphysics*, (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 83-119; Adam Sutcliffe, *Judaism and Enlightenment*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 155-156. Contemporary scholars have specifically stressed that Spinoza was influenced by Abraham Herrera. See Giuseppa Saccaro Del Buffa, "Abraham Cohen Herrera et le jeune Spinoza – entre Kabbale et scolastique: À propos de la création 'ex nihilo,'" *Archives de*

To a lesser extent, a few decades prior to Benamozegh, as part of Spinoza's reintegration into Judaism, some Jewish scholars had already begun to make the connection between Spinoza and Kabbalah. In 1791, during the pantheism controversy mentioned above, Salomon Maimon published a Hebrew commentary on Maimonides's *Guide for the Perplexed* and stated: "In the not too distant past there emerged a Sephardic scholar, Baruch (Benedictus) Spinoza, who shook the world with his deep reflections, far from the popular mind. [...] He agreed with kabbalists on the subject of *tzimtzum*."²⁸ Likewise, Senior Sachs, mentioned above, provided an important contribution regarding the connection between Spinoza and Kabbalah. Following in the footsteps of his pantheist master, Friedrich W. Schelling, and in the context of the rediscovery of Sephardic medieval philosophers, Sachs essayed to create a thread of continuity between Ibn Gabirol, Ibn Ezra, the kabbalists, and Spinoza.²⁹

Benamozegh on Spinoza

In line with this intellectual fermentation around Spinoza's works, especially within the *Haskalah* milieu, Benamozegh composed, in 1864, an entire article about Spinoza's supposed kabbalistic sources – "Spinoza et la Kabbale," published in *l'Univers Israélite*.³⁰ Both Amoroso³¹ and Guetta³² have pointed out the apologetical purpose of this article, through which Benamozegh hoped to

Philosophie 51 (1988): 55-73; Brann, "Spinoza and the Kabbalah," 185-8; Beltrán, *The Influence*; Johan Aanen, "The Kabbalistic Sources of Spinoza," *The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy* 24/2 (2016): 279-99.

²⁸ In Lurianic Kabbalah, *tzimtzum* is a term used to refer to the contraction of God's infinite light during the process of creation, in order to allow for a "conceptual space" in which finite could exist. Maimon probably wished to draw a parallel between the Kabbalistic *tzimtzum* and the pantheism of Spinoza. See his *Giv'at Hamoreh – Commentary on the Guide for the Perplexed*, (Berlin: Officina Scholae Liberae Judaicaem 1791), 100b. In his *Bet Yehudah*, published in 1837, Russian *maskil* Isaac Baer Levinsohn assumed the same comparison between Spinoza and the kabbalist notion of *tzimzum*, but it seems he borrowed it from Maimon without attribution. See: Isaac Baer Levinsohn, *Bet Yehudah* (Vilna: Menahem Man and Simha Zimel edition, 1837), 343-44; cited in Lachover, *Between Old and New*, 111-2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 118-20. Solomon Rubin presented the same view in his pamphlet against Luzzatto. See Solomon Rubin, *Teshuvah nitzahat*, (Lemberg: Stauropigianische Instituts-Druckerei, 1859), 19, note 8.

³⁰ Benamozegh, "Spinoza et la Kabbale." See also Amoroso, *Scintille Ebraiche*, 123-36.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 135-6.

³² Guetta, *Philosophy and Kabbalah*, 38.

defend the supreme importance of Kabbalah and its universal impact. In this article, Benamozegh put forward two main claims concerning the connection between Spinoza and Kabbalah: firstly, that Spinoza was influenced by Kabbalistic sources when he stated that substance thinking and substance extended belong to the same unique substance;³³ and secondly, that Spinoza misunderstood these sources, an error that led him to pantheism.

As support for these claims, Benamozegh focuses first on the note in *Ethics* II, proposition VII:

Before going any further, I wish to recall to mind what has been pointed out above –namely, that whatsoever can be perceived by the infinite intellect as constituting the essence of substance, belongs altogether only to one substance: consequently, substance thinking and substance extended are one and the same substance, comprehended now through one attribute, now through the other. [...] This truth seems to have been dimly recognized by those Jews who maintained that God’s intellect and the things understood by God are identical.³⁴

In this note, Spinoza claims the fundamental unity of all the different attributes, which are basically different understandings of the same unique substance. “What has been pointed out above” alludes to *Ethics* I, proposition 10, where Spinoza demonstrates that attributes are perfectly real and epistemologically independent from one another, and yet, in spite of that, may belong altogether to only one substance. Here, Spinoza himself attributes this explanation to “those Jews” whom Benamozegh identifies as ancient kabbalists.³⁵

According to Benamozegh, Spinoza alludes to three Kabbalistic terms: *Sefer*, *Sofêr* and *Sippur* – literally “book,” “scribe” and “story” – which might respectively correspond to the unique substance, the substance thinking and the substance extended. He writes:³⁶

³³ Spinoza, *Ethics*, II, 7, note.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, II, prop. VII, note.

³⁵ Benamozegh, “Spinoza et la Kabbale,” 134.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 131-2. See also Guetta, *Philosophy and Kabbalah*, 37-8.

It is the Kabbalistic *Sefer* that Spinoza claimed to identify with the indicated supreme substance. Substance thinking and substance extended belong to it and form one substance with the former.³⁷

For Benamozegh, Spinoza's unique substance corresponds to Kabbala's *Sefer* from which the *Sofer* and *Sippur* emerge. In the same way, Benamozegh identifies Spinoza's substance thinking with the kabbalistic concept of *Sofer* but claims that Spinoza misunderstood the true meaning of *Sippur*:

If the kabbalists bestowed upon *Binah*, upon the Kabbalistic *Sippur*, the traits of the extension, it was not in the literal and natural sense of the word, but in a purely metaphorical sense, in order to express the intellectual object, the logical thing. In a word, to express the ideal mater, possessing the same qualities as the corporal mater, the true extension.³⁸

For Benamozegh, the *Sippur* does not correspond to the material extension but only to the idea of extension.³⁹ By conflating the ideal mater with the material one, Spinoza concluded that extended substance belongs to the unique substance and therefore identified God with Nature. Benamozegh was aware that Kabbalistic sources might cause confusion about the union of God and Nature and stated: "their union is closer in this [Kabbalistic] system than it is in any other Hebraic system. So close, that some accuse it of pantheism."⁴⁰ Nevertheless, from his point of view, Kabbalah makes a distinction between them while Spinoza conflated them entirely.⁴¹

To conclude this part, the assumed purpose of "Spinoza et la Kabbale" was to establish Spinoza's Kabbalistic sources in order to enhance the value of the latter. If, on the one hand, the great Dutch philosopher was a kabbalist, one can conclude that all contemporary philosophical systems were indirectly inspired by Kabbalah. On the other hand, by criticizing Spinoza's pantheism and by establishing that Kabbalah was not, in fact, pantheism, Benamozegh paid his dues to the "pantheism controversy" and established the superiority of the Kabbalah over Spinoza's thought. In other words, his basic claim was that all of

³⁷ Benamozegh, "Spinoza et la Kabbale," 132.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 133.

³⁹ Guetta, *Philosophy and Kabbalah*, 37.

⁴⁰ Benamozegh, "Spinoza et la Kabbale," 135.

⁴¹ Amoroso, *Scintille Ebraiche*, 130-1.

Spinoza's "good" thoughts sprang from Kabbalah while all his "bad" thinking ensued from his misinterpretation of it.

The truth is, though, that more than succeeding in demonstrating the influence of the Kabbalah on Spinoza's work, Benamozegh's article reveals the clear Spinozist bias of the author's own understanding of Kabbalah; and particularly his Spinozist conception of the "unique substance," namely God. In the remainder of this essay, this latent bias will be explored. We will see that often without naming him, Benamozegh's conception of the Divine was heavily influenced by Spinoza's philosophy on the nature of the Divine.

Benamozegh's Model of Religious Tolerance

I will begin with a preliminary comment on Benamozegh's translation of Kabbalistic concepts into Spinozist ones. This clearly appears in the following excerpt from his *Israel and Humanity*:

But how could an image be contrived for the unique Being whose infinite attributes are infinite in number, as Spinoza says, or whose ministers and angels are without number, to use the language of the Bible (which expresses, we believe, the same thoughts)?⁴²

Benamozegh is not the first Jewish scholar who tried to explain biblical concepts in a philosophical manner. Great Jewish authorities such as Philo, Saadia Gaon, Maimonides, Gersonides and others preceded him in trying to reconcile the biblical God with Greek philosophy. Nevertheless, his approach is unique in the link he attempts to make between the Bible and an immanent conception of God. This approach is emphasized in the following excerpt from *Israel and Humanity*:

It is a matter of a superior unity, and plurality within that unity, which in no way differentiate Himself from it; a unique God and his attributes, which are to a greater or lesser extent realized in the universe, beings compared one to another, ideas in relation to God who is the Being of

⁴² Elijah Benamozegh, *Israel and Humanity*, (New York: Paulist Press, 1995), 82.

beings, the Consciousness of consciousnesses, who, when He speaks to them, does not leave His own self.⁴³

Here, Benamozegh's discussion of God paraphrases Spinoza's words. God's "plurality within that unity" is parallel to Spinoza's definition of God as "a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality."⁴⁴ The substance by definition is, "in itself and is conceived through itself,"⁴⁵ in the same way that Benamozegh's God "does not leave His own self." Similarly, Benamozegh defines God's attributes as "beings compared to one another," which means that these have their own autonomous reality. Moreover, God, the Perfect One, doesn't "differentiate Himself" from this plurality which composes Him. Similarly, earlier in his text, Benamozegh described God as "the only God, who relies on a wonderful synthesis, the plurality of His attributes."⁴⁶

In light of this Spinozist paradigm, we can now explain both Benamozegh's exegetical approach and his defense against the accusation of heresy, which brings us to his model for the legitimacy of diversity of faiths and worships. In his biblical commentary, Benamozegh tried to reconcile textual criticism and traditional interpretive approaches to the Torah. According to Jewish tradition, the Bible was given by God to humans and is therefore supposed to be perfect. In contrast, textual approaches employ historical and philological tools, which emphasize the sources and mutual influences of biblical texts, as well as the relatability of the Bible to the beliefs held and rituals practiced in the ancient Near East. Nevertheless, rather than questioning biblical authority, Benamozegh proposes to reinterpret the traditional concept of revelation, in order to reconcile it with the claims of biblical criticism.⁴⁷

In the core of his claim, Benamozegh draws a parallel between religious Revelation and the notion of spontaneity of species found in the theory of evolution:

⁴³ Benamozegh, *Israël et l'Humanité*, 183. This text does not appear in the English translation. Cited by Alessandro Guetta, *Philosophy and Kabbalah: Elijah Benamozegh and the Reconciliation of Western Thought and Jewish Esotericism*, translation: Helena Kahan (NY: SUNY Press, 2010), 55.

⁴⁴ Spinoza, *Ethics*, part I, definition VI.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, part I, definition III

⁴⁶ Benamozegh, *Israël et l'Humanité*, 183.

⁴⁷ Regarding this ambitious project, see Guetta, *Philosophy and Kabbalah*, 92-100.

I believe that religious Revelation, as an expression of the spontaneity of the species, as a revelation of the species to the Individual, must contain something that always transcends the sphere of individual reflection, since all that which humanity or the species could reach in its long trajectory of development must have been contained in that germ.⁴⁸

Even during its most primitive period, humanity may have accessed Revelation, not in a cognitive form but in a spontaneous or intuitive one. In other words, according to Benamozegh we should assume that primitive humanity was much more monotheistic than subsequently was the case. Nevertheless, this primitive monotheism was not a reasoned one and was lost when people adopted a more analytical way of thought. The features common to Judaism and polytheism may have their roots in this early period of primitive and universal monotheism.⁴⁹

As noted earlier, Benamozegh's daring approach provoked harsh criticism from the Sages of Aleppo. Among the rabbis' objections was their accusation that Benamozegh placed scientific wisdom on an equal footing with Jewish wisdom, reducing the latter to the level of the former. Moreover, by attributing some biblical customs to pre-Mosaic peoples, Benamozegh contested the divine origins of those customs. Finally, these rabbis alleged that Benamozegh's comparison between some mythological stories and Kabbalah combined the pure and the impure in a sacrilegious manner.⁵⁰

Benamozegh responded to the rabbis of Aleppo in a pamphlet, *Tzori Gilaad*, written in a rabbinical style which was markedly different from the philosophical tone he adopted previously. He did so not only because the Aleppo rabbis did not share his knowledge of modern philosophy, but presumably also because it would have been both ironic and self-defeating to use a European language and quotes from philosophers to defend and prove his total devotion to traditional Judaism. Nevertheless, I maintain that even in this pamphlet, the underlying basis of Benamozegh's approach is a Spinozist one. In Benamozegh's view, philology, history, philosophy, and Kabbalah are different perceptions of the same divine substance. This idea is expressed at the very beginning of his pamphlet:

⁴⁸ Elijah Benamozegh, *Teologia Apologetica e Dogmatica*, (Livorno: Tipografia di F. Vigo, 1877), 268. Cited in Faur, "The Hebrew Species Concept and the Origin of Evolution," 43-66.

⁴⁹ Benamozegh expresses the same idea in his *Israël et l'Humanité*, 122-3, 308.

⁵⁰ Benamozegh, *Tzori Gilaad*, 25. See also Guetta, *Philosophy and Kabbalah*, 88-90.

With regard to the accusation of mixing, I wish to say: who can deny that our Savior, our Rock who gives us our Torah, He is also the creator of the whole world [...]? So how is it possible that God contradicts His own words? Why can't both natural science and divine science live in peace as two sisters? How dare we separate the unity to take away the close relatives [...]?⁵¹

Since everything is related to the same unique substance, Benamozegh rejects the possibility of competition or contradiction between the different wisdoms. Natural and religious sciences often seem to be in conflict, but are really two perceptions of the same substance, two attributes of the same unique God. Benamozegh does not claim that Torah and sciences are epistemically the same, but they are substantially similar. Therefore, one cannot contradict the essence of the other, and they can and should “live in peace as two sisters.”⁵²

Accordingly, since God consists of infinite attributes, no one can claim perfect knowledge of Him or understanding of His will. In the same way, the Torah, which is the Word of God, is “far away from all knowledge and ideas.”⁵³ However, only a person who has “climbed one step after the other”⁵⁴ on the ladder of wisdom can pretend to understand something about God. Moreover, the more divine attributes a person apprehends, the more he or she can hope to perceive the essence of God. This is why knowledge not based on Jewish sources is not only accepted but even required for anyone who wishes to understand the word of God.

Regarding the second and third accusation of similarities between Judaism and pagan rituals,⁵⁵ or between mythology and Kabbalah,⁵⁶ the same Spinozist

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² While Benamozegh formulates this idea in Spinozist fashion, the rejection of the antagonism between rational and revealed wisdoms already had important antecedents among medieval Jewish philosophers. For example, the *mutakallimun*, chief among them Saadia Gaon, proclaimed that Reason and Revelation are supplementary to each other. See Abraham Heschel, “Reason and Revelation in Saadia’s Philosophy,” *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, New Series, 34/4 (1944): 394; see also Colette Sirat, *A History of Jewish Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 15-55.

⁵³ Benamozegh, *Tzori Gilaad*, 26.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ For example, in his commentaries on Genesis 38:19 and 41:55. See Holzman, “Universalism and Nationalism,” 109-10, 112-4.

paradigm leads Benamozegh to oppose two different strands of thought. On the one hand, he rejects the “heretics’ opinion,” namely the higher criticism contesting the divine source of the Mosaic Law.⁵⁷ On the other hand, he opposes Maimonides’ approach,⁵⁸ whereby the Torah condemns every interaction between Judaism and polytheism.⁵⁹ In his letter to the sages of Jerusalem, Benamozegh downplays the radical nature of his approach, and merely cites a number of Talmudic and Kabbalistic sources that clearly assert that some knowledge may be found outside Judaism. Moreover, in his *Israel and Humanity*, he stresses this idea in a philosophical way:

This theological idea leads us to understand the dual aspect of the local God of Palestine and the universal God. The God of Palestine is the One, the source of life in general, the particular contribution of the Semites to the religion of humanity. But He becomes the universal God by virtue of the emanation of His attributes, each of which is personified in a god adapted to each nation. This god is true, so much so that we consider him as a particular aspect of the Divine, who remains in constant relation with the unity that the Jewish faith knows. However, one errs when the link with monotheism, and thus with all the other aspects of the Divine which constitute the different forms of worship among peoples, is broken.⁶⁰

Spinoza stated that God is an absolutely infinite being who is perceived through His attributes. For Benamozegh, these attributes can also be identified with pagan gods or even with YHWH, the Jewish god. Therefore, every Jew and polytheist perceives a different attribute of God; each religion or people perceives

⁵⁶ For example, in his commentary on Genesis 23:6 where he compares Joseph to the Egyptian God Serapis and Abraham to Brahma. See Holzman, “Universalism and Nationalism,” 110-1.

⁵⁷ In his *Israël et l’Humanité*, 118, Benamozegh explicitly attributes this opinion to Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Not a Bible studies scholar, Spencer was rather a prominent sociologist who extended the Darwinian conception of evolution into realms of sociology and ethics. Benamozegh probably refers here to Spencer’s *Principles of Sociology*, which was published in 1876-1896 and translated into French in 1878-1898. See George H. Smith, “Spencer, Herbert (1820–1903),” in *The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism*, ed. Ronald Hamowy, (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2008), 483–5.

⁵⁸ See Maimonides, *The Guide for the Perplexed*, part. III, chap. 30. See also Maimonides, “Laws of Idolatry,” *Mishneh Torah*, 11:1.

⁵⁹ In his *Israël et l’Humanité*, 118, Benamozegh attributes this opinion to Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1693-1755).

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 236.

God in its own particular way and in accordance with its perception.⁶¹ Then, for Benamozegh religious tolerance is a theological idea considering that each faith or religion has some truth. Therefore, rather than combating each other, it follows that contact between different religious groups may be a source of enrichment and mutual exchange, for Jews and gentiles alike.⁶²

Idolatry: Misconception or Heresy?

As we have seen, Benamozegh's model is based on the Spinozist conception of a universal God as the unique substance of the world, who is perceived in His many different attributes by different peoples. These attributes are equivalent to one another, and therefore each person may increase his own knowledge of God through another's knowledge. Up to this point, Benamozegh seems to promote a very radical pluralistic position in which no one can claim complete possession of the truth and no faith can assert its superiority over the other. Benamozegh further adds that a misconception of God can also occur, when one separates the local god from the universal God. Notably, error in faith is not the belief in the pagan gods, but the belief that such a god represents the truth in its totality:

The divine idea in humanity is a light which is refracted through a prism. Each nation reflects one of the rays and Israel stands in the middle: from him [i.e. Israel] the rays irradiate, toward him they converge, therefore he ensures their unity.

But how does the truth differ from error? In taking into account the unity which united all these rays into one beam. Pagans were ignorant of it and therefore they were polytheists. In contrary, Jews preached it and thus preserved monotheism.⁶³

Again, this mild description of the falseness of the belief in pagan gods seems to derive directly from Spinoza's conception of God and His attributes.⁶⁴ People

⁶¹ In his *Israël et l'Humanité*, 125-6, Benamozegh explicitly attributes this idea to Spinoza.

⁶² As Seidler noted it, this claim has no traditional Jewish precedent. See Seidler, "A Nineteenth Century Jewish Attempt at Integrativeness," 15-6.

⁶³ Benamozegh, *Israël et l'Humanité*, 269.

⁶⁴ Maimonides preceded Spinoza in claiming that falsehood has no positive content. See his *Guide for the Perplexed* 1:2; 3:12; 3:13. Since Maimonides and Spinoza share the same view on this subject, either or both could have inspired Benamozegh. See Warren Z. Harvey, "Maimonides

possess a true understanding of the local god, their own conception of the Divine, precisely when this god directly connects to the universal God. In Spinozist terminology, “a true idea must correspond with its ideate.”⁶⁵ But Benamozegh’s real innovation lies in his understanding of falsity or error. Spinoza claims that “there is nothing positive in ideas which causes them to be called false,”⁶⁶ and therefore, “falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge involved in ideas which are fragmentary and confused.”⁶⁷ Similarly, Benamozegh affirms that even in paganism there is no false positive idea, only absence, an imperfect conception of divinity as a whole. In other words, paganism is the consequence of an imperfect perception of the essence of the substance by the intellect.⁶⁸

This line of reasoning leads us to a radical religious conclusion: Benamozegh rejects the concept of religious heresy, since heresy cannot exist in the absence of any positive false ideas. Sometimes humans may be wrong or may have made a mistake, but misconception is not heresy. Reading Kabbalistic sources in accordance with a Spinozist paradigm, Benamozegh constructs a Jewish model of broad religious tolerance: Not only is it possible to learn something from a person with mistaken understanding, but in fact, no one can claim to live entirely free of false understandings. Furthermore, falsehood has no positive content, but is only a lack of knowledge; thus, the very possibility that heresy exists or even can exist is renounced by Benamozegh.

Challenging Rabbinic Authority from Within

Now we can consider the question of authority. The rabbis of Aleppo burned Benamozegh’s books before he could defend himself. From their point of view, the comparison between Torah and the sciences, and between religious and natural laws, was an attack on divine authority. Nevertheless, it seems that history has vindicated Benamozegh. Indeed, after his pamphlet was published, even the most Orthodox rabbis did not think to burn Benamozegh’s books, nor did they deem him unorthodox. In fact, Benamozegh is considered one of the

and Spinoza on the Knowledge of Good and Evil,” *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 22/2 (1978): 167-85.

⁶⁵ Spinoza, *Ethics*, Part. I, axiom 6.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, Part II, prop. 33.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Part II: 49, note.

⁶⁸ See also Boulouque, “Elia Benamozegh,” 343-53.

best defenders of Jewish Orthodoxy in his time.⁶⁹ This is all the more remarkable, given the fact that Benamozegh's theological model in favor of tolerance challenged the existence of any compelling authority on earth, as we saw above.

I want to argue that this acceptance is due not only to the content of Benamozegh's arguments, but also to the form of his answer to the Aleppo rabbis, which ultimately served to convince the Jewish traditional world. Ever since the Talmudic period, spanning the first centuries of the Common Era, controversy has stood at the core of rabbinic tradition. Throughout the centuries, rabbis have engaged in disputes about virtually everything, almost always without resorting to schism or excommunication. According to scholars of Hebrew law, two major elements separate a legitimate legal controversy from an illegitimate one: the attitude towards opponents and the attitude toward the rabbinic institution or tradition.⁷⁰ When Benamozegh chose to answer his Orthodox critics, he emphasized his respect and his desire to remain a part of the Orthodox world. Moreover, even more than the content itself, the redaction of his pamphlet in rabbinic Hebrew, his use of many Talmudic and rabbinic quotes, served to express that his challenge to the rabbinic tradition emerged from an internal point of view, as an Orthodox rabbi, and not as an outsider.

In other words, Benamozegh submitted himself not to traditional dogma but to rabbinical paradigm. Indeed, it was possible for him to contest traditional dogma precisely because he accepted the rabbinical point of view, because he argued as a rabbi rather than as a philosopher. According to the Talmud, the Torah was given to humans,⁷¹ and therefore not God but the rabbis are the legitimate legislators. Thus, one can challenge the concept of divine authority but not rabbinic authority. This human authority does not forbid controversy, but requires the polemist to prove his basic acceptance of the rabbinic tradition through the form of his argumentation.

⁶⁹ As evidence for this claim, it is enough to note that Benamozegh's books are published today in Hebrew by the strictly Orthodox Rabbi Eliyahu Zini.

⁷⁰ Hanina Ben-Menachem, Neil Hecht and Shai Wosner, *Controversy and Dialogue in Halakhic Sources* (Hebrew), Vol. 2, (Boston: The Institute of Jewish Law, Boston University School of Law, 1993), XLV.

⁷¹ Babylonian Talmud, *Baba Metzia*, 59b. See also Ben-Menachem et. al, *Controversy and Dialogue*, 168-9.

Benamozegh and Spinoza differ precisely in this last point. Spinoza argued in favor of a philosophical discourse released from all dogma and religion. When Spinoza criticized the Bible, it was from an external point of view, as a philosopher rather than as a Jew. Correspondingly, when the Jewish community of Amsterdam decided to excommunicate him, Spinoza felt no need to explain himself within the rabbinic paradigm, as Benamozegh did. In adopting this attitude, Spinoza expressed his disinterest in the rabbinic tradition and its continuity. More than his ideas, it was this attitude that the Jewish community found unsupportable, I believe. Over time, Spinoza disappeared from synagogues, while Benamozegh's thought remains profoundly Jewish and still influences even the Orthodox world.

Conclusion

In this paper, I tried to show the significant effect that Spinoza's conception of the Divine had on Benamozegh's thought and writings. For Spinoza, the infinity of attributes is a necessary characteristic of God's nature and all of a substance's attributes themselves are independent realities, which are conceived as substances. Translating Spinoza into Kabbalistic language (while asserting and believing, that Spinoza had essentially translated Kabbalistic beliefs into philosophical language), Benamozegh claimed that there are infinite ways to perceive the divine substance, and these include even other gods and faiths, which Benamozegh describes as different attributes of the same substance.

Once we understand that Benamozegh was reading Kabbalistic sources through Spinozist spectacles, we can understand how and why he succeeded in constructing a model advocating religious tolerance and challenging the traditional concept of heresy, all while using terminology provided by traditional Jewish sources. However, this model for religious tolerance is not the only consequence of Benamozegh's Spinozist understanding of God as a substance composed of infinite attributes. For example, the legal dualism in Benamozegh's thought between Noachism and Hebraism, universal law and particular law, probably ensues from his conception of God, and must be compared to Spinoza's distinction between ceremonial law and divine law.⁷²

⁷² Benamozegh, *Israël et l'Humanité*, 494-5. Benamozegh explicitly attributes his dualism to Spinoza. See also Amoroso, *Scintille Ebraiche*, 85-104 (and especially 98-100). Amoroso emphasizes the connection between Benamozegh's conception of God and his legal dualism.

To conclude, I do not claim that Benamozegh was a convinced Spinozist. On the contrary, as discussed above, he sharply criticized the Dutch philosopher for having been, according to his own understanding, a pantheist.⁷³ Therefore, rather than a philosophical translation of Kabbalistic concepts, for Benamozegh Spinoza's thought was a deviation from the true system of Kabbalah.⁷⁴ But in Benamozegh's world, disagreement does not mean ostracizing the other. Conceivably, for him, some aspects of Spinoza's philosophy are incorrect; but others, such as his understanding of God's attributes, are undoubtedly true and useful in better explaining the universal figure of God of the Kabbalah. It can be concluded that Spinoza is certainly central to the understanding of Benamozegh's argument in favor of religious tolerance; but without a natural inclination to tolerance, Benamozegh would probably never have opened the Dutch philosopher's books. Thus, more than a source of inspiration, Spinoza was a tool for Benamozegh, a framework that enabled him to structure his Kabbalistic thoughts and to translate them into Western philosophical concepts.

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⁷³ Benamozegh concluded his article "Spinoza et la Kabbale" with the following sentence (p. 374): "No, Kabbalah is not the pantheism of Spinoza. It is more and better than the latter. It is its witness, its judge and its condemnation." See also *Israël et l'Humanité*, 120, 155. For more on Spinoza's pantheism, see John Dewey, "The Pantheism of Spinoza," *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, vol. 16/3 (1882): 249-257.

⁷⁴ Benamozegh, *Spinoza et la Kabbale*, 372-4.

Moses and Monotheism as History.
Reading Freud through de Certeau, Barthes and the *Annales* school

by Nethanel Treves

Abstract

*Across Psychoanalysis, Jewish Studies and History, rarely has a single essay raised a debate comparable to the one triggered by Freud's last book *Moses and Monotheism*. The aim of this paper is to explore it once more from the perspective of the rhetoric of the historical discourse. In the first part we will make use of Michel de Certeau's and Roland Barthes' works on the writing of history in order to examine its relation to historiography. We will try to show how Freud undermined the very bases of the discipline questioning its scientific and more positivist character (rather than being questioned by it) and pointing toward trajectories that will be fully undertaken only at a later time. In the second part we will analyze the affinities and the echoes between Freud's methodology and the historiographical revolution accomplished by the French School of the *Annales* in those same years, outlining a pattern of transformation of the discipline prefigured and explored, in their own way, by both Freud and the French historians.*

Freud: Master of Historical Suspicion
Freud a Historian? Of What Kind of History?
Between Historical Fiction and Fictional History
Freud's Discourse
The *Annales* School: a Parallel Movement?
The Psychologization of the Historical Subject(s)
Conflicting Temporalities
Freud and History: Who Questions Whom?

As we can see, simply from looking at its structure and without having to invoke the substance of its content, historical discourse is in its essence a form of ideological elaboration, or to put it more precisely, an imaginary elaboration [...].

Roland Barthes – The Discourse of History

Freud: Master of Historical Suspicion

Among the many things that sanctioned the beginning of the twentieth century we have certainly to include the birth of Psychoanalysis. The new science imposed itself on the public scene as that new space where a promise of salvation could be finally stated in secular terms. Psychoanalysis appeared, in the wake of those religions and ideologies that came before it, as a narrative of redemption that could free the individual from itself. Alongside with such a metahistorical – maybe theological – task, Freud created a set of tools and perspectives that we still use today. His insights changed our very way of thinking and perceiving the world and what happens to us, and therefore reality itself. In a famous work, Paul Ricoeur tried to look at him under a new light: along with Marx and Nietzsche, the French philosopher referred to Freud as a *master of suspicion*. Postulating the existence of other layers beneath our conscious selves, Freud contributed indeed to that movement that was pointing at highlighting the deeper structures of reality. The suspicion he cast over the (literally) *self*-reliant *Belle Epoque* Europe brought about significant upheavals into the very understanding of the surrounding world. Ricoeur points out that the hidden element through which Freud reshuffled our perception casting suspicion onto the previous certainties is the unconscious. In this, we agree, without reservation. However, from a certain point of view, this understanding limits Freud's revolutionary thinking to this, cutting out all those other kinds of disruptive insights that revolve only marginally around Freud's more properly psychoanalytical work and that go far beyond the sole realm of individual consciousness.

The argument we will try to put forward here is that Ricoeur was right, but to a greater extent than he believed. The turmoil Freud triggered into previous ways of thinking will be thus explored from different angles: we will focus on his last

published work – *Moses and Monotheism*¹ – and look at the Freud that emerges from it as a historian in order to see what this might entail for historiography itself.

A disclaimer is due in approaching this work. *Moses and Monotheism*, as we are soon going to see, is a text composed of multiple layers, an outcome of tormented writing and with a troubled publishing history. Therefore, it constitutes a powerful prism to investigate a wide range of aspects connected to Freud's last years. Notwithstanding an initial scarce fortune and a skeptical critical reception after being published, Freud's *Moses* became increasingly popular among scholars, witnessing a real explosion of interest around the 1990s.² Extensive readings of *Moses* triggered a fertile dialectical relationship between this book and Freud's biography: the book is continuously reinterpreted through new insights on its author's life and, *vice versa*, new understandings of Freud's life are reached through new readings of this text. We are not going to tackle here the main debates displayed upon and through the *Moses* book, for which we refer to the many studies already available.³ Nor we

¹ Sigmund Freud, *Moses and Monotheism*, trans. Katherine Jones (London: Hogarth Press, 1939). The original German version appeared in 1939 with the title *Der Mann Moses und die Monotheistische Religion*. Although Jones' translation, more literal and probably closer to the author's spirit, was reviewed and approved by Freud himself, the version included in the *Standard Edition* has been retranslated under the editorship of James Strachey.

² Ruthless are the attacks moved to Freud by Trude Weiss Rosmarin and Abraham Shalom Yahuda, both important biblical scholars. The latter even begged him not to publish the book. See Ernest Jones, *Sigmund Freud: Life and Work. The Last Phase 1919-1939*, (London: Hogarth Press, 1957), 250, 396; Peter Gay, *Freud: A Life for Our Time*, (New York – London: Norton, 1988), 645-6.

³ We are pointing here, for instance, to the important discussions of Freud's own Jewishness (Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, Marthe Robert, Peter Gay) and of the ties of this work to the rise of anti-Semitism (Sander L. Gilman, Daniel Boyarin), to the attempt to position it within previous streams and traditions (Jan Assmann), to the endeavor to "psychoanalyze the psychoanalyst" (Ilse Grubrich-Simitis), to the evaluation of the contribution of this essay to psychoanalytic theory in general (Richard J. Bernstein, Cathy Caruth) and to the investigation on the actual truthfulness of Freud's historical claims (Pier Cesare Bori). Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, *Freud's Moses: Judaism Terminate and Interminable*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Marthe Robert, *From Oedipus to Moses: Freud's Jewish Identity*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1976); Peter Gay, *A Godless Jew: Freud, Atheism, and the Making of Psychoanalysis*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Sander L. Gilman, *Freud, Race, and Gender*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Daniel Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Jan Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, "Freud Study of Moses

are going to attempt a deepening of the several biographical accounts of the father of Psychoanalysis.⁴ Most of the riddles posed by the *Moses* book have been framed as questions on Freud's own reasons to write, on the causes of his insecurity and on the background of its production. Inverting such a perspective, our goal is rather that of casting a gaze on the odd feeling caused in the *reader* of *Moses and Monotheism*.⁵ In the first part, therefore, we are going to analyze the most (post)modern aspects and implicit suggestions of this text in light of Michel de Certeau's and Roland Barthes' works on the writing of history and on the historical narrative. After a brief exploration of his peculiar way of addressing the past, we will argue that Freud, exposing maybe to an excessive extent various inner principles of historiography, makes inescapable some considerations echoing the outcome of the postmodern debate on the historical practice. Then, in the second part of the paper, there will be an attempt to compare the peculiar method adopted by Freud in *Moses* to some coeval historiographical discourses, exploring the efforts to face theoretically some of the aporetic aspects of the writing of history identified by Freud.

To reread Freud's writings through the lenses of authors who wrote more than thirty years later and from a very different context (such as France in the '60s and '70s) might appear as an anachronistic venture. Yet, it might be useful to

as a Daydream: a biographical essay," in *Early Freud and Late Freud: Reading Anew Studies on Hysteria and Moses and Monotheism*, trans. Philip Slotkin (London – New York: Routledge, 1997 [1991]); Richard J. Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative and History*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Pier Cesare Bori, *È una storia vera: le tesi storiche dell'Uomo Mosè e la religione monoteistica di Sigmund Freud*, (Rome: Castelvecchi, 2015).

⁴ Aside from Jones' first important comprehensive study and Gay's well-known biographical work, an updated and balanced portray of Freud is offered by Élisabeth Roudinesco, *Freud in his time and ours*, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 2016). Quite unconventional, and original, is the volume of Adam Philips, *Becoming Freud: The Making of a Psychoanalyst*, (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 2014). For an external (and critical) appraisal on the general role of psychoanalysis in early twentieth century Europe, its promise of salvation and its relation to other modern "grand narratives" see Ernest Gellner, *The Psychoanalytic Movement: The Cunning of Unreason*, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003 [1985]).

⁵ This is why there will be almost no reference to Freud's Vienna, to the rise of Nazism and its threat to Psychoanalysis or to the author's inner tribulations in giving birth to the *Moses* book, all of which we believe are indispensable elements to reach a full understanding of Freud's last production but lie outside of the focus of this work. Good accounts can be found in the volumes mentioned in the footnotes above or, for as much as it concerns Vienna, in the well known Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-siècle Vienna*, (New York: Random House, 1981).

decentralize a gaze often focused on other aspects of this work. Both Barthes and de Certeau, with different timings, took part in a debate on the nature, the modes and the techniques of historiography arisen between structuralism and post-structuralism and later subsumed by the so-called postmodern reflection. These discussions shook and reshaped historiography and the writing of history to an unprecedented extent and, in a sense, let the discipline escape some previous naivety. The French debate, to which other important voices took part as Paul Ricoeur himself or Michel Foucault, was at some point overshadowed in the English-speaking world by the publication of Hayden White's *Metahistory* (1973), the arise of the so-called linguistic turn and the quarrel of narrativism.⁶ A new historiographical consciousness supposedly derived from these discussions, fostering and informing – for good or ill – the profile of many historical approaches born and developed thereafter.⁷ Often, as it will be seen, de Certeau and Barthes seem to address a kind of historiography and a type of historian which are not fully understandable without delving into their context and grasping the polemical tone they adopt. What is, then, the reason for retaining such terms of the discussion? We are not interested in praising Freud as a postmodernist *avant la lettre*, as a focus on his “historical narrative” might too easily lead to do, on the contrary, we would like to adopt that point of view and those analytical tools in order to examine the sense of oddity that Freud's *Moses* book still provokes today. In a sense, we believe that the historian targeted by the two authors never totally vanished, and maybe, inasmuch as he “still creeps” into contemporary ways of writing – and conceiving – history, the awkwardness we stumble upon reading *Moses and Monotheism* is due to him.

⁶ Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, (Baltimore – London: John Hopkins University Press, 1973). Franklin R. Ankersmit, *Narrative Logic. A Semantic Analysis of the Historian's Language*, (Boston – London – The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983). For a criticism of White's theory of history (and of the general intellectual wave he embodied at some point), see Carlo Ginzburg, “Just One Witness,” in *Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the “Final Solution,”* ed. Saul Friedlander (Cambridge, MA – London: Harvard University Press, 1992).

⁷ For instance, in marking the distance of *Microhistory* from White's and Ankersmit's radical skepticism, Carlo Ginzburg implicitly acknowledges to owe to that discussion the “definite awareness that all the phases through which research unfolds are *constructed* and not *given*: the identification of the object and its importance; the elaboration of the categories through which it is analyzed; the criteria of proof; the stylistic and narrative forms by which the results are transmitted to the reader.” Carlo Ginzburg, *Threads and Traces: True, False, Fictive*, trans. Anne C. Tedeschi and John Tedeschi (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012 [2006]), 212.

Freud's *Moses* book is many books together: it is a quest for the origins of religions, it is a text concerning psychoanalysis, it is an answer to (or an internalization of) anti-Semitism, and maybe it is also a book about history and historiography. Here, we will try to focus on this last hypothesis, attempting – in light of the insights given us by these and parallel debates – to trace a historiographical phenomenology of Freud's last masterpiece.

Freud a Historian? Of What Kind of History?

The first question we should ask before delving into our subject concerns the degree to which we are allowed to actually consider Freud a historian. We would like here to deal with this issue in particular for the *Moses* book, rather than in general for Freud. Proper investigations have been made concerning the latter and comprehensive overviews for an understanding of the value of Psychoanalysis for historians are already available.⁸ Yet, this question in the case of the *Moses* becomes more difficult. As a first move into the topic it is useful to understand the problems that would arise (and that have been raised) in doing so.

Moses and Monotheism is a problematic work by countless aspects. On a first concrete level, as Edward Said reminds us, “[*Moses and Monotheism*] is a composite of several texts, numerous intentions, different periods,”⁹ and therefore – he adds – it represents a paradigmatic example of *late style*: a work written by the author apparently more for himself rather than for some future

⁸ For instance, Peter Gay's *Freud for historians* advocates for the possibility of including Psychoanalysis into the toolbox of historiography. Although his effort aims at getting the two disciplines closer and more familiar to each other, he strengthens the difference between them. Imagining a fortress made up by “six concentric rings of intellectual fortifications mobilized against the Freudian assault” and the “historian [who] nervously awaits the invader” (4), throughout his work Gay accompanies Freud and Psychoanalysis in breaking into each one of them, showing its usefulness and its compatibility with history. Psychoanalysis – this is his conclusion – “should enrich, without disturbing” (210) history as many other disciplines. No matter how much we can agree with his general exhortations and specific remarks, we would like to suggest (and work with) a different idea of Freud's work: neither an invader army nor a toolbox, but a doubt germ, that comes from inside rather than from outside. Inviting them to cooperate, Gay actually sanctions the difference and the distance between history and what Freud does, differently, we aim at showing the analogies and the porosity between the two. Peter Gay, *Freud For Historians*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

⁹ Edward W. Said, *Freud and the Non-European*, (New York: Verso, 2004), 27 ff.

readers in which, instead of reconciling himself and his lifelong work in a recapitulatory text, he chooses to bristle and to provoke for one last time. Michel de Certeau, in a sense, foreran such a view stating that *Moses* cannot be seen as an organic work, but only as “a discourse of fragments.”¹⁰ In such a confusion – in which many got caught by ending up in seeking more Freud’s own reasons to write than his results – what can be said of *Moses and Monotheism* as a historiographical work?

At first sight, the *Moses* book really seems a collage of thoughts, erudition, and speculations. The central *clarification* [*Aufklärung*] Freud is attempting at seems to resolve itself, rather than in an unravelment of the questioned issue, in a continuous correction, in a polished self-justification, in a step-to-step elucidation and in an explanation of his own method: a *meta*-clarification. The crux at stake that originates such impression is exactly the feeling that, if we are to consider *Moses* a historical work, there is an overwhelming predominance of speculative thinking and inductive reasoning at the expense of *proofs*, *sources* and *documents*, the traditional basic touchstones through which the writing of history is possible.

One of the main representative figures of this debate is certainly Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi. In his famous work on Freud’s text, he saw a discontinuity between *Moses* and his previous *Totem and Taboo*¹¹ articulated exactly on the problem of historicity. If in the latter, he says, “the pivotal event it presupposes [the murder of the primeval father] does not really take place in historical time” but in the “dreamtime of mankind,” what happens in the former is radically different. Indeed, in *Moses* there is an actual historiographical attitude that according to Yerushalmi is proved by the “historian’s insistent demand for historical proofs.” What Freud is trying to do – he goes on – aims at “corroborat[ing] a

¹⁰ Michel de Certeau, *The Writing of History*, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988 [1975]), 311.

¹¹ Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, trans. James Strachey (London – New York: Routledge, 2001 [1913]). Yerushalmi is obviously referring to its fourth chapter, called “The Return of Totemism in Childhood,” where Freud first presents his theory on the origins of civilization tracing the arise of the incest taboo in the murder of the primeval father by the brothers’ horde (which he takes up from Darwin). The law of exogamy, seen by Freud as pivotal in all human societies, would have derived then from the brothers’ sense of guilt and their consequential “deferred obedience” to the killed parent. *Ibid.*, 166 ff.

psychoanalytically derived truth with historical facts.”¹² De Certeau, from a different perspective, highlighted how

Too great a lack of scholarly credibility keeps him from publishing the work. Freud needs historical proofs, not in order to be convinced – he is already convinced enough without them – but in order to arm the “weakness” of his myth before producing it on foreign ground, in the field of history.¹³

De Certeau’s interpretation does not go as far in this direction as for example does Richard Bernstein, who similarly stresses the mythical and fantastic aspects of *Moses’* story.¹⁴ What is suggested by de Certeau, one of the authors that tried to face such a question more completely, is that such a fragmentary nature does not mirror a *failure* in the writing of history, but exactly the opposite: the polysemy of what he sees as a “vocal text” points to a way of doing history in which the past stops to be objectified and severed from the present. In *The Writing of History*, indeed, one of de Certeau’s major goals is to analyze the dynamics of power beneath the writing of history. He starts his text with an account on how the historian’s relation with the past and with the dead can be represented as what it might be called a “unilateral intimacy.” The past is objectified, studied and anatomized in the same manner in which modern medicine treats its object-bodies. Yet, “[t]hese ghosts” – remarks de Certeau speaking about the dead – “find access through *writing* on the condition that they remain *forever silent*.”¹⁵ The past is made accessible *through* its silence. The kind of cleavage that occurs between the *utterer* and the *uttered* of history, between the present and the past, is the fracture the historian seeks in order to create the very possibility of an identity, and it is rooted precisely in his “*decision* to become different.”¹⁶ The Otherness embodied by the past is not just *sought* by a historian-adventurer, but it is created as *radically different*. Such a division inevitably generates historicist perspectives, where the absence of something

¹² Yerushalmi, *Freud’s Moses*, 21. A similar opinion is held by Pier Cesare Bori and David Meghnagi. See Pier Cesare Bori, “Una pagina inedita di Freud: la premessa al romanzo storico su Mosè,” in *L’estasi del profeta ed altri saggi tra ebraismo e cristianesimo*, (Bologna: il Mulino, 1989 [1979]), 256; David Meghnagi, *Il padre e la legge: Freud e l’ebraismo*, (Venice: Marsilio, 1997 [1992]), 104.

¹³ De Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 310.

¹⁴ Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses*, 64-74.

¹⁵ De Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 4.

shared between the self and the other, between the present and the past, undermines any hypothesis of continuity.

In this respect, Freud's work appears as something *exceptional*, literally, in the sense that it constitutes an *exception*. It is not by chance if de Certeau chooses exactly this awkward text to speak of the production of history. Freud's complexity (in both the positive and the negative meaning of the word) yields to a kind of historiography absolutely different from the operation just described. De Certeau locates Freud at the edge of the very history he analyzes. However, he cannot be interpreted as simply the umpteenth *Aufklärer*-concealer of a clearer past, as the producer of a new narrative to be imposed upon his forerunners' ones. The polyphony of *Moses* constitutes, according to de Certeau, exactly that characteristic able to qualify Freud's work as something disruptive. The fragmentary nature, the "*late-styleness*" of this text does not allow the very possibility of a historical referent whereas this is understood as a dead body: in other words, de Certeau notices the disappearance of the *res gestae* in the very articulation of the *historia rerum gestarum*.

We see in the conclusions drawn by de Certeau along this interpretative line the echo in the realm of history of what Said read more recently in the terms of the political. In his lecture *Freud and the Non-European*, maybe in a slightly stretched and reductive reading of Freud's text, Said seizes a similar outcome as its most important teaching. Through the application of his *contrapuntal* method, Said juxtaposes *Moses* to other voices making the contrast emerge clearly. First, he highlights, against Yerushalmi's simplistic reading of a positive "Jewish Jewishness," the complex and unresolved model of identity paradigmatically outlined in the very figure of the man Moses. In Said's view, Yerushalmi jumps too hastily to conclusions about what has been "historically Jewish" and what has not. "Freud himself doesn't actually reach [these conclusions] because [...] the actual Jewishness that derives from Moses is a far from open-and-shut matter, and is in fact extremely problematic."¹⁷ Yerushalmi appears then to him "far more anxious than Freud to scrape away all traces of monotheism from Egypt," characterizing therefore the new monotheistic

¹⁷ Said, *Freud and the Non-European*, 32. The polemic between Yerushalmi and Said went on also by other means. After the Freud Museum chose to publish Said's lecture, Yerushalmi, who was among its main financial supporters, called the museum complaining and asking if they were aware that Said was recently portrayed throwing stones against Israeli soldiers. See Michael Molnar, "Le Freud de Yosef," in *L'histoire et la mémoire de l'histoire: Hommage à Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi*, ed. Sylvie-Anne Goldberg (Paris: Albin Michel, 2012), 159-60.

religion as something distinctly Jewish.¹⁸ Secondly, Said compares Freud's work to Israel's attempt to consolidate an official Israeli-Jewish identity through the archaeological effort to find material proofs of a Jewish presence in Palestine.¹⁹ To the contrary, "in excavating the archeology of Jewish identity, Freud insisted that it did not begin with itself but, rather, with other identities (Egyptian and Arabian) which his demonstration in *Moses and Monotheism* goes a great distance to discover, and thus to restore to scrutiny."²⁰ The breakage postulated by de Certeau in the first pages of his work, in Freud, is then mended. Or better, internalized in the very subject of historiography. To quote at length directly his words:

An oxymoron puts together two contradictory poles, the Jew and the Egyptian. But it thus interiorizes the division that until then had been a "distinction" in respect to others. [...] For Freud, this break is always internal, cleaving the subject himself. It annihilates the self-identity that had been acquired through the elimination of a "remainder." And since the question is posed in terms of a historical foundation, this annihilation must be inscribed at the origin, namely, in the murder of Moses. Identity is not one, but two. *One and the other*. In the beginning, there is the plural. Such is the principle of writing, of analysis (which is division, decomposition), and of history.²¹

The consequence of this is twofold and contradictory, and it sends us back to our initial question. On the one hand Freud's move appears to stage a rupture with the historiographical attitude described by de Certeau. *There is an interruption of the interruption*. The past is no longer objectified in a dead body to handle and inspect and examine and measure. It becomes part of us: "the Freudian fiction does not lend itself to this spatial distinction of historiography in which

¹⁸ Said, *Freud and the Non-European*, 33. Another interesting reflection about Yerushalmi's attitude toward Freud's Jewishness is offered by Jacques Derrida. In *Archive Fever*, first published in 1995, Derrida describes the father-like behavior of Yerushalmi recalling his son (Freud) to some Jewish identity. This happens especially in the last chapter of his book, entitled "Monologue with Freud," where he uses the pronoun "we" speaking of the them as Jews, and "because he is dead and thus incapable of responding, Freud can only acquiesce. He cannot refuse this community at once proposed and imposed. He can only say 'yes' to this covenant." Jacques Derrida, *Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression*, trans. Eric Prenowitz (Chicago – London: University of Chicago Press 1998 [1995]), 41.

¹⁹ Said, *Freud and the Non-European*, 43 ff.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 44.

²¹ De Certeau, *The Writing of History*, 314.

the subject of knowledge is given a place, the ‘present’, separate from the site of his or her object, which in turn would be defined as ‘past’. *Here, past and present are moving in the same polyvalent space.*”²² On the other hand, Freud still thinks on such a terrain, maybe even suggesting a new way of doing history. “The word remains – ‘history’ or ‘Moses’ – but the thing is split, and its fragments come and go in a general rearrangement, reiterating the ‘de-fiction’ generating fiction.”²³

Between Historical Fiction and Fictional History

De Certeau defines *Moses*, in reason of its peculiar character, a work that could not avoid to be “situated [but] at the intersection of history and fiction.”²⁴ But what does it mean to be at such an intersection? And most importantly, what did it mean for Freud himself to write history in such a way? In 1934, in the preface of the first draft of *Moses*, never included in the final version of the book and published for the first time only in 1979, Freud showed to be already perfectly conscious of the hybrid nature of his work:

As the sexual union of horse and donkey produces two different hybrids, the mule and the hinny, so the mixture of historical writing and fiction gives rise to different products which, under the common designated condition of “historical novel,” sometimes want to be appreciated as history, sometimes as novel. For some of them deal with people and events that are historically familiar and whose characteristics they aim to reproduce faithfully. They derive their interest, in fact, from history, but their intent is that of the novel; they want to affect the emotions. Others among these literary creations function in quite the opposite way. They do not hesitate to invent persons and even events in order to describe the special character of a period, but first and foremost they aspire to historical truth despite the admitted fiction. Others even manage to a large extent in reconciling the demands of artistic creations with those of historical fidelity. How much fiction, contrary to the intentions of the historian, still creeps into his presentation, requires little further comment.²⁵

²² *Ibid.*, 312. Italics added.

²³ *Ibid.*, 316.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 308.

²⁵ Freud quoted (and translated) in Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi, “Freud on the ‘Historical Novel’”: From the Manuscript Draft (1934) of *Moses and Monotheism*,” *International Journal of Psycho-*

Freud is trying here to distance himself and his work from three of the many forms the mixture of a historical novel can generate: first, a novel that makes use of history as its prime material; second, accounts that aim at reaching the *historical truth* despite, and through, their fictional elements. The third might raise some questions: what does it mean to *reconcile the demands of artistic creations with those of historical fidelity*? The movement can be understood in both directions. If when Freud is speaking of “demands of artistic creation” he is referring to an aesthetic criteria, this third case could be referring to the attempt of fitting some *harmony* into the work of history, or of *finding* this harmony in the actual *res gestae*. It is the shift of history toward fiction. On the other hand, if we read differently this expression we might stress more the element of the *creation*. Along this interpretation, what Freud is dismissing is exactly one of the common receptions of his *Moses*, that of being a *fictional creation*. It does not really matter if such a creation actually aims at the representation of the past or not. “[C]ontrary to the intentions of the historian,” he goes on, fiction still *creeps* into his work. It is the shift of fiction toward history.

To explain why then he wanted to adopt this caption, Freud himself overtly admits the great difficulty of his task: the absence of any reliable *source*. To overcome this problem

one undertakes to treat each possibility in the text as a clue, and to fill the gap between one fragment and another according to the law, so to speak, of least resistance, that is – to give preference to the assumption that has the greatest probability. That which one can obtain by means of this technique can also be called a kind of “historical novel,” since it has no proven reality, or only an unconfirmable one, for even the greatest probability does not necessarily correspond to the truth.²⁶

Proceeding by imagining, by agreeing upon the highest probability [*Wahrscheinlich*] and relying on it to move forward, it is a mode of investigation of the unknown more often associated with biblical scholarship than with

Analysis 70 (1989): 375-95, 379. Yerushalmi is aware of Bori’s previous published study on the same manuscript, which he mentions. See Bori, “Una pagina inedita di Freud,” 245 ff. Also Grubrich-Simitis had the chance to work extensively on the original document, cf. Ilse Grubrich-Simitis, *Back to Freud’s Texts: Making Silent Documents Speak*, trans. Philip Slotkin (New Haven – London: Yale University Press, 1996), 93-203.

²⁶ Yerushalmi, “Freud on the ‘Historical Novel,’” 379.

historiography. To which extent, then, is Freud doing something different from that? Are his assertions, after all, something else than biblical *conjectures*? Pier Cesare Bori, one of the first scholars who had the chance to study the preface original manuscript, taking into account the biblical scholarship known and read by Freud, observes that the latter actually mastered the works of several great scholars of the Bible of his time, many of whom are indeed quoted and mentioned within the three essays.²⁷ However – he continues – Freud seems to be familiar biblical exegesis but not to “practice” it. Bori points out three orders of reasons: first, he doesn’t feel confident enough in using those analytical tools; second, he is quite skeptical toward the apologetic attitude underlying the writings of many of such authors; third, he is impatient to find in Moses’ story a *historical confirmation* of the general schema outlined in *Totem and Taboo*. Therefore, despite the abundance and recurrence of the mosaic theme in biblical literature (and its great influence on him), Freud turns much more willingly to ethnography rather than to theology.²⁸ In light of these remarks, *Moses and Monotheism* can hardly be understood as a work of biblical scholarship, no matter how much the shared attitude toward conjecture could link it to that tradition.²⁹ Bori concludes that the reason Freud dismissed the preface from the published version of the book had to do with this: he wanted to produce a *purely historical study* [*rein historische Studie*].³⁰

²⁷ Bori believes that Freud restrained himself from quoting too much and too extensively from these sources because that would have compromised the agility of the essay-form. Considering Freud’s effort, and his anxiety, to find more proofs and new confirmations, we can hardly agree with this remark. Pier Cesare Bori, “Il Mosè di Freud: per una prima valutazione storico-critica” [1976], in *L’estasi del profeta*, 192.

²⁸ Pier Cesare Bori, “Materiale storico-religioso nella biblioteca di Sigmund Freud: alcuni rilievi sul catalogo” [1975], in *L’estasi del profeta*, 228.

²⁹ See also Bori, “Il Mosè di Freud,” 192. Within the *Moses* book, Freud himself is also very clear on this point. We quote him at length: “No probability, however seductive, can protect us from error; even if all parts of a problem seem to fit together like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, one has to remember that the probable need not necessarily be the truth and the truth not always probable. And, lastly, *it is not attractive to be classed with the scholastics and talmudists who are satisfied to exercise their ingenuity unconcerned how far removed their conclusions may be from the truth*” [italics added]. Freud, *Moses*, 29-30. On Freud’s relation with the Bible see also Grubrich-Simitis, “Freud Study of Moses as a Daydream,” 85-6; Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses*, 14.

³⁰ Bori, “Una pagina inedita di Freud,” 258. Of the same mind is Grubrich-Simitis who, perusing the book and the original manuscripts, concludes too that at the end “Freud acted more like a conventional historian than a creative writer.” Grubrich-Simitis, *Back to Freud’s Texts*, 194.

In the quoted passage of the 1934 preface Freud seems to seize some of the most recent perspectives reached by the field of historiography.³¹ There is no qualitative difference, indeed, between *filling the gaps* in the way Freud reluctantly feels constrained to do and the modern conception of the *historical imagination* underlying the production of *any* historical text. In a sense, the historian's position is that of the puzzle player: he wants to observe the entire picture but before he needs to connect all the pieces. Some pieces miss, and the best he can do is to *imagine* what the contribution of the image on those pieces to the whole picture could have been. "The line between inference and imagination is normally and regularly crossed by the historian. The act of historical re-creation means picturing the linkage possibilities in the past. The peculiar form that the picturing of links takes is the figurative narrative."³²

The flaw of *Moses*, from this point of view, does not appear anymore that of being a *speculation* in opposition of a *solid work* relying on *solid sources*. If on the one hand we do give credit to Yerushalmi's remark on Freud's apprehension to find historical sources, on the other hand also those actual sources, secondary ones, that Freud was aware of and did not mention or rely on are meaningful. Jan Assmann, trying to articulate an image of that *paradigm of memory* that preceded modern historiography, highlights how the amount of materials precisely about Moses and Egypt was already quite considerable at Freud's time. Moreover, it is worth noting how part of this material pointed to the same arguments Freud was making. Quoting Assmann: "[t]he Classical sources agree that circumcision originated with Egyptians and Ethiopians."³³ Despite "[h]e knew of the Greek and Latin sources which described Moses as an Egyptian, [...] he never mentions them in his book."³⁴ To stay within the metaphor adopted above, Freud consciously chose not to cast into the empty spots of the picture puzzle pieces coming from a different set, or that could have actually *qualitatively* changed the nature of his operation. He consciously aimed at a scientific paradigm.³⁵

³¹ We shall notice that, even if the preface is left unpublished and the draft rewritten and reworked, such a mode of proceeding "still creeps into his presentation." More than that, often some statements seem to have been even boldened in the published text. See Grubrich-Simitis, "Freud Study of Moses as a Daydream," 101-103.

³² Art. *Historical imagination*, in *Routledge Companion to Historical Studies*, ed. Alan Munslow (London: Routledge 2000), 124.

³³ Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian*, 154.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 145.

³⁵ To introduce the puzzle metaphor [*Zusammenlegspiel*] it is actually Freud himself. Freud, *Moses*, 30.

To be clear, the core of our argument is not that Freud was doing history, but on the contrary that the actual practice of doing history is not that far from what Freud did. Both de Certeau and our analysis of Freud's filling the gaps as an act of historical imagination point at what he himself somehow foresaw already, and chose not to tell to avoid confusion and misunderstandings: the intrinsic connection between the novel-form and the history-form. Ahead of its time, this insight impressively portends some later attempts to look at the historical text from such a perspective whose language and theoretical horizon, of course, were not there yet.

De Certeau's discussion led us in the direction of a complete reformulation of the very concept of historiographical work. To properly understand the spirit of this move it is important to locate such an attempt in the context that gave birth to it. *The Writing of History* has been published in France for the first time in 1975 and belongs, as we said, to that broad set of works attempting, in the wake of structuralism and post-structuralism, to *rethink* history. De Certeau's reflection concerns the historian's task, precisely, the *writing of history*, the aspects of its production. On the other side of the historical text we find the reader of history, whose encounter with the historical text does not consist in its *production*, but rather in the interpretation and the reception of its narrative. What kind of history are we then able to read in *Moses and Monotheism* from the point of view of the *historical narrative*?

Freud's Discourse

Another author who contributed to the same endeavor to rethink history, even if on a different level of analysis, is certainly Roland Barthes. In *The Discourse of History*, originally published in 1967, he boldly argued that the very constitutive structures of the historical narrative resemble those of classic fiction.³⁶ Today, in retrospect, we can better understand the value of this text as that of a provocation. Nevertheless, whether it meant to stretch the perspective or not, it lends us an important lens to compare Freud's awkward creature to what we actually think of when we speak of a historical work, and therefore to measure its possible distance from it. More than that, if we keep understanding *Moses and*

³⁶ Roland Barthes, "The Discourse of History," in *Comparative Criticism: A yearbook*, 3, ed. E. S. Shaffer, trans. Stephen Bann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981 [1967]).

Monotheism as a work at the crossroad between history and fiction, a work that from a certain point of view contributes to bridge the conceptual gap between the two, *Moses* and Barthes' piece appear to be aiming at the same order of arguments.

Barthes' overtly admitted purpose is to attempt a *linguistic description of discourse*. In this perspective, his first move is to borrow from Roman Jakobson the concept of *shifters* to explore the continuous "transition from the utterance itself to the act of uttering"³⁷ and *vice versa*. Shifters are those explicit signs that allow the reader to see how and where the discourse is actually organized. It is unnecessary to highlight the astonishing amount of mechanisms of this kind in Freud's *Moses*, in which the reader is accompanied throughout all the author's choices, all his doubts and his attempts. In his work, Barthes tries to decompose the facade of absolute exactitude that shines from the historian's text. With Freud this seems to become superfluous. *Moses and Monotheism* is indeed often defined as *redundant*,³⁸ but it is worth distinguishing two aspects of such a characteristic. On the one hand, to be sure, there is a redundancy in the *content*: the story outlined throughout the text is relentlessly repeated, resumed, summarized, abridged, sketched and schematized, along with the plot already elaborated in *Totem and Taboo*. Maliciously, we might even observe that it looks like an attempt to make the reader (as himself) familiarize with it and naturalize it. On the other hand, more importantly here, there is a certain redundancy of the *form*.³⁹ What disturbs in *Moses* is Freud's incessant coming back on the issues of method. A certain "invasiveness" of the author in his text – an annoying one – can be perceived beyond the several prefaces and introductory remarks spread all over it. What actually bothers are all the notes of method underlined by Freud himself, his explicitations, his admissions. A first critique of *Moses* can be found within the book itself.⁴⁰ In Barthes' own terms, what is overwhelming, and what contributes substantially to the feeling of redundancy that most of the readers have, are the endless *shifters* between the utterance – the

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 7.

³⁸ This is the main characteristic of that "oddly flawed structure" we are told of in Grubrich-Simitis, "Freud Study of Moses as a Daydream," 101-3. See also Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses*, 11.

³⁹ Regardless of the content, many scholars are struck specifically by this anomaly of the *form*, especially in consideration of Freud's normal textual "harmonious structure." Grubrich-Simitis, "Freud Study of Moses as a Daydream," 55-6.

⁴⁰ Part of Freud's hesitation in publishing the book, after all, derives from the fact that he himself recognizes how it "could not stand up to his own criticism." See Grubrich-Simitis, *Back to Freud's Texts*, 196; Bori, "Il Mosè di Freud," 181.

actual story – and the act of uttering: those places, copious and vast, in which the author insists on his own speaking, and through which he organizes the narration of the story. For instance, consider the several times Freud seems to choose to block himself – and the reader – from proceeding, just to begin again enthusiastically the page after.⁴¹

Barthes' argument is that the usual reluctance of the author from appearing directly into his discourse consists in a "systematic deficiency of any form of sign referring to the sender of the historical message." The issue is raised by the fact that "history seems to be telling itself all on its own."⁴² The substitution operated in such a case is that – writes Barthes – of the "emotional persona" with an "objective persona." Freud is not acting any swap of this kind. The author emerging as a function of the text, to stay within Barthes' terminology, is not an objective speaker, a scientist deprived of feelings. The very beginning of the first essay – "To deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of its sons is not a deed to be undertaken light-heartedly – especially by one belonging to that people" – suggests a personal involvement in the topic, not just because of the *heart* necessary to put forward such an argument, but also, and especially, because Freud himself is speaking as a Jew.⁴³ The fact that in the next sentence he pretends to overcome such ties does nothing but corroborate our thesis: instead of omitting and concealing the mechanisms underlying the historiographical production (in this case, the *placement* of the author), he constantly puts forward disturbing contrasts, revealing what is usually kept implicit. The usual disappearance of the "author behind the work" in *Moses* does not occur at all. To the contrary, the author seems to be this cumbersome presence within the text, dealing not just with the matter of history but also with his relation with it and with his construction of the discourse.⁴⁴

Barthes' work offers some other important chances for reflection. Passing from analyzing the act of uttering to the very utterance, Barthes tries to decompose it

⁴¹ Notably at the end of the first two essays. Freud, *Moses*, 25, 85. Both Barthes and Jakobson are actually focused on a restricted kind of shifters, say, more specifically *linguistic* ones. For instance, Barthes discusses very precise and nodal elements of the discourse as "here is" or "there is." Differently, we adopted here a broader notion of the concept: what we might call *discursive shifters*.

⁴² Barthes, "The Discourse of History," II.

⁴³ Freud, *Moses*, II.

⁴⁴ We believe Freud when he admits that he has "not been able to efface the traces of the unusual way in which this book came to be written." *Ibid.*, 164.

in elementary units. The historical utterance – he states – “involves both ‘existents’ and ‘occurrents’, that is beings or entities, and their predicates.”⁴⁵ Then he explores those mechanisms that according to him are functional to reinforce the very strength of the historical utterance. For instance, to pick an example within the very *Moses*, the way in which *naming* “the advance in spirituality” makes us thinking of a necessary referent for this formula. We can struggle to understand what its meaning may be, but a distinctive conceptual space is already allocated to it. Barthes affirms that one of the inherent features of the discourse of history is its “radical censorship”: “the status of historical discourse is uniformly assertive [...] we recount what has been, not what has not been, or what has been uncertain.”⁴⁶ Keeping this remark in mind, Freud’s *Moses* appears once more as an exceptional text. In other words, what happens into a historical text is that *what has been* systematically predominates over *what has not been* and *what could have been*, operating in this way a repression. To the contrary, the entirety of Freud’s work is based on a *hypothesis*. It doesn’t rely on sources or documents (as we have seen, these are sought only subsequently), the “feet of clay”⁴⁷ of *Moses* imply that all the three essays are ascribable to the category of the *what could have been*. Both the occurrents and, even more boldly, the existents are only supposed to be there. Both the entities and the predicates of his history are only *hypothetical*. Freud does not operate the usual historical censorship, for it is in fact Freud himself who gives the very terrain for the skepticism and the feeling of suspicion that his work leaves in the reader. If normally “no one is there to take responsibility for the utterance,” Freud does instead reclaim this responsibility explicitly and repeatedly.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” 12.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴⁷ As Freud himself defines the initial surmise. Freud, *Moses*, 29.

⁴⁸ In his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, written some twenty years before the *Moses* book, Freud shows to harbor already a peculiar perspective on historiography that engages our attention. Speaking of Alexander the Great – Freud writes – “[a historian] could refer you to the reports given by ancient writers [...] He could put reproductions before you of coins and statues of the king which have survived and he could hand round to you a photograph of the Pompeian mosaic of the battle of Issus. Strictly speaking, however, all these documents only prove that earlier generations already believed in Alexander’s existence and in the reality of his deeds, and your criticism might start afresh at that point.” The reason why, still, there would be scarce doubts about his very existence – he goes on – is due to the absence of any “conceivable motive for assuring you of the reality of something [the historian] himself did not think real, and secondly, [to the fact] that all the available history books describe the events in approximately similar terms.” Honesty, plausibility and conformity then, nothing more to assure the value of truth to a historiographical account. Sigmund Freud, “Introductory Lectures on Psycho-

In the last part of the section of his article focused on the analysis of the utterance, Barthes implicitly – but not too much – suggests an *identity* out-and-out of what up to this point could have been considered a simple *analogy* between the historical narrative and fiction. He tries to explore the use made by the historian of specific narrative mechanisms as metaphors, syllogisms and functions. The latter concept is drawn by Vladimir Propp's narratology, and it refers to those plot structures repeatedly occurring in every fictional narrative. Barthes argues that the historian's discourse, exactly as in a tale or in a myth, systematically encapsulates its matter subject in preexisting schemas of developments: precise *functions*. In this respect, Freud's work seems absolutely interesting on two levels. On the one hand, it is worth noting how an important part of Freud's theoretical production consisted exactly in *formulating* new and particular schemas and consolidating them throughout his work. In a sense, the psychoanalytic patterns and models he thinks through can be seen exactly as such. Furthermore, one of the disturbing element of *Moses* are exactly the continuous and redundant and strenuous and clumsy attempts to *apply* these patterns to a "blank history." It is sufficient to think, for instance, of the plot outlined more than twenty years before in *Totem and Taboo*, how it is constantly recalled and trot out and how all his "difficulties" generally derive precisely from the attempt to see in the story he is exploring, or discovering, or constructing, figures and patterns previously identified.⁴⁹

On the other hand, Freud himself articulates his narration dealing exactly with schemas of this kind (aside from those traced by himself). Freud *thinks* through these schemas, but he also *sees* them. It is worth recalling how the first essay, the first of the two *clay feet* of the iron statue, analyzes the story of Moses in light of the work written in 1909 by Otto Rank. The latter, in a study that from this point of view reminds us of Propp's *Morphology of the Tale*, outlines that set of similarities shared by popular myths and national narratives that Freud will

Analysis," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1981 [1961]), 15:18-19.

⁴⁹ See for instance his programmatic intent declared in the second prefatory note: "That conviction [the correctness of his conclusions] I acquired a quarter of a century ago, when I wrote my book on *Totem and Taboo* (in 1912), and it has only become stronger since. From then on I have never doubted that religious phenomena are to be understood only on the model of the neurotic symptoms of the individual, which are so familiar to us, as a return of long forgotten important happenings in the primaeval history of the human family, that they owe their obsessive character to that very origin and therefore derive their effect on mankind from the historical truth they contain." Freud, *Moses*, 94.

contrast with the knowledge we have of the peculiar case of Moses. Freud's move is precisely to break down that prototypical grid. He decomposes it to look *beneath* it, to look at what *could have* generated Moses' oddity. We can say that there is a double movement: Freud shows a striking consciousness of the mechanisms of historiography, both in the moment of its reception and in the moment of its production, but at the same time he relapses into the constraints and the blindness of these very mechanisms.

In the third section of his article Barthes explores the problem of signification. His argument is that history differs from chronologies and annals because, while the latter are "pure, unstructured series of notations,"⁵⁰ the former consists precisely in the act of *signification* of these chronologies. Barthes boldly states:

The historian is not so much a collector of facts as a collector and relater of signifiers; that is to say, he organizes them with the purpose of establishing positive meaning and filling the vacuum of pure, meaningless series.⁵¹

If the chronologies are actually lacking of meaning is quite questionable, but what strikes here is that Freud is doing completely without them. We don't find any "pure chronology" beneath Freud's history. The signification the historian ordinarily operates on these naked series assumes here the shape of a leap into the void. What, according to Barthes, is usually a collection and a correlation of signifiers, in Freud is transformed in the completely artificial creation of the elements to signify. Moreover, the argument usually put forward against Freud on the level of the sources, the documents, the *facts*, gets weaker. Indeed, the gist of what the historian does is not about the gathering of such concrete elements, but exactly about what is done by Freud too, and with a clarity that disturbs precisely in reason of its artificiality. Again, the nearing we are suggesting here is not that of *Freud to history*, but the opposite: that of *history to Freud*. We can imagine both history and what Freud does in his *Moses* as an *armor*: in the latter case what is missing is the knight inside the shell, but the very nature of the armor, its disposition and the quality of the iron don't change.

Nietzsche probably better conveys where Barthes is pointing at when he states "[t]here are no facts in themselves. It is always necessary to begin by introducing

⁵⁰ Barthes, "The Discourse of History," 15.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 16.

a meaning in order that there can be a fact.”⁵² Standing in the same position, Barthes insists in this direction affirming that the *fact* does actually exist only in the space of language.⁵³ However, he notices, the problem underlying the most common understanding of any historical narrative is exactly that such fact-as-a-linguistic-object is perceived as a fact-of-the-real-world. To adopt a terminology that Semiotics is more familiar with, the misunderstanding relies on the confusion between the *signified* and the *referent*. What the discourse offers to us is only a *historia rerum gestarum*, but its reader commonly believes to receive the actual *res gestae*. Remarking his distance from the Saussurian tradition (which does not take in consideration an external referent), Barthes is arguing here that the dynamic signifier/signified stays all within the discourse, and it never comes out of it. To the contrary, the past is neither on one nor on the other side of the discourse, it is a referent external to it. In this perspective, the historical text loses most of its ties with “the past as it really was,” becoming a phenomenon entirely belonging to the sole realm of the discourse itself.

The question Barthes answers immediately after is the question that spontaneously arises if one frames the problem of the discourse of history in such a way: *what is, then, the mechanism that makes us take the signified for “real”?*

⁵² Nietzsche quoted in Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” 16.

⁵³ Nietzsche’s work was well known by Freud, who actually took it into account precisely while working on the *Moses* book. It is also in reason of the “continual exchange with Zweig over Nietzsche” that – Yerushalmi tells us – “in the very midst of writing this draft [of 1934], Freud was also preoccupied with the nature of the historical novel, with ‘poetic license versus historical truth’.” Yerushalmi, “Freud on the ‘Historical Novel’,” 378. Another interesting link between Nietzsche and Freud is outlined by Michel Foucault. In a famous intervention, the French philosopher – in a parallel movement to Ricoeur’s one – couples Freud, Nietzsche and Marx, the three “masters of suspicion,” also as the three thinkers that posed the conditions for modern hermeneutics. In the thought of all of them – writes Foucault – “interpretation has at last become an infinite task.” In particular, while in Freud “psychoanalysis never ceases to deploy itself without ever being able to complete itself,” Nietzsche seems to understand philosophy as “a kind of philology continually in suspension, a philology without an end, always further unrolled, a philology that would never be absolutely fixed.” Even more interestingly in concern of our topic, Foucault argues that this infiniteness is due to the absence of a primary *interpretandum*: “There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers itself to interpretation but an interpretation of other signs.” Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx,” in *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, ed. James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley et al. (New York: The New Press, 1998 [1964]), 2:274-5. Once more, then, Freud’s text appears to be exploding and to produce an unsettling conflict: if on the one hand Freud’s obstinate quest for some kind of origins is clear (see below for a discussion of this point), on the other hand these origins are hardly *facts* but rather, in turn, interpretations.

Barthes coins here a concept on which he will come back in other works: the *reality effect* [*effet de réel*].⁵⁴ An effect of “reality” is induced in the reader through the whole set of devices characterizing the historical text. “Our civilization” – says Barthes – “has a taste for the realistic effect,” as we can see by the development of many genres as the documentary literature or the private diary. Such a mechanism induces the reader to fall in the confusion mentioned above: that between the signified and the referent of the discourse. But “[h]istorical discourse does not follow the real, it can do no more than signify the real, constantly repeating that *it happened*.”⁵⁵

The repercussions of this way of understanding history on Freud’s *Moses* are enormous. It is worth summing up what we have seen juxtaposing Barthes’ insights to Freud’s work. First, we have seen the particular and extensive way in which Freud directly organizes and intervenes into his discourse, namely his use of discourse *shifters*. Such an attitude distances Freud from the historian’s attempt to disappear behind his text letting “history speak by itself.” Freud seems in this respect to make explicit several of the most fundamental structural devices of the historical discourse. Second, he boldly moves on the terrain of history undermining its basic conventions: the entities and the predicates (*existents* and *occurrents*) are assumed as *hypothetical*, literally, fruits of a hypothesis. Moreover, of this nature it seems to be, consequently, the whole edifice built on such premises. What appears therefore weaker is exactly the “radical censorship” that allows the affirmative character of the historical text. Next, we have explored and analyzed the complex relation Freud has with his text and with its narrative “bricks.” On the one hand there is an unscrupulous insertion of *a priori* formulated schemas, on the other hand we see a remarkable consciousness of such a mechanism and the capacity to dig into it.⁵⁶ Lastly, we noticed how Freud does without the conventional (infra)structures of signification: chronologies and annals. If in *Totem and Taboo* this choice yields to an inscription of the described events into a mysterious ancestral time whose very duration is uncertain, *Moses* seems to be slightly more grounded and anchored to a few

⁵⁴ A year later, in 1968, Barthes will focus specifically on this notion in Roland Barthes, “The Reality Effect,” in *The Rustle of Language*, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989 [1968]). For a critical appraisal see Franklin R. Ankersmit, *History and Tropology. The Rise and Fall of Metaphor* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 125 ff.

⁵⁵ Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” 17.

⁵⁶ The uncanny relies in the unexpected order of the two different moves: it is in the beginning of the book, indeed, that Freud shows to master consciously the devices he is going to use, apparently more naively, later in the text.

touchstones. Still, the very material subdued to signification changes nature, becoming itself a product of the historian's narrative and hypothetical-speculative thinking.

What emerges from this analysis is, as we already hinted, that the gap between history and Freud's *Moses* is much shorter than usually acknowledged, but the latter didn't move, it is history itself to be much less *history* than one could have expected. In other words, the impossibility not to see how Freud writes his history *a priori* shall not make us doubting of his method or his results. This is not the point. To the contrary, the richness of his work lays precisely in the extent to which he *facilitates* our gaze on history and on how historiography moves along his same trail, but *in incognito*. What truly seems to be missing in *Moses and Monotheism*, as many authors after all noticed obsessively, is *reality*. That is, in Barthes' terms, the *reality effect* on the level of the discourse. Intervening to such an extent in his own building, being so self-reflective, showing now naively and then consciously the very terrain of encounter between history and fiction, doing away with the conventional facade of the historian, Freud subtracts himself from conditions necessary to produce the reality effect. His narrative does not convince. It seems to have to do more with a dream than with an archive. At the same time, Freud's work offers us the very means to outline its critique, showing the disquieting dynamics of the writing of history itself.

What in *Moses* leaves us disappointed, what bothers us, it is not related to the fact that this book does not satisfy what we believed to be the most important historiographical requirements: the problem is that history itself is shown as naked in the artificiality of such requirements. History itself does no longer satisfy what we believed to be its disciplinary demands. Freud – consciously or not – unearths in this text some profound logics of the writing of history, casting suspicion onto what we believed to be its very limit.

The *Annales* School: a Parallel Movement?

So far we have analyzed the relation of dialectical and reciprocal unconcealment taking place between Freud's *Moses* and what historiography turns out to be in light of Barthes' and de Certeau's insights. In a sense, we can interpret what emerges reading Freud through discourse analysis as a shadow of *suspicion* cast onto an understanding of the writing of history as a positivist science devoid of

any authorial constructed element, onto the tacit assumptions on which the historical narrative is founded. But additional angles must be explored. Freud imbued with uncertainty a discipline which at the time was relatively very young and in the midst of continuous and radical revolutions. Yet, Freud did not unsettle historiography as a solitary hero: on the contrary, his intellectual operation is to be analyzed in relation to its context. The connections, echoes and assonances that lead our gaze elsewhere must be retraced and followed. What was happening at Freud's time within historiography itself?

The Discourse of History ends prefiguring and alluding to a change in the realm of historiography occurring around the time in which Barthes was writing. After finishing to describe “[h]istory’s refusal to assume the real as signified,” he specifies that this attitude is rooted in the very consolidation of historiography as a discipline that characterized its development throughout the nineteenth century. The paradox – he writes – assumed its perverse form then:

Narrative structure, which was originally developed within the cauldron of fiction (in myths and the first epics) becomes at once the sign and the proof of reality. In this connection, we can also understand how the relative lack of prominence (if not complete disappearance) of narration in the historical science of the present day, which seeks to talk of structures and not of chronologies, implies much more than a mere change in schools of thought. Historical narration is dying because the sign of History from now on is no longer the real, but the intelligible.⁵⁷

Stephen Bann, the author of the first English translation of this text, read this last remark as a sign of how Barthes “had himself been attentive to the theoretical innovations of the *Annales* school, who had already defined a historical approach denying the primacy of the event, and by the same token drawn attention to the conventional nature of classic strategies of narration.”⁵⁸ Bann is right: as hinted also by the suggested shift from *chronologies* to *structures*, the reference is to them. It is not a coincidence that the *Annales* school is said to have accomplished the most important revolution in the field of history of the last century. Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch, the two founders of the *Annales d’histoire économique et sociale* began to write their most important works in the mid 1920s, while Freud committed himself to the writing of *Moses and Monotheism* soon after. If

⁵⁷ Barthes, “The Discourse of History,” 18.

⁵⁸ Stephen Bann, “Introduction: Barthes’ discourse,” in *Comparative Criticism*, 4.

our insights on Freud are right, what is the relation between these two essentially concurrent radical changes of perspective on historiography?⁵⁹

First, we have to be aware that speaking of the *Annales* in general terms is quite problematic. The official date of birth of the composite group we call *Annales* school coincides with the foundation of the homonymous journal in 1929 by Febvre and Bloch. Since then, at least three generations succeeded one each other along a movement of progressive institutionalization and diversification: after a first phase of “guerrilla action against traditional history, political history and the history of events,”⁶⁰ the group and its journal embodied in the postwar period the heart of the French academic establishment. Lastly, after 1968, the group started to suffer a gradual fragmentation that threatened the very possibility of speaking any longer of a single school. To analyze the ruptures this movement provoked into the previous disciplinary panorama a good path might be that of a comparison between the approaches of Freud and of the *Annales* school along two axes: the changes occurred in the representation of the *historical subject* and in the very notion of *time*. Our argument is twofold: on the one hand, if we assume Freud as a historian we are to notice a particular and important convergence of trajectories regarding these themes; on the other hand, some of the oddities that in Freud appear untenable and point to the aporetic structure of the writing of history in the *Annales* are explicitly framed and tackled on a theoretical level.

The Psychologization of the Historical Subject(s)

⁵⁹ We will focus on the attempt to trace some theoretical connections, aware of the fact that few others would likely prove to be significant. Indeed, despite Freud’s personal ties to France, his work there and his closeness to some important French intellectuals, several authors complain the extreme slowness for Psychoanalysis to penetrate and affirm itself in France. “Freudianism” became a real trend within the French academic environment only some thirty years after Freud’s death. See for instance Stuart Hughes, *The Obstructed Path: French Social Thought in the Years of Desperation 1930-1960*, (New Brunswick – London: Transaction Publishers, 2002), 9-10; Roudinesco, *Freud in his time and ours*, 202. Sherry Turkle, *Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud’s French Revolution*, (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 5 ff.

⁶⁰ Peter Burke, *The French Historical Revolution: The Annales School, 1929-1989*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 2.

To grasp the revolutionary repercussions of the innovations introduced by the *Annales* school, and maybe most importantly to avoid the disposal of Freud as a-historical too hastily, it is crucial not to look at their coeval historiography with today's eyes. History has always been an important field of knowledge in the Western tradition. Yet, its conceptualization in the terms we currently understand it is quite recent, and it is hardly traceable beyond the Early Modern period. The consolidation of historiography as an academic discipline, moreover, occurred during a time even closer to us, taking place mostly in the nineteenth century. The very context within which history arose – and its space, Europe – can easily explain why its focus on political history and on the history of the nation state has been so largely hegemonic up to the twentieth century. As Burke notices, “the narrative of political and military events, presented as the story of the great deeds of great men [...] was first seriously challenged during the Enlightenment,” with the emergence of the so called “history of society.”⁶¹ The movement toward something different from the simple narrative of the state, found an articulation in the most known historians of the time, as Gibbon, Michelet, Ranke (who, despite his disciples turned back on it, was not interested solely in political history) or, soon after, Marx, but it did not replace the most spread attitude. Burke concludes then that even if “it is inexact to think of the established professional historians of the period as exclusively concerned with the narrative of political events [...] All the same, historians were still perceived by the social scientists in precisely this way.”⁶² One of the most important ruptures represented by the *Annales* lies in the very articulation of a shared space for history and social sciences: the *Annales* opened or, more exactly, sanctioned the opening of history to new fields such as economics, sociology, anthropology, geography and psychology.

Hence, the *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* became the laboratory of a whole new set of *histories*, of perspectives and gazes on the past. Among the most interesting developments we undoubtedly have to include what has been called *histoire des mentalités*, that is the study, inaugurated by Bloch in *The Royal Touch*, of *collective representations*: those shared *illusions*, those *beliefs* and those consequential *behaviors* that characterize entire populations within certain periods of time.⁶³ Drawing considerably from Frazer's *Golden Bough*, Bloch investigated the common medieval belief in miraculously healing

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 10.

⁶³ Marc Bloch, *The Royal Touch: Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France*, trans E. J. Anderson (New York: Routledge, 2015 [1924]).

properties of the king's body. A few years later, his friend and colleague Lucien Febvre followed him on the opened path of historical psychology publishing a book on Martin Luther and his famous work on Rabelais *The Problem Of Unbelief In The Sixteenth Century*, in which he explored the very inconceivability of atheism at that time.⁶⁴

The roots of this new kind of historical approach are to be sought into coeval anthropology or, to be precise, around the French school of ethnology. According to Burke, if the concept of “collective representation” is drawn from Durkheim, the term “mentality” probably derives from the work on the “primitive mentality” written by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl in 1922.⁶⁵ Apparently, what is outlined through these two concepts does not seem, then, to recall any of the more properly psychoanalytical works already circulating at the time. Of such an opinion is for example Peter Gay when he states that, after all, the concept of “mentality” seems to be nothing more for the historians around the *Annales* group than a way to give a perfunctory form to the “potent irrationalities” of the past without “troubling themselves to trace back these states into their roots in the unconscious mind.” For this reason “[t]he worlds of the historian and of the psychoanalyst remain worlds apart.”⁶⁶ A different perspective is offered by André Burguière, who states that

The notion of mentalities does not have the sole aim of linking intellectual history and the history of ideas to social history in order to rescue them from the idealism of *Kulturgeschichte*. Mentalities have to do with both the unconscious and habitual forms of mental life and with reflective forms, with emotions and with representations.⁶⁷

From this standpoint, Burguière acknowledges precisely the existence of that kind of “digging” denied by Gay. At one with Burke on the possibility to credit Lévy-Bruhl for the authorship of the concept that the historians of the *Annales* brought into the field of history, he observes that

⁶⁴ Lucien Febvre, *Martin Luther: A Destiny*, trans. Roberts Tapley (New York: Dutton, 1929) and *The problem of unbelief in the sixteenth century: the religion of Rabelais*, trans. Beatrice Gottlieb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). They were first published, respectively, in 1928 and 1942.

⁶⁵ Burke, *The French Historical Revolution*, 18.

⁶⁶ Gay, *Freud For Historians*, 119.

⁶⁷ André Burguière, *The Annales School: An Intellectual History*, trans. Jane Marie Todd (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 101-102.

[Lévy-Bruhl's] concept of primitive mentality has been criticized for expressing the West's superiority complex. In assimilating the traditional cultures most remote from the Western model to the childhood of humanity, it supposedly served as a scientific alibi for colonialism. But the potentially destabilizing aspect of such a concept for a fixist, a historical view of rationality and of the structures of consciousness has been underestimated. In fact, it is precisely the idea of a rational consciousness transcending the world and history that lies at the foundation of the West's superiority complex, its universalist ambition, and its claim to rule the world.⁶⁸

The move of the *Annales*, under this light, assumes a meaning totally different from the one hypothesized by Gay. Instead of representing a hasty way to account for the irrationality of the past, it seems, in its telling movement from ethnology to history, precisely to bridge the gap between the West and the Rest. The irrational does not inhabit only the mind of the primitive, of this Other who, despite living in our present, seems to belong to another order of time. The irrational belongs also to *our* history and *our* time, it inhabits our own mind. In this case history does not seem to represent a science of the Other, but to the contrary the science of the self. Despite both the disciplines belong to the realm of what have been called *heterologies*, we cannot yet take for granted such a transposition in the 1920s: to analyze early modern Europe with the tools adopted to study the *far* Other was not something that could be done with levity. It represents the postulation of a continuity.⁶⁹ According to the interpretation given by Burguière, the *Annales* appear to be introducing in the temporal space of the West an element unsettling the very idea of "rational consciousness." On the one hand, one can grasp here a challenge to the European rationality of the self paralleling all Freud's work. From another perspective, this is an attempt, from some points of view, familiar to those who read in the Freud of *Civilization and its Discontents* and of *Totem and Taboo* a similar abridgment of the gap between our society and the Other: not a banishment of neurotics and babies in a world, a time and a space apart, but the inclusion of the

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 53.

⁶⁹ The adoption of such a perspective to investigate the recent past should not be equated with the evolutionist paradigm predominant in 19th century anthropology, which assimilated the "savage mind" to previous stages of human development in order to trace an evolutionary pattern. That's not the goal, nor the language or the mindset of the *Annales* are of this kind.

primitive in our own ones.⁷⁰ On the side of the *Annales*, clear signs of a common trajectory, for instance, are visible in “Bloch’s approach [which] privileged the manifestations of a collective unconscious that structure society and are incarnated in institutions or habits before coming to govern individual attitudes.”⁷¹

To sum up, what occurs in Bloch and Febvre is a *psychologization of the subject of history* on different layers, not all belonging to the realm of rational consciousness. Of course, nobody is claiming that history suddenly became psychological: history has always been, partly, attentive to the psychology of its protagonists. The rupture is constituted by the fact that to this protagonists’ mind is given a psychological *depth*. The psychological inquiry of the men of the past is moved from the analysis of their *rationalities* to the investigation of their *irrationalities*. This constitutes a break also from that historical-biographical literary tradition entirely focused on the description of the inner reasons beneath the decisions of some great figure of the past assuming it as a complete rational actor, as who was writing. Despite the fact that the biographical form is chosen repeatedly by Febvre, these are never biographies in the traditional sense.⁷² “None of these books takes the form of a real biography, but in choosing as its observation post the coherence of an individual trajectory, each seeks to reconstitute the mental universe of an age.”⁷³ Analogously, Freud’s goal – as stated in the 1934 preface – is to “gain knowledge of the person of Moses.” However, we perfectly know that it is a second purpose, the solution of the problem “which can only be specified later on,”⁷⁴ that prevails in the end and that few scholars would refuse to embrace as the main aim of *Moses and Monotheism*.

The problem that arises spontaneously at this point has been a topic of crucial interest both for the *Annales* and for Freud: it is the question of the relation

⁷⁰ The telling subtitle (as well as original title) of *Totem and Taboo* is self-explanatory: “Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics.”

⁷¹ Burguière, *The Annales School*, 56. On the consequences of the adoption of the concept of mentality and its ambiguous nature of being alternatively an *explicans* and an *explicandum* see also Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago – London: The University of Chicago Press, 2006 [2000]), 191, 198-200.

⁷² In addition to the already mentioned works on Luther and Rebelais, is to be considered *Around The Heptameron: Sacred Love, Profane Love* (1944), centered on the figure of Marguerite de Navarre.

⁷³ Burguière, *The Annales School*, 57.

⁷⁴ Yerushalmi, “Freud on the ‘Historical Novel’,” 379.

between the individual and the group. The psychologization we mentioned, indeed, could be operated either on the Great Man or on the crowds. As we know, the crux of the shift from the individual to the group is one of the main “difficulties” overtly admitted and faced by Freud in his *Moses*: the gap between the two realms represents the most insurmountable obstacle for the resolute accomplishment of his analysis.⁷⁵ We should distinguish two aspects of this issue: on the one hand Freud is moving, keeping the lenses of psychoanalysis on his eyes, from the field of the individual to that of the group; on the other hand, more importantly and problematically, Freud tackles the question of the dynamics of this group through time and generations. The discussed analogy seems then to be twofold: there is an analogy between the individual and the group dynamics and there is an analogy – a different one – between the group dynamics *through time* and the individual lifetime. The first shift does not seem to be new, already in 1921 Freud tried to deal with this problem in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. It is not by chance that Freud’s insight in this text, at least in respect to his predecessors, is to consider the mass as a congregation of individuals. The psychic mechanisms of each of them remain basically unaltered. The mass is no longer that awkward agent animated by a collective soul as described by Gustave Le Bon, what intervenes is a particular configuration of the desires of its components in their relation with the figure of the leader.⁷⁶ The problematization of the analogy between the individual and the group is avoided through the adoption of this perspective. To the contrary, in *Moses* the problem reemerges: the mass is no longer simply a sum of the individuals’ psyches. There are peculiar dynamics inherent to it as, above all, the transmission of some memory traces through different generations. The mass in *Moses* is taken in consideration *as a mass*. Moses is not killed by a single individual, but by the Jewish *people*, exactly as the Jewish *people* will forget and then go through the aftermath of such a traumatic experience.⁷⁷

The reason for which Freud is venturing this path is his need to explain a collective and intergenerational dynamic of *latency* in the group. To delve into

⁷⁵ Freud, *Moses*, 149 ff.

⁷⁶ Precisely, what actually characterizes them as a mass is said to be their common assumption of the same external object as ego ideal, normally, a leader as it could have been Moses. See Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1949 [1921]), 80. Cf. also the chapter “The Group and the Primal Horde,” *Ibid.*, 90 ff.

⁷⁷ We can succinctly formulate Freud’s analogy like this: the mass is considered as such not because it works *as a sum* of individuals, but because it works *as a single* individual. Cf. Freud, *Moses*, 116 ff.

the interpretation of Freud's position and to establish whether we are facing or not a form of lamarckism lies outside of our scope here. What is relevant is that, despite what he declares in the original draft (that his immediate goal is to "gain knowledge of the person of Moses"), there is scarcely trace of a psychoanalytic gaze upon the biblical prophet. It is not Moses the one who is psychoanalyzed in *Moses and Monotheism*. Despite the title, it is not him the subject of the historical narration, at least not in the terms of a psychoanalytical history. The Jews are. Similarly, to carry on Freud's own juxtaposition, in *Totem and Taboo* Freud works on the brothers' mind, and the very death of the primeval father only opens the possibility of a psychoanalytical investigation. Despite the stress on the *Great Man*, it is the group which is posed under observation in *Moses*.⁷⁸

In this respect, *Moses and Monotheism* seems to be a work more pertinent to *historical psychology* than to *psychological history*. To quote Lewis Spitz describing the two modalities of American Psychohistory, *Moses* "involve[d] a study of the psychology of people who are not great men, the psychology of groups."⁷⁹ There is a radical discontinuity, then, from those other works as the attempts to psychoanalyze either the dead Leonardo Da Vinci or the living Woodrow Wilson. Since the *Moses of Michelangelo*, aside from all what has been said about Freud's relation with his father and with Judaism, or about his very opinion on *Moses*, what changes is the very object studied: no longer the individual but the group, the people. The focus on the movements of Moses' hands yields to the narrative of the man Moses as (just) the *conditio* for what has to be said later about a collective group.

Still, the collective psyche cannot be faced without starting from the individual. Not specifically Moses, but *any* individual. More than that, any *contemporary* individual. Freud begins therefore his chapter "The Analogy" exploring a sequence of patients' cases useful to outline the characteristics of the schema to

⁷⁸ Similar observations have been made in *Heterologies* by Michel de Certeau, who entitled one of its chapters "The Anti-Individualist Biography." There he writes: "the innovation of Freudianism consists in its use of biography as a means of destroying the individualism posited by a modern and contemporary psychology. With this tool, it undermines the postulate of liberal and bourgeois society. It undoes it. It substitutes another history in returning, as we have seen, to the system of tragedy." Michel de Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000 [1986]), 24.

⁷⁹ Lewis W. Spitz, "Psychohistory and History: The Case of *Young Man Luther*," in *Psychohistory and Religion*, ed. Roger A. Johnson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977 [1973]), 59.

apply to his historical study. What concerns us more here is the particular *direction* of this move.⁸⁰

With the publication of *French Rural History* in 1931 Marc Bloch made famous the so called “regressive method,” drawn, in turn, from the work of the nineteenth century historian F. W. Maitland. Bloch argued the necessity to “read history backward,” to proceed logically, then, “from the known to the unknown.”⁸¹ Bloch was here attacking what Simiand called some decades before the “Idol of Origins.”⁸² In *The Historian’s Craft* he explains that the danger of the “obsession with origins” lies on the ambiguity of the term: sometimes “origins” are understood as “beginning,” other times as “causes.” The problem arises when these two meanings are overlapped, and the origins of something are assumed to be a “beginning which explains. Worse still, a beginning which is a complete explanation.”⁸³ To the contrary, Bloch stresses the necessity to look more at the contemporaneity of the facts rather than at their ancestral roots. After all, he says quoting a proverb, “[m]en resemble their times more than they do their fathers.”⁸⁴

Without taking any stand in regard to Bloch’s position, it is useful to assume its viewpoint in order to explore an additional layer of *Moses*. In this respect, Freud’s move resembles the kind of case we have seen above: a jarring contrast that results both in an untenable position and in a revealing and telling clarification. On the one hand, Freud tries to read his story exactly through what we can interpret as an explanatory “origin”: the plot of the killing of the father outlined in *Totem and Taboo* and proposed again here. The seriousness of the issue becomes clear when one realizes that such a plot does not serve just for a “passive” reading of Moses’ and the Jews’ sequence of events. The tale of the father gets transformed into a pattern for the formulation of inferences, of the very hypothesis *Moses* is nourished with and based on. From this point of view, Freud epitomizes precisely the risks lying behind the idol of origins.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Freud, *Moses*, 116 ff., 126.

⁸¹ Burke, *The French Historical Revolution*, 23.

⁸² Marc Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft*, trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1953 [1949]), 29.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁸⁵ Interestingly enough, Bloch makes a concession of legitimacy precisely to religious history, where causes and beginning might actually coincide. See Bloch, *The Historian’s Craft*, 31.

On the other hand, as we were saying, the access point to (both the shaping of the horde’s story and) the study of the mass psyche in *Moses and Monotheism* is Freud’s contemporary’s mind. Psychoanalysis, therefore, emerges as that place of production of the knowledge necessary to retrace the past back from the present.⁸⁶ As in Bloch, from the known to the unknown. Richard Bernstein suggested a reading on the same tone:

There is a *double* temporal perspective that runs throughout the *Moses* study. The rhetorical structure of the book, and Freud’s historical narrative about the Egyptian origins of Moses, lead us to think that Freud is giving us an account of the character of the Jewish people by appealing to what happened in the past. But this explanatory narrative is itself constructed primarily on the basis of our *present* psychoanalytical understanding of the dynamics of the human psyche.⁸⁷

Bernstein perfectly grasps the ultimate conclusion one can draw: that the doubleness of the movement, to a certain extent, is illusory. Indeed, *Totem and Taboo*’s plot too is formulated through and on the basis of such psychoanalytic procedure. Consequentially, the very “origin” is actually rooted in what we might call a psychoanalytic truth. However, what strikes in regard to our discussion is once again Freud’s capacity to juxtapose in disturbing mixtures mechanisms and functions proper of history, showing them under a new and revealing light. Freud puts forward here, presenting both as untenable, a “regressive” and a “progressive” method of facing the past. What remains is the sum of the inconsistencies underlying beneath any *a priori* way of doing history.⁸⁸ In both cases we see what Bernstein correctly identifies as a *projection*.⁸⁹ That is to say, returning to Barthes, the projection of an actual *referent*.

Again, Freud is outlining he himself the very terrain that makes possible (and unavoidable) to attack him. He makes *too explicit* what usually passes unnoticed.

⁸⁶ A viewpoint, this, from which Freud’s *Moses* appear in firm contrast with Pater Schmidt’s attempts to investigate the *origin* of monotheism and of the idea of God.

⁸⁷ Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses*, 71.

⁸⁸ This does not exclude a certain dialectic between the schema and its application, as Bernstein himself highlights a few pages later.

⁸⁹ “[Freud] is projecting what allegedly happened in the past – ‘the historical truth’ – on the basis of our understanding of the dynamical conflicts of the human psyche.” Bernstein, *Freud and the Legacy of Moses*, 72.

On the one hand, Freud first articulates the *problem* of the shift from the psychology of the individual to that of the mass, framing with precision the existing obstacles; then, he clumsily overcomes the hurdles through dubious, inconsistent and quite questionable devices.⁹⁰ On the other hand, the very nature of historical research is problematized in the evidently stretched and inappropriate attempts to undertake it from resolute angles. The unsuitableness of the effort to “grasp the past” both from the perspective of the present and from an explanation through the origins is masterly – as much as naively – displayed. Moving along the same axis of the *Annales* scholars, Freud seems to be demanding a raise of consciousness, an awareness about the very elements that make his work so much questionable. In this sense, Freud is offering us the conditions of the critique punctually moved to him.

Conflicting Temporalities

In the wake of these last remarks, we shall go back to Barthes’ conclusions in order to suggest a further terrain of investigation of Freud’s work. Barthes, as we said, seems to sympathize with the *Annales*’ shift of focus from the narrative to the understanding of the structures of history. Freud, especially considering the third essay, seems to move in a similar direction. Given the *feet of clay* as the premises, is then possible for him to explore (and shape) the many details of the *iron statue*: namely, the temporal dynamics of religions, peoples and collective mentalities. What this move seems to imply in both cases is no less than a *disarticulation of historical time*.

What in the 1960s evolved into a variant of structuralism out-and-out, consisted originally in an attempt to challenge the so called *histoire événementielle*, the kind of history perceived as hegemonic within what Burke names the “Old Historiographical Regime,” and its restricted focus on the dimension of the *event* with the consequential adoption of a certain style of narrative. The way out from this “old kind of history,” to reverse Febvre’s famous catchword, is sought and found along many different trajectories: the most successful has probably been the one articulated in theoretical terms by Fernand Braudel in *The Mediterranean*. In this book the French historian tried to give an account of the

⁹⁰ We are of course referring primarily to Freud’s peculiar form of psycho-Lamarckism and the idea that some “memory traces” could be transmitted and inherited between different generations. Freud, *Moses*, 151 ff.

Mediterranean area during the age of Philip II. In fact, he adopted a wider periodization starting at the end the fifteenth and ending at the beginning of the sixteenth century. On this line, one of its major achievement has been the capacity to consider *time* and *space* in unprecedented ways.⁹¹ Braudel theorizes a distinction among different orders of historical time destined to survive for many years. He identifies three different dimensions: first, the level of the *event*, “the scale not of man, but of individual men.”⁹² Braudel defines such a layer as “surface disturbances, crests of foam that the tides of history carry on their strong backs.” To dive deeper into these tides he theorizes the level of *conjunctures* and the famous *longue durée*. The former takes into account the long-term dynamics of cultures and civilization (this is, for instance the time scale of the *mentalities*), while the latter refers to the “history whose passage is almost imperceptible [...] in which all change is slow, [the] history of constant repetition, ever-recurring cycles.”⁹³ Braudel speaks in this case of the “geographical time” of man in his relationship with the environment. In 1950, one year after the first edition of *The Mediterranean*, in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France Braudel insists on his position:

[...] social time does not flow at one even rate, but goes at a thousand different paces, swift or slow, which bear almost no relation to the day-to-day rhythm of a chronicle or of traditional history. Thus I believe in the reality of a particularly slow-paced history of civilization, a history of their depths, of the characteristics of their structures and layout.⁹⁴

⁹¹ Indeed, another interesting trajectory, particularly for a comparison with Freud, concerns the attempt to rethink *space*. Within the *Annales* school, progressively, a new way to understand and to *signify* space affirmed itself. In this respect, a hypothetical third section of our analysis could have been focused on Freud’s own movement in this direction. As stressed by different angles, among others, by Jan Assmann, Sander Gilman and Edward Said, in Freud’s way of representing and talking about space and geography, in his discourse, a postcolonial-like mindset seems to be prefigured and portended by many points of view through specific forms of signification. Suspicion would have been instilled here in the realm of the relation between the self and the Other from the perspective of a pre-Second World War Europe disposing only of a pre-postcolonial perspective on certain kinds of problems.

⁹² Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean And The Mediterranean World In The Age Of Philip II*, II vols, trans. Siân Reynolds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996 [1966]), 1:21. A first and shorter version of the book appeared already in 1949.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 1:20.

⁹⁴ Fernand Braudel, “The Situation of History in 1950,” in *On History*, trans. Sarah Matthews (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982 [1950]), 12.

We are not interested here in analyzing further Braudel's distinction.⁹⁵ He researched and wrote within a framework aiming at reaching a new understanding of social and material history and their "slow," almost motionless time. Yet, one of Braudel's most important legacies today, if we disregard the specific *content*, lies in the more general *form* of his move: here too, a *disarticulation of time in different and multidimensional temporalities*.⁹⁶

Indeed, Freud seems to be having a conversation with the efforts of history to remodel itself. Our argument, again, is that Braudel succeeded in lucidly theorizing what Freud naively showed in *Moses and Monotheism*, advocating for a programmatic change in the very perspective that Freud revealed as aporetic and obsolete. At the end of his majestic work, Braudel highlights and, in a sense, acknowledges to those who criticized him, that with such a widening of scale, in dealing with structures and conjunctures, "the role of the individual and the event necessarily dwindles."⁹⁷ Apparently, *Moses* seems to inhabit a totally different level, facing precisely the facts concerning the man, the *individual* man Moses. The first and the second book in particular seem to fully belong to the *histoire événementielle*: Moses, his birth, his adoption, the exodus from Egypt, his murder, Qadesh etc. all undoubtedly touch only the kind of temporality pertinent to the *event*. However, we have to recall the problem "which [could]

⁹⁵ A broader discussion of Braudel's tripartition and its critical reception can be found in Traian Stoianovich, *French Historical Method: The Annales Paradigm*, (Ithaca – London: Cornell University Press, 1976), especially chap. 4.

⁹⁶ As many other thinkers of his time, Braudel is strongly influenced by the production of Henri Bergson. The latter, criticizing the idea of time spread by physics and the natural sciences as something quantifiable, homogeneous and composed of standard, discrete and measurable units, insisted on its subjective aspect. It has been Bergson the first to oppose to the idea of time understood as such the notion of *durée*, meant to highlight the varying dimension of *lived* and *experienced* time. Universal time, made by countless but countable fragments is substituted then by a new multiplicity of "durations" whose length and nature are determined by the psychic and emotional constellation of the subject. It is from this philosophical disarticulation of the concept of time itself and from this change of scale that we must look at Braudel's historiographical novelty. Cf. Gérard Noiriel, "Comment on récrit l'histoire. Les usages du temps dans les *Écrits sur l'histoire* de Fernand Braudel," *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 25 (2002): 57-81. Braudel himself will make explicit appeal to the "[philosopher's] attention to the subjective element internal to the concept of time" in order to understand his tripartition. Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, "History and the Social Sciences: The *Longue Durée*," *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 32/2 (2009): 171-203, 198. The article was originally published in 1958, and it probably represents Braudel's most complete formulation of the concept.

⁹⁷ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean*, 2:1242.

only be specified later on” mentioned in the first draft of 1934. In the same year, Freud wrote to Arnold Zweig:

Faced with the new persecutions, one asks oneself again how the Jews have come to be what they are and why they have attracted this undying hatred. I soon discovered the formula: Moses created the Jews.⁹⁸

Throughout *Moses and Monotheism* Freud tries to answer to this question (that is to say, to argue for his answer): this is the stated purpose at the origins of the writing of this text. Yet, Freud’s slogan might mislead: what does it mean that the *man Moses* created the Jews? Assmann masterly grasps the aporia noticing how, “[n]ormally, one would conceive of the ‘creation of a nation’ as a typical process of ‘longue durée.’” To the contrary, Freud seems to be outlining it as a punctual event, inscribed in the decision of the individual Moses.

Freud’s radical method of historical personification compresses a process of centuries into the figure of “the great man.” Freud’s construction of Moses as the creator of his nation goes against all historical probability. No nation has ever been created. [...] Freud was aware of the problem and provided an interesting answer. It was not the “living” or the “historical Moses” alone to whom he attributed the creation of the Jewish nation, but the living and the dead, the historical, the repressed, and the remembered Moses taken together. The return of the repressed was also for Freud a process of “longue durée.”⁹⁹

Assmann identifies in the psychoanalytical figure of the return of the repressed, pivotal in the general economy of Freud’s text, the very mechanism that allows the shift from the history of the event to the history of long-term structures and dynamics. Once more, it will not be judged here whether Assmann is right or not. What is relevant with respect to our topic is that the very architecture of *Moses and Monotheism* consists of a juxtaposition, a combination that manifests itself in a strident and unsettling contrast.

Scholars have often highlighted, from many different viewpoints, the discontinuity between the first two essays and the third one. The pattern that we have seen discussing Freud’s book through Barthes’ reflection on the historical

⁹⁸ Freud to Zweig, May 30, 1934, quoted in Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience*, 12.

⁹⁹ Assmann, *Moses the Egyptian*, 164.

narrative, and that emerged again in the attempt to compare Freud's own way of psychologizing the historical subject, seems here to appear once more. The fracture between the two first essays and the last one does not run only along the many lines that have been so regularly put forward. It is rooted also in a difference of *scale*: the *micro* and the *macro* of historical investigation are pulled together in an unsettling bond. Freud juxtaposes the *event* and the *structure*, two different levels of history, *grasping* a question without being able to *articulate* it. On the one hand he displays to our eyes the "littleness of the man" – paradoxically – exactly giving to him an extraordinary, exaggerated importance, regardless of whether this Great Man influences the course of events (or structures) through his *being alive* or through his *being dead*. On the other hand the level of the structure is filled with a kind of substance whose very complexity exemplifies the difficulties inherent to any attempt of outlining the structure's content.¹⁰⁰

Freud and History: Who Questions Whom?

In this paper we explored from different angles the problems and the opportunities deriving from considering Freud as a historian. We looked at the *Moses* book as a source, as we said, of *suspicion*. The reader who faces *Moses and Monotheism* for the first time and without the help of scholarly literature has to tackle a feeling of annoyance: something in a certain order is unsettled, teased. What we tried to do here is to anatomize such feeling, trying to grasp the trajectories of such aversion and to retrace it to the doubts suggested – more or less overtly – in Freud's text. In the first part we have seen essentially how Freud, exposing to an excessive extent the way history is written, instills a radical doubt on the practice and the relation to historical truth of historiography, which turns out not to be qualitatively different (least of all *superior*) from what Freud does in his study. Making too clear, too present, too perceivable the inner mechanisms of the writing of history that usually remain hidden under the blanket of narrative, Freud does away with the *reality effect*. And, in fact, *Moses* seems everything but real.

In the second part of the paper we examined Freud's work in relation to the case of the *Annales* school as an attempt to undress history and revolutionize it more, say, from within. We looked at how important changes occurred in the way to

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Braudel, "The *Longue Durée*," 178.

treat the historical subject and the very idea of time and scale underlying historical writing. Again, many of Freud's moves seem to be displaying into a concrete text, and thus showing with a dazzling clarity, several issues that in the *Annales* will be framed and faced theoretically. In this respect, we noticed how the very *terrain* of the critique usually given to Freud's book is articulated and made possible, offered, by Freud himself. Thus, we ask: who is questioning whom? Are some supposed essential tenets of history really undermining Freud's work or is it the latter who is questioning the former? What results disturbing, in conclusion, might be precisely Freud's *lightness* in doing so, an attitude that is unbearable for the reader, historian or not, who feels compelled to reply, to answer, to speak.

Edward Said, defending important classics from any sort of chrono-centric attack, identifies among them a category of works endowed – he says – with an *antinomian force*. He is not speaking of those texts which, allegedly, manifest and radiate some transcendental, universal and a-temporal values, but to the contrary of those works that, embodying so deeply precisely the values and the perspectives of their own time, or slightly casting our sight a little further, or – we add – inoculating *uncertainty, disturb and suspicion, “demand a response”* from their future readers. Freud's *Moses and Monotheism* belongs without any doubt to this kind of undying works.

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**“They called us *Maccaroni*, pasta eaters....”
The Integration of Italian Jews in the Nazi Camps**

by Bieke Van Camp

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to contribute, through the combination of lexicometric and qualitative analyses, to the study of the unofficial relations of domination conveyed by different forms of interaction in the Nazi camps. By using Italian testimonies, this article will try to shed light on the hierarchical dynamics that developed in the camps, in order to comprehend the particular difficulties related to integration and survival. The testimonies of Italian Jews show indeed that there were many varying forms of stereotypes that arose within the concentration and extermination camps, some originating within the community of those imprisoned on racial grounds, others developing within other categories or groups of prisoners. In the first case, stereotypes are generally based on nationality, language and seniority of imprisonment.

Introduction

Sources and Methods

Hierarchical Dynamics in the Nazi Camps

Conclusion

Introduction¹

The first image that comes to mind when describing other individuals is related to the idea of the category to which each of the individuals is connected². It can refer as much to nationality, to ethnic or religious groups, as to the function that the individual occupies in the given society. In the Nazi concentration and

¹ I am deeply grateful to Prof. Mareen Niehoff, the Max Cooper Professor of Jewish Thought at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, who prompted me to write this paper and provided me good advices and generous help.

² Ruth Amossy and Anne Herschberg Pierrot, *Stéréotypes et clichés: langue, discours, société*, (Paris: Armand Colin, 2011), 34.

extermination camps this is no different: in testimonies, co-detainees are first of all identified as Poles, Italians, Jews, political prisoners etc. and to a lesser extent as doctors, guards and so on. These basic collective representations thus have a considerable impact on the social identity of the deportee and, conversely, on the image he has of his co-detainees. In this sense, these images affect the relationships between groups and their members,³ which in most cases lead to stigmatization and to relations of dominance. Subsequently, we can ask what origins these representations have and how they are translated during the concentration camp experience as well as in post-war testimonies. This implies considering the concentration camps as a recomposed society and heterogeneous *ensemble* of social sceneries.⁴

After an explanation of the sources and methods applied to accomplish this study⁵, I consider the concentration camp society and the groups that are likely to assume a dominant position within it: a typology of informal/tacit hierarchies in the concentration camps and the place of Italians in them are studied. Indeed, historiography⁶ has shown how Jews of different origins, crowded together in extreme living conditions, don't necessarily form a homogeneous group. Many historians⁷ and former deportees already demonstrated how language – or language proximity –, the number of deportees per country (minorities or majorities in the camps), and seniority of imprisonment are important factors in shaping the individuals' integration in the camps. However, I argue that establishing a corpus of testimonies based on solid criteria as well as a lexicometric approach could validly contribute to this research field. In this regard, this article explores the prejudices elaborated by other groups concerning

³ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁴ Erving Goffman, *Asiles : études sur la condition sociale des malades mentaux et autres reclus*, (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1968); Wolfgang Sofsky, *L'ordine del terrore: il campo di concentramento*, (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002), 21.

⁵ This work presents preliminary results on a restricted corpus of sources.

⁶ For instance *The Nazi Concentration Camps: Structure and Aims, the Image of the Prisoner, the Jews in the Camps, Proceedings of the Fourth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference – January 1980*, (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1984), in particular the contributions of Yisrael Gutman, "Social Stratification in the Concentration Camps," *Ibid.*, 172 and Leni Yahil, "Jews in Concentration Camps prior to World War II," *Ibid.*, 86. On stereotypes on the different deportees' nationalities see as well Christopher Browning, *Remembering survival: inside a Nazi slave-labor camp*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010).

⁷ In particular in Italian historiography: Giovanna Massariello Merzagora, "Una perpetua Babele. Usi e forme della Lagersprache," in *La lingua dei Lager: Parole e memoria dei deportati italiani*, ed. Rocco Marzulli (Rome: Donzelli, 2017), 119-55. Donatella Chiapponi, *La lingua nei lager nazisti*, (Rome: Carocci Editore, 2004).

Italian Jews as well as the stereotypical images / discourses developed by Italian deported Jews on co-prisoners from other countries. The goal is to understand the hierarchical dynamics in the camps in general, in order to comprehend the particular difficulties related to the integration and survival in the concentration camps, as described in Italian testimonies.

Sources and methods

About the sources: Shoah testimonies

The analysis of testimonies of Shoah victims as historical sources should make it possible to reveal concrete social scenes.⁸ We consider as testimony any document exposing a sufficiently long experience “to provide an evolutionary image⁹” of the latter. Thus any object or speech capable of transmitting an experience of the actor (necessarily an eye witness¹⁰ who has assisted in an active or passive way to the related experience) can be analyzed. The truth of the testimony rests in this case on the confidence of its receiver.¹¹ Moreover, the will to analyze social dynamics and logics, rather than events (characterized by dates and places), should make it possible to go past the debates concerning the truthfulness or falsehood of the testimonies.¹²

The sources - testimonies - are extremely abundant and differ according to their nature, the time of their writing and / or recording, but this does not make them incompatible. Indeed, taking into account testimonies of a diverse nature (testimonial narratives, oral testimonies, letters etc.), induces different kinds of

⁸ Frédéric Rousseau, *La Grande Guerre des sciences sociales*, (Outremont: Athéna Editions, 2014), 18.

⁹ Helena Trnkova, “De l’engagement et des échafaudages identitaires en guerre. L’exemple austro-hongrois,” in *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁰ Renaud Dulong, *Le témoin oculaire. Les conditions sociales de l’attestation personnelle*, (Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1998).

¹¹ François Buton, “Que faire des témoignages? Les témoignages, entre usages sociaux et qualifications scientifiques” (introduction to the seminar, Université de Montpellier, France, November 26, 2015).

¹² The former president of the Shoah Foundation Institute USC, Douglas Greenberg, regrets that for many historians there is still a tacit hierarchy of sources, with a predilection for manuscript sources originating from bureaucracy. Douglas Greenberg, “La memoria storica della Shoah: l’uso delle testimonianze dei sopravvissuti,” in *Sterminio e stermini: Shoah e violenze di massa nel Novecento*, eds. Renata Badii, Dimitri D’Andrea, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010), 295-6.

difficulties or limits and their variety within the corpus is therefore important. Due to the large quantity of sources available, a central question to this research regards the selection of the eye-witness accounts.

Quantitative methods: prosopography and lexicometry

First of all it is necessary to determine the *parent population* (according to 3 main criteria) of the corpus of testimonies. We have thus targeted the Jews (1) who survived deportation from Italy (2) and who have testified (3) on their concentration camp experience in the aftermath of the war. The methods of selection of the witnesses in the analyzed corpus are based on the model of the French *socio-histoire* (both a qualitative and quantitative approach) and on the practice of microhistory.¹³

A privileged “tool” in *socio-histoire* is biography¹⁴ and its inclusion in a global prosopographic study (through the construction of a database) of the considered corpus of testimonies.¹⁵ Therefore, the corpus built according to as many criteria as possible, has to contain a wide variety of Jewish deportee profiles (to get as close as possible to the criteria of a sampling-model with good statistical properties reflecting all the different deportee realities of the chosen *parent population*). The age, social background, education, places of birth, data related to the deportation (trains, camps etc.), and aspects related to the testimonies themselves (date, place, nature, etc.) should therefore be taken into consideration. In other words, the corpus of individuals and their testimonies was the object of a quantitative prosopographic study for the purpose of scientific description (which makes it possible to consider who speaks, when they speak and from which background they speak¹⁶), before being subjected to qualitative analyses.

¹³ In this case, microhistory is not so much understood as an in depth analysis of a single case (Carlo Ginzburg, *The cheese and the worms: the cosmos of a sixteenth-century miller*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1980)) but as a way to put a small number of individuals without direct geographical ties at the center of a study that aims to reveal some key analysis tools to broader studies. Tal Bruttman, Ivan Ermakoff, Nicolas Mariot, Claire Zalc, “Changer d’échelle pour renouveler l’histoire de la Shoah,” in *Pour une microhistoire de la Shoah*, (Paris : Seuil, 2012), 12.

¹⁴ Nicolas Offenstadt, “Socio-histoire,” in *Historiographies. Concepts et débats*, eds. Christian Delacroix, François Dosse, Patrick Garcia, Nicolas Offenstadt, (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), vol.1, 618.

¹⁵ François Buton and Nicolas Mariot, *Pratiques et méthodes de la socio-histoire*, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2009), 15.

¹⁶ Renaud Dulong, *Le témoin oculaire*, 11.

Another operating tool to this study is lexicometry, which was implemented using the TXM desktop software.¹⁷ The contribution of lexicometry helps to quickly grasp the over- or underemployment of words¹⁸ in the testimonies, and above all it allows to carry out a great number of calculations starting from the testimonies' plain text. In this study we use in particular calculations of co-occurrences (the simultaneous presence of two or more words or lemma¹⁹ in the same phrase), and of concordances (allowing to determine the context in which the lemma is mobilized) in order to avoid losing the meaning behind the words/sentences/ etc. when studying representations, this tool has several advantages, but it is necessary, however, to be aware of some of its limitations. The corpus must indeed be digitized, which can be time-consuming (and which explains why I will use a limited corpus for the lexicometric analyses). Also, the texts included in the corpus must be fairly homogeneous (in size, date, nature, etc.) so as not to distort the results. Furthermore, by endowing lexicometric analyses with an explanatory value, the risk is to lose sight of the actors (the witness, the interlocutor, the situation) behind the quantified words or lemma. In this sense, lexicometry makes it possible to test hypotheses, but is not sufficient in itself. If quantitative methods do allow to test hypotheses (through factor analysis or lexicometric analysis); a qualitative approach alone can provide contexts, sense. Obviously, the results of both types of analyses can be considered

¹⁷ “TXM is free, open-source Unicode, XML & TEI compatible text/corpus analysis environment and graphical client based on CQP and R. [...] it provides qualitative and quantitative analysis tools.” TXM was created within the ANR Textométrie project at the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Lyon and is particularly adapted to research in Social Sciences and Humanities. Bénédicte Pincemin, Serge Heiden, “Qu’est-ce que la textométrie? Présentation,” (2008), <http://textometrie.ens-lyon.fr/spip.php?rubrique80>. Serge Heiden, “The TXM Platform: Building Open-Source Textual Analysis Software Compatible with the TEI Encoding Scheme,” in *24th Pacific Asia Conference on Language, Information and Computation*, ed. K. I. Ryo Otoguro, (Japan: Institute for Digital Enhancement of Cognitive Development / Waseda University, 2010), 389-98. The software was used as well by Damon Mayaffre in his study on the difference of vocabulary witnesses use to describe their concentration camp experience according to the period in time they testify (Bénédicte Pincemin, Damon Mayaffre, Serge Heiden, Philippe Weyl, “Génétique mémorielle. Shoah, mémoire et ADT,” (paper presented at the “13^{ème} Journées internationales d’Analyse statistique des Données textuelles,” Nice, France, June 7-10, 2016).

¹⁸ Claire Lemercier and Claire Zalc, *Méthodes quantitatives pour l'historien*, (Paris: La Découverte, 2008), 50.

¹⁹ Lemmatization implies grouping words of the same family by dictionary entry (called “lemma”).

representative only of the experiences of the individuals included in the analyzed corpus.²⁰

Description of the analyzed corpus of testimonies

For the purpose of this article, a group of 40 witnesses²¹ was selected: initially, I took into consideration all works written from a first-person perspective published by Italian editors²² and, as to include individuals coming also from lower classes, I then selected witnesses included in different oral testimonies collections.²³ The final corpus therefore presents the following characteristics²⁴: there are 17 men and 23 women (figure 1), the oldest at the time of deportation is 44 years old and the two youngest 11 years old (the age groups are then present in a balanced way; figure 2). A fifth of the witnesses were born in Lazio (especially in Rome), another fifth in Piedmont, followed by the other Italian regions. It should be noted that 2 witnesses were born and deported from the Aegean island

²⁰ In this regard, the point of view on the questions dealt with in this paper is strictly that of the Italian deportees. A complementary study on how deportees from other nationalities see the Italians is part of the author's research in progress.

²¹ The political scientist Nicolas Mariot argues indeed in his work *Tous unis dans la tranchée ?* that manipulating in a same research outcome a group of more than 40 witnesses would become too time-consuming in regards to the additional results other testimonies can reveal: "beyond the analyses of 40 texts, it is necessary to read pages and pages more to discover new elements." Nicolas Mariot, *Tous unis dans la tranchée? 1914-1918, les intellectuels rencontrent le peuple*, (Paris: Seuil, 2013), 406.

²² Those are in general more in depth testimonies. In order to list the testimonies, I've consulted the catalog of the Central National Library (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale) as well as Anna Baldini's research. Anna Baldini, "La memoria italiana dello sterminio degli ebrei d'Europa (1944-2009)," in *Atlante della letteratura italiana*, vol. III: *Dal Romanticismo a oggi*, eds. S. Luzzatto, G. Pedullà, D. Scarpa (Turin: Einaudi, 2012), 758-63.

²³ In Particular the archives of the deportation in Piedmont (Archivio della deportazione piemontese, Archivio Istoretto, Turin) in the 1980s; the oral history research projects of the Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea ("Interviste alla storia," Archivio della Memoria, CDEC, Milan and to a lesser extent the collection "Ricerca sulla deportazione," CDEC) and the archives of the USC Shoah Foundation (which has a full access point in the Istituto per i beni sonori e audiovisivi, Rome).

²⁴ I collected the necessary data from the biographical dictionary Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *Il libro della memoria: gli Ebrei deportati dall'Italia (1943-1945)*, (Milan: Mursia, 2002); from the testimonies themselves; from the catalog of the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale and from the biographical notes of Istituto Piemontese per la Storia della Resistenza e della Società Contemporanea (*Archos Biografie*). These individuals were the object of a complete prosopography in my master's dissertation under the supervision of Prof. Frédéric Rousseau, "L'expérience de la Shoah par les témoignages italiens. Violences symboliques et stratégies de réponse," discussed June 10, 2016 at Université Paul-Valéry, Montpellier.

of Rhodes (under Italian rule at the time) and 2 others from areas of present-day Croatia (in particular the town of Fiume/Rijeka). Almost a quarter of the individuals were born abroad and settled later in Italy, often fleeing earlier racial persecution in these countries (notably Poland and Austria). The different “social classes²⁵” in which we have ranked individuals according to their symbolic capitals²⁶ (e.g. level of study and profession) are present rather equally: the working class represent almost a quarter of the corpus; the intellectual fractions and the petty bourgeoisie about a third (figure 3). This starts from the desire to give the floor to doctors as well as to the most modest workers.

Figure 1
The witnesses according to their gender

	Witnesses	%	<i>Archivio deportazione piemontese</i> <i>ADP</i>	%
Male	17	43	3	27
Female	23	58	8	73
total	40	100	11	100

Figure 2
The witnesses according to their age (January 1942)

	Witnesses	%	<i>ADP</i>	%
< 16 years old	9	23	0	0
16 to 20 years old	7	18	1	9
21 to 25 years old	9	23	2	18
26 to 30 years old	7	18	3	27
> 30 years old	8	20	5	45
Total	40	100	11	100

²⁵ The categories were established using the scheme elaborated by Christophe Charle, “Les milieux d’affaires dans la structure de la classe dominante vers 1900,” *ARSS* 20-22 (1978): 86. The scheme is simplified and reproduced in the work of Nicolas Mariot, *Tous unis dans la tranchée?*, 413.

²⁶ The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defines the notion of “symbolic capital” in *Raisons pratiques: sur la théorie de l’action*, (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 160-1.

Figure 3
The witnesses according to their social background (prior to deportation)

	Witnesses	%	ADP	%
working classes	9	23	0	0
petty bourgeoisie	11	28	4	36
middle classes	4	10	2	18
upper classes	15	38	5	45
unknown	1	3	0	0
total	40	100	11	100

For the purpose of lexicometric analyses, we had to fall back on a more limited corpus of digitized testimonies, which make up a homogeneous *ensemble*. Indeed, the corpus has to be homogeneous (length of the testimonies; date; etc.) in order to obtain relevant results.²⁷ The corpus is formed by 11 archival transcriptions originating from the collection of the Piedmontese Institute for the History of the Resistance and of the Contemporary Society [*Istituto Piemontese per la Storia della Resistenza e della Società Contemporanea*],²⁸ which in the 1980s created the Piedmontese Deportation Archives [*Archivio della Deportazione Piemontese, ADP*].²⁹ It should be noted that this was a regional initiative, which gathered testimonies of political and racial deportees resident in Piedmont at the time of interviews.³⁰ This archive is made up of 219 testimonies, recorded on audio cassettes, collected between 1982 and 1985. Within

²⁷ Lemerrier and Zalc, *Méthodes quantitatives pour l'historien*, 50.

²⁸ To the best of my knowledge, this is the only collection of Italian testimonies of which the texts were transcribed and digitized.

²⁹ Archivio della deportazione piemontese, Istituto piemontese per la Storia della Resistenza e della società contemporanea 'Giorgio Agosti,' Turin.

³⁰ The testimonies were collected between 1982 and 1985 in the houses of the deportees and registered on audiotapes. The project was directed by Aldo Agosti, professor of the history department of the University of Turin, and coordinated by Anna Bravo, Federico Cereja (both from the University of Turin), Brunello Mantelli (History Institutes) and Anna Maria Bruzzone (expert in the use of oral sources). Parts of the interviews are edited by Anna Bravo and Daniele Jalla, *La vita offesa. Storia e memoria dei Lager nazisti nei racconti di duecento sopravvissuti*, (Milan: Franco Angeli, 1986). On the way Italian post-war culture conceived the figure of the deportee – and on the mixing of racial and political experiences see the works of Paola Bertilotti, who discussed her PhD at Science Po, under the supervision of Marc Lazar, on the memory of Fascist and Nazi Anti-Semitic persecutions in Italy (full title: “Les persécutions antisémites fascistes et nazies en Italie: mémoires et représentations entre 1944 et 1967”). She has published in particular “A poco a poco la memoria. Contrasti e trasformazioni della memoria dello sterminio in Italia,” in *Storia della Shoah in Italia*, eds. Marcello Flores, Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, Simon Levis-Sullam, Enzo Traverso (Turin: UTET, 2010). See also Lorenzo Bertucelli, “Le camp de Fossoli (Carpi, Italie): Histoire, témoignages, mémoires,” in *Témoins et témoignages: figures et objets dans l'histoire du XXe siècle*, eds. Charles Heimberg, Frédéric Rousseau, Yannis Thanassekos (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2016), 167.

our corpus 11 individuals, 3 men and 8 women, testified in this manner: these testimonies are therefore subjected both to qualitative and lexicometric analyses. To that end, we have eliminated the interviewers' questions from the text, so to take into account only the witnesses' discourses. It should be noted as well that different interviewers were in charge of the testimonies: if the interviewers give information about what they know in the wording of their questions, the indications given by the latter may lead the witness "to complete his/her perceptions and even to rectify them."³¹ This bias or filter has to be considered at all time when interpreting the results of the lexicometric analyses. Furthermore, these witnesses represent a fairly unbalanced sample in relation to the overall corpus, as can be seen in the present figures (1; 2; 3; 4): women, upper class individuals and elder deportees are indeed overrepresented.

From the point of view of the concentration camp experience, the two witnesses who were interned for the longest time in the camps were arrested in October 1943; The one who was arrested the latest was arrested in August 1944: the duration of their experiences varied therefore between approximately 18 and 8 months. Most of the individuals were deported through the Fossoli transit camp to the Auschwitz camps,³² and 2 (those from mixed marriages) to Ravensbrück. In the camps these individuals were "selected" for the most diverse forced labor commandos (figure 4): exterior forced labor; factory forced labor; favored interior commandos (kitchens, *Kanada*...); specialists (doctors, nurses, translators ...) and other privileged roles (*Kapos*, *Blockälteste*, ...). If those working in exterior forced labor commandos and factories account for 43% of the present corpus, those who have occupied privileged "functions" and specialists account for 18%.

³¹ Dulong, *Le témoin oculaire*, 25-6.


³² Concerning the dynamics of Italian deportation and the role of Fossoli see Michele Sarfatti, *Gli ebrei nell'Italia fascista. Vicende, identità, persecuzione*, (Turin: Einaudi, 2007); Lilitana Picciotto Fargion, *L'alba ci colse come un tradimento: gli ebrei nel campo di Fossoli 1943-1945*, (Milan: Mondadori, 2010); Giuseppe Mayda, *Storia della deportazione dall'Italia 1943-1945: Militari, ebrei e politici nei lager del Terzo Reich*, (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002).

Figure 4

The witnesses according to their forced labor commandos in the Nazi Concentration and Extermination camps

	Witnesses	%	ADP	%
forced labor outside	11	28	5	45
factory forced labor	6	15	0	0
favoured interior commandos	10	25	5	45
privileged skilled forced labor	7	18	1	9
Other	6	15	0	0
Total	40	100	11	100

Finally, regarding the act of testifying, we have consulted a total of 84 testimonies (on average 2 testimonies per witness): 51% of the testimonies in the corpus are published works, with or without the bias of a second person (archivist, historian, journalist...), whereas oral testimonies arising from the important moments of archival collection represent 45% of the testimonies, to which are added a few declarations and letters. It can be noted that only 9 testimonies (representing a quarter of the individuals) is written before 1947 (figure 5). Indeed, in the attempt to establish a corpus that is balanced according to the social backgrounds of the witnesses, we have included testimonies covering a large time interval (1945-2016), as the published testimonial accounts in the first years following Liberation are almost exclusively written by individuals coming from the upper classes.



Hierarchical dynamics in the Nazi camps

The categorization of the deportees

The categorization of prisoners in itself acts as a means of hierarchization. Moreover, the insignia of these categories had to be visible on the jackets of the deportees: they were thus categorized/stigmatized as much in the eyes of the SS as amongst the other prisoners. The green triangles (common law criminals) occupy, in general, the official hierarchical functions, which reinforces them in a position of strength in the camps (even outside these roles). However, struggles for informal power are well documented:³³ if internal harmony is ensured when each member (or category) accepts the status that has been assigned to him, the opposite on the other hand can produce internal violence and conflict.³⁴ To assign different statutes to prisoners, and thus stigmatize them, acts therefore as an instrument of social control.

As historiography has shown, Jewish deportees were to be found at the bottom of the social structure. The analysis of co-occurrences with the lemma “anti-Semitic / anti-Semite(s) / antisemitism” in the ADP corpus shows that antisemitism is particularly present in the comments coming from Polish³⁵ codetainees. Settimia Spizzichino recalls in her published testimony:

As soon as I could, I went taking a walk in the camp in search of some Italians. I was informed about three sisters from Trieste who had recently arrived. I went to see them and we began to speak. They said they were political internees and asked: ‘And you, who are you? What did you do?’ I replied, ‘I haven’t done anything, I am here only because I am a Jew.’ It seemed that they did not understand and I tried to explain myself; I related the raid, the journey, the deportation. ‘But that means you are

³³ In particular by David Rousset, *Les jours de notre mort*, (Union générale d’Editions, 1974).

³⁴ “Internal harmony is ensured [in human groups] when all members accept the status assigned to them. Challenges to the hierarchy, on the other hand, often provoke violence. Thus, a stable social organization both enhances the group’s ability to deal with its environment and by regulating group relationships reduces internal violence.” Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to authority*, (New York: Harper, 2009), 124.

³⁵ The word “Poles” occurs 7 times within 10 words distance (left and right) from the lemma “Anti-Semite/Semitism/Semitic.” Of all the co-occurents of the lemma, the word “Poles,” presents the most elevated co-occurrence score and number of co-frequency.

Jude! - said the tallest. '*Jude* is what the Germans say - I exclaimed taken aback - I am Jewish!' They looked at me with disgust. 'We do not want to have anything to do with the *Juden*.' I went away filled with rage and shame ... shame on their behalf, the "politicians."³⁶

Settimia Spizzichino, deported from the area of the ancient ghetto of Rome,³⁷ was clearly seeking to find deportees with whom she would be able to speak Italian and reconnect, through language and conversations, with her life from before deportation.³⁸ If the deportees thus tried to organize themselves in national groups,³⁹ also to look for potential support or 'allies' in order to survive, it must be said that the nationality of the deportees goes hand in hand with a whole series of prejudices.

Starting points: lexicometric analyses

The table of the hierarchical lexicon of nouns and adjectives⁴⁰ present in the ADP corpus (figure 6) demonstrates indeed the importance given in the testimonies of Italian deportees to the different nationalities present in the camps.

³⁶ This quotation, as well as all the following quotations are translated by the author of the paper. Settimia Spizzichino, *Gli anni rubati: le memorie di Settimia Spizzichino, reduce dai lager di Auschwitz e Bergen-Belsen*, ed. Isa di Nepi Olper, (Cava de' Tirreni: Comune di Cava de' Tirreni, 1996), 47.

³⁷ Settimia Spizzichino, daughter of Mosè Mario Spizzichino, trader, and Grazia Di Segni, was born on April 15, 1921 in Rome. She was the youngest of 6 children. From Tivoli, due to the Anti-Semitic persecutions, the family moved to the area of the ancient ghetto of Rome. During the roundup, on the October 16, 1943, she was arrested with her father, mother and sister Giuditta. Settimia Spizzichino was deported through the Tiburtina station in Rome to Auschwitz on October 18, 1943. In Birkenau, she worked in forced labor commandos before being subjected to medical experiments in the Auschwitz *Stammlager* (Block 10). In January 1945 she was transferred to Bergen Belsen where she was liberated by the British forces. Settimia Spizzichino is the only woman, arrested during the roundup on the October 16, to survive deportation.

³⁸ Chiara Nannicini Streitberger, "Les Italiens antifascistes dans les camps. L'exemple de Flossenbürg," *En Jeu: Revue pluridisciplinaire de la Fondation pour la mémoire de la déportation* 7 (2016): 22.

³⁹ Michael Pollak, *L'expérience concentrationnaire: essai sur le maintien de l'identité sociale*, (Paris: Editions Métailié, 1990).

⁴⁰ The table portraying the full lexicon (without lemmatization) is to be found in appendix, figure 13.

Figure 6
The frequency of occurrence of the most occurring nouns / adjectives in the Piedmontese corpus

	nouns (lemma)	translation	frequency of occurrence
1	campo/i	<i>camp</i>	565
2	tedesco/a/hi/he	<i>German</i>	270
3	russo/a/i/e	<i>Russian</i>	205
4	italiano/a/i/e	<i>Italian</i>	191
5	lavoro/i	<i>work</i>	178
6	gente	<i>people</i>	134
7	madre/i	<i>mother</i>	430
8	SS / S.S.	<i>SS</i>	129

If the lemma “German(s)” [*tedesco/a/hi/he*] and “Russian(s)” [*russo/a/i/e*] occupy a prominent place in the testimonies (representing more occurrences than words related to concrete objects/situations of everyday life: hunger, thirst, forced labor, etc.⁴¹), this is explained in the case of the lemma “German(s)” by the fact that the word embodies both the immediate perpetrators / actors of the persecution and all *evil* related to persecution in general. Furthermore, the lemma “German(s)” returns as much in the beginning of the different testimonies describing episodes related to the persecutions in Italy than in the end of the testimonies, describing the feelings of the witnesses towards “the Germans” in the aftermath of the war. In the case of the lemma “Russian(s),” its high frequency of occurrence can be explained by the fact that for most witnesses the Russians embody liberation (they are also referred to during the concentration camp experience as a temporal reference point: *When the Russians will be here..., Tomorrow the Russians will come... We can hear the Russian [bombing]*). The use of both “German(s)” and “Russian(s)” in the testimonies, goes therefore well beyond their *immediate* meaning, i.e. nationalities (one representing the oppressor, and to a greater extent deportation in itself, the other liberation and hope).

On the other hand, the lemma “Pole(s)/Polish” [*polacco/a/i/e*], figure 7, occupies a prominent place in the same list. It must be said here that these nouns refer both to the language and nationality, which in some way distorts the results

⁴¹ This is the outcome as well in a larger lexicometric study on the effects of the time of testifying on lexical fields. Bénédicte Pincemin, Damon Mayaffre, Serge Heiden, Philippe Weyl, “Génétique mémorielle. Shoah, mémoire et ADT,” (paper presented at the “13^{ème} Journées internationales d’Analyse statistique des Données textuelles,” Nice, June 7-10, 2016). Paper downloadable on the JADT’s website: <http://lexicometrica.univ-paris3.fr/jadt/jadt2016/>.

(the hierarchical list of lexicon without lemmatization sheds light on this point; figure 13⁴²).

Figure 7

The frequency of occurrence of nouns / adjectives related to language and nationality in the Piedmontese corpus (min. 10 occurrences)

	nouns (lemma)	translation	frequency of occurrence
1	tedesco/a/hi/he	<i>German</i>	270
2	russo/a/i/e	<i>Russian</i>	205
3	italiano/a/i/e	<i>Italian</i>	191
4	polacco/a/he/hi	<i>Pole/Polish</i>	101
5	francese/i	<i>French</i>	58
6	ungherese/i	<i>Hungarian</i>	17
7	ceccoslovacco/a/hi/he	<i>Czechoslovak</i>	13
8	olandese/i	<i>Dutch</i>	11
9	greco/a/i/he	<i>Greek</i>	10

If we study the case of the lemma “Pole(s)/Polish” more closely (insofar as Polish is the nationality / language of which the image emerges fairly unanimously after a qualitative study of the testimonies), several hypotheses can be tested. In order to avoid losing the meaning of the words, we first carried out some concordance analyses (figure 8).

Figure 8


The frequency of occurrence of the word “Pole(s)/Polish” in the Piedmontese corpus according to its semantic value (through concordance analyses)

	Frequency of occurrence	%
Negative value	60	59
language barriers	15	
hierarchization	19	
other	26	
neutral	36	36
Positive value	5	5
Occurrences total	101	100

⁴² The table portraying the full lexicon (without lemmatization) is to be found in appendix at the end of the article.

From the table of concordances, we have proceeded to the description of

different lexical fields (figures 8 and 9). The first three “categories” represent statements in which the lemma is mobilized to describe a rather negative episode. In the category “language barriers” the lemma “Pole(s)/Polish” is used signifying the Polish language [*polacco*]; the statements describe above all the incomprehension (or isolation) related to the lack of language knowledge. The



lemma is then associated 19 times with the hierarchical organization (official and unofficial) within the *Lager* (the preminent place of the Polish, and the abuse of their status, is especially discussed). The third category assembles a heterogeneous *ensemble* of other episodes presenting a negative value (“The Poles with whom we were hated us ... / The Poles were anti-Semites above all .../ The Polish prisoners bullied the other prisoners...”).

In the corpus of testimonies, a rather positive value is attributed to the Poles or to Polish language, when the deportee relates punctual episodes, describing other inmates (in this case it’s only the singular “Pole” and not the plural form “The Poles” that is used): “There was a very competent Polish doctor who took care of us... / He was a very nice Pole” This goes to show that in order to describe co-deportees in testimonies, it’s to their nationality the witnesses refer. This explains partly the importance attributed to lemma related to nationalities in testimonies dealing with deportation.

Finally, the category of “neutral values,” refers on the one side to the civilian world (as the majority of witnesses are interned in camps in Poland, the sentences concern civilian workers as well as resistance networks outside of the camps⁴³);

⁴³ The doctor Leonardo de Benedetti included in the ADP corpus, gives indeed a long description on the resistance networks in and outside the camps.

on the other side, and to a greater extent, the lemma “Pole(s)/Polish” can be used in enumerations of different nationalities present in the camp / the block /...

The presence of other nationalities (the French and the Czechoslovaks for example) in close proximity to the word “Poles” is attested as well by the study of co-occurrences (figure 10).⁴⁴

Figure 10

The cooccurrent nouns of the word "Poles" (m., pl.) in the Piedmontese corpus, classified according to the score of attraction probability

cooccurrent	translation	frequency	co-frequency	score	mean distance
polacchi	<i>Poles (m)</i>	54	14	18	5,6
antisemiti	<i>anti-Semites</i>	3	3	6	6,7
polacche	<i>Poles (f)</i>	25	5	6	3,4
tedeschi	<i>Germans (m)</i>	144	8	5	3,5
capi	<i>Kapos</i>	24	4	4	1,5
italiani	<i>Italians (m)</i>	85	6	4	5,5
cecoslovacchi	<i>Czechoslovaks</i>	2	2	4	2
tzigàni	<i>gypsies</i>	2	2	4	6,5
padroni	<i>bosses</i>	3	2	3	5,5
politici	<i>political prisoners</i>	23	3	3	7,3
francesi	<i>French (m)</i>	32	3	3	2
criminali	<i>criminals</i>	9	2	2	4,5
polacco	<i>Polish / Pole (m)</i>	11	2	2	6,5
civili	<i>civilians</i>	13	2	2	0
contatto	<i>contact</i>	14	2	2	3,5
prigionieri	<i>prisoners</i>	65	3	2	5,7
ebrei	<i>Jews</i>	70	3	2	7,3

We have investigated the co-occurrences starting from the word “Poles” and not from the lemma “Pole(s)/Polish” (which means the Polish language is not taken into account here). If the presence of the word “Poles” (f. and m.) in the table could be surprising at first sight, this can be explained by the fact that the word “Poles” often returns in the same sentence or at the beginning or end of the next or former sentence. The fact that these are transcriptions of oral testimonies induces a lot of repetitions.

⁴⁴ The co-occurrence calculations take into account 10 words distance (left and right) from the key word. The results are classified according to the score describing the probability of proximity between two words or lemma.

It is interesting to note, that the word “Poles” is most often associated with the word “Germans,” the two nationalities representing frequently the hierarchy of the Lager (indeed the two words often don’t take up their primary and proper meaning of “nationality,” but slide to mean *Kapo*, “guards,” SS, or in any case privileged prisoner). It’s in this same sense that the words “*Kapo*” and “*bosses*” are co-present in the statements containing the word “Poles.” Moreover, the word “Poles” seems to be associated with the more advantageous categories of prisoners: political prisoners and professional criminals. On the other hand, the word “civilians” reflects the fact that the civilian workers in the camps were mostly Polish.

Finally, the word “anti-Semites” is used only in connection to the word “Poles.” This, again, implies a representation of violent (physical and symbolic) behavior of the “Poles” towards the Jewish (and Italian Jewish) witnesses. Moreover, when the co-occurrence search window is widened,⁴⁵ the words “authority” and “*Lager*” can be added to the table, both referring to a prominent position of the Poles in the tacit hierarchy of the camps.

The problems related to the difficult comprehension of the language spoken in the camps come back when one also takes into account the verbs⁴⁶: the verb *capire* [to understand] and above all its form *capivamo* [we understood] results to be the most co-present. To go further into this analysis, we consider the words that co-occur with the words *capivo* [I understood] and *capivamo*; in both cases the word *non* [didn’t] has the highest number of co-frequency (and is repeated more than once in the same sentence: 17 co-occurrences with *capivamo*, whereas the latter is present only 13 times in the ADP corpus). The noun “*angoscia* [fear / anguish] has the highest co-occurrence score.⁴⁷

From this case study, through the prism of lexicometric analyses, the two sets of representations insistently associated with the term “Polish/Poles” are, on the one hand, hierarchical organization, on the other, linguistic barriers. Each of these fields subsequently refer to images of anguish, fear, and isolation. Indeed, relationships of dominance can often be linked to language.

⁴⁵ Taking into consideration 20 words before and 20 after the key word.

⁴⁶ We excluded auxiliary verbs.

⁴⁷ The score represents a correlation coefficient taking into account different variables (the frequency of occurrence of the co-occurrent, the co-frequency, and mean distance).

Language as a factor of isolation and hierarchization

If German is considered the official language in the Nazi *KL*, Polish is attested as the “second” language of orders: as the linguist Giovanna Massariello Merzagora points out, the appellation of certain functions occupied by prisoners (*Blockova - Blockowa*: Polish variant designating the function of *Blockälteste*, “dean of the block” in women’s camps) is a good indicator on the hierarchical superiority of the Poles.⁴⁸ In the ADP corpus subjected to lexicometric analyses, the strongest co-occurrence score of the word “language” (7), apart from functional co-occurrences (auxiliary verbs / pronouns) is to be found in the co-frequency of the word “Polish.” This underlines yet again the importance of Polish in the camps. Moreover, the linguistic affinity between Slavic languages and Polish, between Germanic languages and German, provides a greater possibility of exchange between them. Therefore, Italian prisoners who did not master a foreign language, making them initially incapable of understanding orders, were first mistreated by the SS and *Kapos*, and then felt isolated from their fellow prisoners.⁴⁹

Leonella Jona Bellinzona,⁵⁰ interned in Ravensbrück and a teacher in primary education in the post-war period, points out the problem of understanding languages:

I actually tell all the students and mothers I know, ‘Without diploma, but languages...’ Because if you know some languages, you already have a great advantage over others, on the other hand we... [...] whilst the Russians knew German, the Poles knew French and German, we were

⁴⁸ Giovanna Massariello Merzagora, “Il lager come babilonia: il plurilinguismo nei KZ,” in *Il lager: il ritorno della memoria. Atti del convegno internazionale 6-7 aprile – Università degli studi di Verona*, eds. Gian Paolo Marchi, Giovanna Massariello Merzagora, (Milan–Trieste: ANED-Edizioni Lint Trieste, 1997), 133.

⁴⁹ Donatella Chiapponi, *La lingua nei lager nazisti*, 37.

⁵⁰ Leonella Jona Bellinzona, daughter of Federico Jona Bellinzona, a stationmaster, was born on the February 22, 1913 in Turin. Her mother was catholic. Leonella was a primary school teacher before the racial persecutions. After the armistice on September 8, 1943, she entered a Resistance group between Canale and Turin. She was arrested on May 2, 1944 as a partisan and transferred from Turin to Fossoli due to the fact that her father was Jewish. She was deported from Verona in a convoy for Jewish women from mixed marriages on August 2, 1944 to Ravensbrück, where she worked in particular in a sewing commando. Leonella Jona Bellinzona, during the evacuation march, was liberated near Lütz on April 30, 1945, by the Russian army.

absolute waste, we found ourselves in tragic conditions, our condition as Italians has been tragic. Contempt everywhere.⁵¹

Language, or rather, the ability to communicate with others (in this case with fellow prisoners, privileged deportees, guards), is indeed one of the (only) pillars that makes it possible to regain a social bond. Moreover, the guards did not hesitate to isolate the newly arrived deportees as much as possible. Leonella Jona Bellinzona remarks: “Then, in the blocs, they managed to put together people from a nationality that didn’t amalgamate with the other nationalities.”⁵²

Isolation is one of the techniques of humiliation theorized by the sociologist Erving Goffman.⁵³ Feeling isolated tends to prevent redefining one’s own role, as no point of comparison to others can be found. Therefore, if the isolation from the outside world, where the deportee left all his points of reference, constituted a clear break and identity crisis, being isolated in the camps constituted an utter crisis. At an encounter between Teodoro Ducci⁵⁴ and Achille, another Italian deportee, Achille expressed to Teodoro his condition of isolation:

You see Teo, in my *Kommando* there are Ukrainians, Poles and Hungarians. Nobody knows a word, I do not say of Italian, but at least French. We understand each other with this mixture of German and Yiddish which is the official language here, if one can say it like that. I live in an obsessive solitude. There is no one I can communicate with. You know what it means not understanding and not being able to exchange a word with those that surround you day and night? I am alone in a

⁵¹ *Trascrizione intervista a Leonella Bellinzona* [IT Coo FD451], 16, interviewer: Laura Matteucci, September 27/29, 1982, October 7, 1982, Archivio della deportazione piemontese, Archivio Istoreto, Turin.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 30.

⁵³ Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*, (Anchor Books, 1961).

⁵⁴ Teodoro Ducci, son of Rodolfo Ducci, a sales representative, and Luisa Hoffmann, was born on August 12, 1913 in Budapest (Hungary). His parents moved to Opatija (nowadays Croatia) where he grew up. Teo Ducci mastered at the University Ca Foscari in Venice in Diplomatic Sciences in 1939 and worked as a translator for the University of Padua and for the editor Baldini & Castoldi. In 1943, the family moved to Florence due to the bombings and went into hiding. The family was arrested on February 12, 1944. On April 5, 1944 Teo was deported through Fossoli to Auschwitz. In Birkenau he was subjected to a variety of forced labor commandos (especially *Schädlingsbekämpfung*). He participated in the Death March on January 18, 1945 from Auschwitz to Mauthausen, where he was liberated on May 5, 1945 by the American army.

heterogeneous crowd of which I am excluded. We have in common only the fact that we're Jews and deported. Believe me, it's scary. I'm going crazy. I haven't heard a kind word in days. Here, in this Babel, they make me die a slow death. I have no one to help me. I'm afraid I won't be able to pull through.⁵⁵

“Babel” (from the Hebrew verb בבל, BBL, “to confuse”), is indeed an image that returns in several testimonies.⁵⁶ Babylon becomes the first society provided with a social hierarchy, based on the dispersion of languages and therefore on the division of its subjects. In the testimony of the translator Teodoro Ducci, who had received a religious education, the reference to the Tower of Babel embodies the impossibility of communication and thus mutual help between deportees. Above all, the quotation shows how the knowledge or understanding of languages in the camps was necessarily linked to hierarchical organization.⁵⁷ This is also what Liliana Segre reports: “In the factory we were almost all Western Europeans: Dutch, Belgian, and many French women. It was a Babel of languages which, intermingled, made the outcome extremely difficult. There were also prisoners from Eastern Europe who spoke Yiddish and were therefore fraternized by a common destiny.”⁵⁸

As these witnesses testify, among the Jewish community of the East (Ashkenazi Judaism) the spoken language is very often Yiddish, conveying a certain sense of common belonging and common destiny. The chemist, Primo Levi, analyses the isolation and stigmatization of Italian Jewish deportees, through the prism of the Yiddish language, in an interview of 1982:

We were rejected, we Sephardic Jews or Italians anyway, because we did not speak Yiddish, we were foreigners to..., foreigners at first to the Germans as Jews, and foreigners also to the Eastern Jews because we weren't like them, because we didn't have, they had no idea that [another form of] Judaism existed... Many, many Polish Jews of low extraction were annoyed by this fact: ‘But you're a Jew? Redest keyn jiddisch, bist ni

⁵⁵ Teo Ducci, *Un tallèt ad Auschwitz. 10.2.1944 – 5.5.1945*, (Florence: La Giuntina, 2000), 75.

⁵⁶ Giovanna Massariello Merzagora, “Una perpetua Babele. Usi e forme della Lagersprache,” in *La lingua dei Lager: Parole e memoria dei deportati italiani*, 119-55.

⁵⁷ Roland Barthes, “Leçon inaugurale de la chaire de sémiologie littéraire au Collège de France prononcée le 7 janvier 1977,” in *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Eric Marty, (Paris: Seuil, 1995), vol. III : 1974-1980, 803; Pierre Bourdieu, *Langage et pouvoir symbolique*, (Paris: Seuil, 2001).

⁵⁸ Liliana Segre, *La memoria rende liberi*, ed. Enrico Mentana, (Milan: Rizzoli, 2015), 111.

keyn jid' they say, I don't know if you understand. *Redest keyn jiddisch, bist nit keyn jid*,⁵⁹ as *Yiddish* is the adjective that derives from *jid*, and *jid* meaning *Jude*, which means Jewish, it is almost a syllogism, it means a Frenchman who does not speak French. A Frenchman who doesn't speak French is not French. A *Jid* who doesn't speak Yiddish is no Jid. [...] We Italian Jews, we felt particularly defenseless, we and the Greeks were the last among the last; I would say we were in even worse conditions than the Greeks, because the Greeks were in large part accustomed to discrimination, there was anti-Semitism in Thessaloniki, they had built their weapons [...]. But the Italians, the Italian Jews so used to being considered on equal terms with all the others, were truly without shells, naked as an egg without shell.⁶⁰

In her testimony, published in 1947, Liana Millul⁶¹ accentuates the same idea: “The Italian Jewish deportee was in a position of inferiority and isolation, not only because of the hatred of the SS and the *Kapos*, but also because he/she was unable to communicate with the other Jews. In the camp, at once, a strong feeling of solitude grew in all of us.”⁶²

Language therefore does convey, more than a mere coded statement, relations of dominance. A Jew of the East, who found himself being part of a majority or who has arrived previously in the camps, demonstrated through the exchanges of speeches that he dominated over his interlocutors. This goes hand in hand with a sense of legitimacy to dominate. In the case of the quotation of Primo Levi, the eastern deportees did not speak only in Yiddish to their interlocutors, but in a mixture of Yiddish and a language in which the interlocutor is able to grasp the meaning of the discourse. In this way, the relation of dominance is more concealed from a linguistic point of view (the one who feels himself dominant

⁵⁹ Translation: “If you don't speak Yiddish, you're not a Jew.”

⁶⁰ Anna Bravo and Federico Cereja, “Ex deportato Primo Levi: un'intervista (27 gennaio 1983),” *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 55/2-3 (1989): 310.


⁶¹ Liana Millul, daughter of Corrado Millul, a stationmaster, and Gina Pia Essinger, was born on December 21, 1914 in Pisa. She was an elementary school teacher. In 1940, she moved to Genoa and participated, after the armistice, in the activities of the Resistance group *Otto*. She was arrested on March 7, 1944 and interned in the Fossoli camp. She was deported to Auschwitz on May 16, 1944. Liana Millul worked in a variety of forced labor commandos (mostly outside). By the end of 1944, she was transferred to Ravensbrück and to Malchow where she worked in a munitions factory until her liberation on April 30, 1945.

⁶² Liana Millul and Donatella Chiapponi, “Intervista a Liana Millul,” Genoa, September 15, 1999, in *La lingua nei Lager nazisti*, 119.

descends at the level of the one he thinks he's dominating). By denying this relationship of domination, the dominant emerges only reinforced in his position. This is an example of what the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls the "strategy of condescension."⁶³

The other quoted examples demonstrate, on the contrary, that the deportees able to speak in Yiddish did not necessarily make an effort to be understood and thus exclude the minority of deportees incapable of understanding. This means they obliged the latter to adapt. The language spoken by the Italian deportees, or rather their lack (in general) of linguistic knowledge placed them therefore automatically below prisoners from other nationalities or Jewish traditions: having had to succeed in an effort of acculturation to maximize their chances of survival (which equals not being isolated), the Italians necessarily underwent a stronger selection.⁶⁴ This is what we find as well in the testimony of Alberto Sed in particular, where the deportee receives the punches intended for another prisoner who, by his knowledge of German, knew how to put the blame on Alberto instead of him.⁶⁵

It must be said, however, that the foreign witnesses or those coming from Rijeka (annexed to Italy in 1924) in the present corpus, knew more (Slavic) languages and were far less isolated. In addition, as far as the hierarchical and advantaged commandos go, these individuals seem to have had more chances to occupy privileged positions in the Nazi Camps (figure 11). This demonstrates how the lack of linguistic capital can be a factor of isolation or stigmatization and, conversely, the knowledge of



⁶³ Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, "Les fins de la sociologie réflexive (Le séminaire de Chicago)," in *Invitation à la sociologie réflexive*, (Paris: Seuil, 2014), 194.

⁶⁴ Pierre Bourdieu, Jean-Claude Passeron, *La reproduction: éléments pour une théorie du système d'enseignement*, (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1970), 91.

⁶⁵ Alberto Sed, *Sono stato un numero. Alberto Sed racconta*, ed. Roberto Riccardi, (Florence: La Giuntina, 2009), 85.

languages a possible weapon of survival.

Nationality and stereotypes

The isolation of the Italian minority of Jews in the camps (6 806 deported individuals⁶⁶), was soon accompanied by stereotypical images or abusive language coming from other Jewish deportees. In the Italian testimonies these stereotypes return many times and isolate the witnesses further. Leonella Jona Bellinzona recalls:

The Italian woman, who entered the camp between the end of 1943 and 1944, when she entered the camp, found herself even below the sub-proletariat, if it's possible to express it this way, because she arrived in the camp being considered with an evil eye by the Germans, who were calling us *Badoglio* and who spat when we passed. Considered with an evil eye by the other inmates and surrounded by their terrible mistrust; they called us *Mussolini fascist* and, besides, a complete ignorance of the language.⁶⁷

The insults that the Italians have most endured are undoubtedly those referring to the contemporary political situation in Italy: the use of the names *Badoglio*⁶⁸ and *Mussolini* were indeed very frequent. It is interesting to note here that in the ADP corpus, looking for co-occurring words with the word “Germans,” the word “*Badoglio*” emerges three times.⁶⁹ The oral testimony of Elena Recanati Foà,⁷⁰ who was interned in Birkenau, Bergen Belsen, Braunschweig and Ravensbrück, is particularly explicit on the matter:

⁶⁶ Liliana Picciotto Fargion, “Tavole riassuntive della persecuzione antiebraica in Italia,” in *Il libro della memoria. Gli Ebrei deportati dall'Italia (1943-1945)*, 28.

⁶⁷ *Trascrizione intervista a Leonella Bellinzona* [IT Co0 FD451], 27, interviewer: Laura Matteucci, September 27-29, 1982; October 7, 1982, Archivio della deportazione piemontese, Archivio Istoretto, Turin.

⁶⁸ Pietro Badoglio, Marshal of Italy and future head of state, signs the armistice with the Allies on September 8, 1943.

⁶⁹ Frequency of occurrence 3, co-frequency 3, mean distance 8.7.

⁷⁰ Elena Recanati, daughter of Luigi Recanati, a trader, and Luigia Simon, was born on November 12, 1922 in Turin. The family, due to the racial persecutions in 1938, fled to Rome. She married Guido Foà on August 9, 1942, in Rome and moved back to Turin, where their first child, Massimo, was born. The family went into hiding in Canischio, but was finally arrested on August 9, 1944. In prison, the baby was put into safety. Elena Recanati Foà was deported through Bolzano to Auschwitz on October 24, 1944. She was transferred after only three days to

And then I have to say, perhaps because I was used to being persecuted, persecuted as a Jew, persecuted also during the captivity... when I was in the hands of the Germans ... the Germans persecuted me because I was Jewish, but the Poles, with whom we were, also hated us, because we – Italians- were not Jews like them, we did not understand Yiddish, we had a different mentality, we didn't feel equal; so we were already detested by the other Jews who considered us different. And in addition, the Germans hated us because we were Italians. Among the Germans they said: 'Italienen, ah Badoglio.' When I was liberated by the Russians: 'Italienska, ah Mussolini.' It was never ok, I had always been persecuted for one reason or another, for being Jewish, for being Italian, for being a woman.⁷¹

Apart from the insults related to the Italian political situation, there are also much more "common" insults to be found in Italian testimonies, such as *Macaroni*, and its variants *Maccheroni*, *Macarrone* (litt. "pasta eaters"). This is the case in particular in the testimony of Bruno Piazza:⁷²

I had already experienced during the day how the Italians (and also the Greeks) were treated worse than all the others by the Poles. We were a small minority and they despised us. 'Taliano?' they asked with a sarcastic smile. 'Maccaroni?' and they softened the "r" so that they seemed to say 'Maccagioni.' 'Spaghetti,' I replied without losing my composure, 'Tagliatelli in sauce and tortellini from Bologna, quite the opposite of your dishwater,' they didn't understand all of it, but they realized that I laughed at them and repeated seriously: 'Taliani

Bergen Belsen and from there to Brunswick and then to Ravensbrück. She was liberated on April 30, 1945 by the Russian army.

⁷¹ *Trascrizione intervista a Elena Recanati* [IT Co0 FD867], 28, interviewer: Laura Matteucci, March 30, 1982, *Archivio della deportazione piemontese*, Archivio Istoretto, Turin.

⁷² Bruno Piazza, son of Giulio Piazza and Olga Frankel, was born on December 16, in Trieste. He was a lawyer and journalist and was married to Angela De Job with whom he had three children. Bruno Piazza was arrested (for the second time) on July 13, 1944 in Trieste because of his supposed antifascist activities. He was interned in the Risiera di San Sabba camp and then transferred to the prison of Trieste (Coroneo). He was deported on July 31, 1944 as a political prisoner to Auschwitz. In Birkenau he supervises the storage area. After being selected for the gas chambers (where he got pulled out because of the fact that he had been deported for political reasons), he occupied the function of *Schreiber* in his block. Bruno Piazza was liberated on January 27, 1945, by the Russian army.

*maccaroni, greco bandito.*⁷³ The company of these stupid and wicked people, scum of the backstreets of Cracow, Warsaw, Lviv, and Lublin, was indeed one of the innumerable torments of the camp.⁷⁴

These elements are present in testimonies of deportees interned in different Nazi concentration and extermination camps (in particular Ravensbrück, Bergen Belsen and various Auschwitz camps), which means that they were reproduced independently in different places. The fact that common insults of all times like *Maccaroni* did find their way into the extreme living conditions of the Nazi concentration camps, goes to show that a sort of normality does find its way within these particular social spaces.

Length of internment in the concentration and extermination camps

There was yet another inequality among the deportees, accentuated by the policies of deportation in the respective countries: if the Polish and German Jews seemed to be at the top of the scale (among the Jews) it had to do as well with their “Seniority” of imprisonment (those who survive have now exceeded many selections). The intermediate “positions” were then attributed to those who were or deported at an earlier stage, from 1942 onwards (the French for example), or those who understood the languages of the camps more quickly (due to language proximity).

The fact that Italian Jews entered the camps relatively late made the adaptation time “attributed” to them by the other prisoners extremely reduced.⁷⁵ Indeed, the accounts testify about the lack of understanding of the “old” detainees. Especially in the women’s testimonies, the hatred against the Italians is clear and is mainly due to the fact that the Italians were able to stay much longer in their homes of origin, that they had to endure “less terrible events”: in other words, all those who have not been, at least for a while, in Birkenau did not deserve respect.⁷⁶

⁷³ Translation: “*Italians macaronis, Greeks criminals*”

⁷⁴ Bruno Piazza, *Perché gli altri dimenticano*, (Milan: Feltrinelli Editore, 1956), 85-6.

⁷⁵ Yisrael Gutman, “Social Stratification in the Concentration Camps,” in *The Nazi Concentration Camps: Structure and Aims, the Image of the Prisoner, the Jews in the Camps, Proceedings of the Fourth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference – January 1980*, (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1984), 172.

⁷⁶ Ima Spanjaard Van Esso declares in particular: “On top of that, they [Polish and Czech deportees] could not seem to forgive us that we had not been in Birkenau.” Declaration of Ima

The place of the Italians is, from this point of view, indeed far from being preeminent. Their presence in the camps dating, for the longest, only from October 1943, they found themselves in rather the same conditions as the Jews deported from Greece (deportation being organized from February 1943 for the Jews of Salonica and later for the Greeks of the south). The Italians (and Greeks, for that matter) did not take long, in turn, to assert their seniority on those who arrived later: this is the case in particular with the Hungarians (Hungary being occupied by the Germans on March 12, 1944, deportation was organized, after a stage of ghettoization, from April and until July 1944). If the Poles, in the Italian testimonies we have consulted, had an image of a “violent” people (because of their privileged, hierarchical roles), but were generally respected by the fear they cause and by their ability to have overcome, physically and mentally, so many trials, the Italians soon stigmatized the Hungarians as “Physically degraded, dirty beings.” Dora Klein⁷⁷ writes how a co-deportee (named Marta), seeing her poorly tended, said: “Calm down then, do your hair and be a little more self-assured, like this you look like a Hungarian.”⁷⁸ Dora Klein continues: “I had to realize to my great regret how the Hungarian Jews didn’t appear to us as victims of a tragic event, but as a symbol of physical degradation.” Giuliana Fiorentino Tedeschi⁷⁹ explains this change of condition from the bottom of the scale to a

Shalom Spanjaard Van Esso, interviewer: R.C. Broek, Utrecht, April 13, 1948, n. 854, 250d: Kampen en Gevangenissen, Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam.

⁷⁷ Dora Klein, daughter of Baruch Klein, a trader, and Rosa Herskowitz, was born on January 25 1913 in Lodz, Poland. The spoken languages within the family household are Yiddish, Polish and German. She was denied access to Medical school (because of her Jewish background) and decided to migrate to Bratislava (Czechoslovakia) in 1930. She was forced to leave the country because of communist activities. She pursued her medical studies at the University of Bologna. Dora Klein then moved to Naples to be close to her fiancé. The couple’s first daughter, Silvia, was born on the 25th of November 1937. In order to flee further Nazi persecutions, she left her daughter in Udine and moved to Borgotaro, where she was arrested on the 30th of November 1943. She was deported through Fossoli to Auschwitz on April 5, 1944. Dora Klein was nominated *Ärtzin*, doctor, in the Auschwitz sub-camp Budy. She was transferred in January 1945 to Bergen Belsen where she was liberated by the British army on April 15, 1945.

⁷⁸ Dora Klein, *Vivere e sopravvivere: diario 1936-1945*, (Milan: Ugo Mursia Editore, 2001), 236.

⁷⁹ Giuliana Fiorentino, daughter of Carlo Fiorentino, a pharmacist, and Rina Rietti, was born on April 9, 1914 in Milan. She mastered in linguistics at the University of Milan in 1936. She married the architect Giorgio Tedeschi and moved to Turin in 1939, where her two children were born. Giuliana was arrested with her husband on the 8th of March 1944, the children were put into safety. Giuliana was deported on the 5th of April 1944 through the Fossoli transit camp to Auschwitz. In Birkenau she worked in the recycling of shoes before being transferred to Auschwitz I, where she worked mainly in construction commandos. Giuliana Fiorentino was

middle position: “Ours was an exceptional group. We had left aside the Greeks, too savage, and removed the Hungarians, unbearable and bleating with those plaintive characteristic of their language, and we had constituted a Latin sector.”⁸⁰ If at the beginning Italian witnesses testify about inferiority or stigmatization, the more their concentration camp experience settled in time, the more their situation normalized.⁸¹

Figure 12

The frequency of occurrence of the word "Hungarian/s" according to its semantic value (through concordance analyses)

	Frequency of occurrence
Enumeration of nationalities	3
Witnesses' origins	4
Neutral (descriptive value)	4
Language barrier	2
Humiliating value	4
Occurrences total	17

The lexicometric concordance analyses of the ADP corpus (figure 12) highlight in this same sense how the lemma “Hungarian(s)” [*ungherese/i*] is used in the first place for practical reasons (the enumeration of the nationalities present in the barracks, the possible Hungarian origins⁸² of the witnesses, the description of a prisoner, identified by his nationality: *the Hungarian did so, did that...*). However, the lemma is used as well to pejoratively designate a group of off-center prisoners (“The Hungarians who were moribund ... / the lamentations of the Hungarians...”). Unlike the lemma “Pole(s)/Polish,” used by the witnesses in statements indicating a feeling of inferiority, the Hungarians are referred to in a rather condescending way.

transferred in January 1945 to Ravensbrück, and from there to Malchow and Leipzig. During the evacuation march from Malchow she fled on April 22, 1945.

⁸⁰ Giuliana Tedeschi, *Questo povero corpo*, (Milan: Editrice Italiana, 1946), 61.

⁸¹ “The situation of Italians, in the camp, in the beginning, was terrible; then, slowly, making oneself understood, with gestures and words, the situation got a little better.” *Trascrizione intervista a Leonella Bellinzona* [IT Co0 FD451], 16, interviewer: Laura Matteucci, September 27/29, 1982, October 7, 1982, Archivio della deportazione piemontese, Archivio Istoretto, Turin.

⁸² In this case the deportee Elemer Gyarmatj, born in Baja.

In the ADP corpus, which, as said, remains however very restricted, the lemma “Greek(s)” [greco/a/i/che] only occurs a total of ten times. If half of these occurrences relate to the witness’s pre-deportation studies (the learning of ancient Greek in high-school) or to the description of other nationalities in the camps; the other half concerns descriptions with a rather positive value: (e.g. “The Greeks were very human...”).

Conclusion

Through interactions that occur in the Nazi concentration camps, tacit and informal hierarchical relationships did emerge. When two deportees spoke to one another, a political deportee to a Jewish deportee, a Jewish Polish deportee to a Jewish Italian deportee, a deportee who had been in camps for years to a deportee who had only just arrived, they weren’t merely two deportees speaking: through them spoke their social, religious, cultural and political backgrounds and conditions, and more broadly the recent history of persecution and deportation, the general history of Jewish persecutions and diaspora, the history of religious divergences...⁸³. This study shows that there are as many mechanisms of subordination put in place officially (through the categorization of prisoners for example), as there are, emerging in a “natural” way.

The fact that Italian deportees constituted a minority within the camps (due to the fact that they were deported relatively late and that their number was significantly lower compared to other nationalities) had as a result that Italian Jews seem to have been particularly disadvantaged. What emerges from the study of 40 of their testimonies is that Italian Jews often felt isolated and therefore even more stigmatized. Belonging to a minority, or to (an) isolated group(s), which, moreover, in general had poor linguistic capacities, represented an additional symbolic violence. It must be added that as the concentration camp experience settled in time, Italians began to find their place and did not hesitate to stigmatize other groups, in particular through the use of abusive language. This further emphasizes a form of normalization of the life within the camps. I would also

⁸³ The image is borrowed from the description of Pierre Bourdieu. Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc Wacquant, “Les fins de la sociologie réflexive (Le séminaire de Chicago),” in *Invitation à la sociologie réflexive*, (Paris: Seuil, 2014), 195.

argue that the fact that the Italian Jews felt as isolated as their testimonies show, made them connect to one another even more so than other national groups.⁸⁴

It should also be noted that the witnesses of the corpus that seem particularly sensitive to the questions raised in this paper present rather homogeneous profiles. In 7 out of the 40 testimonies⁸⁵ we analyzed, an explicit reflection on language, subordination and stigmatization returns predominantly (if in the other testimonies these elements can be present, they are more implicit). These witnesses, four women and three men, all come (except for Elena Recanati Foà⁸⁶) from the “intellectual fraction” (upper classes) of the mobilized corpus: two of them are teachers; one is a translator; another a lawyer / politician; and finally one doctor and one chemist. The witnesses’ identity (conveyed by a political, social cultural background of origin, or on the contrary by the peculiarities of his/her experience in the camps or in the aftermath of the war) often seems to decide on the central themes of the testimony. In other words, the witnesses would have been more sensitive in their testimony to particular aspects of deportation according to their experiences before, during and after deportation. Thereupon, we must keep in mind that in the corpus on which we have carried out lexicometric analyses, the individuals coming from the upper classes are overrepresented and that the interviews take place 40 years after their concentration camp experiences.

It should be noted as well, that we didn’t get beyond studying informal domination on the scale of groups (Italian Jews), which necessarily implies falling back on generalizations and representations. As in all forms of society, there are even more forms of hierarchization and relations of dominance at the level of individuals, which could be the subject of a more in-depth study.

⁸⁴ I carried out this same research based on a corpus of Dutch testimonies. What emerges from this study is that the latter experienced to a lesser extent isolation or incomprehension than the Italians did. Furthermore, the Dutch deportees testify more on mingling with other nationalities than on constituting small national groups.

⁸⁵ Liana Millul; Leonella Jona Bellinzona; Primo Levi; Elena Recanati Foà; Dora Klein; Bruno Piazza; Teodoro Ducci.

⁸⁶ Her father is a sales representative (petty bourgeoisie).

Figure 13

List of full lexicon classified according to the frequency of occurrence (without lemmatization)

nouns / adjectives	english translation	frequency of occurrence			
1 campo	camp	454	33 figlio	son	67
2 lavoro	labor	144	34 prigionieri	prisoners	65
3 tedeschi	Germans	144	35 Fossoli	Fossoli (transit camp)	64
4 gente	people	134	36 punto	point	62
5 modo	way	134	37 medico	doctor	61
6 SS	SS	127	38 pane	bread	60
7 russti	Russians	123	39 bambino	child	59
8 madre	mother	122	40 mamma	mum	58
9 vita	life	117	41 giovane	young	56
10 confuso	confused	111	42 sorella	sister	56
11 giorni	days	109	43 forza	strengt	54
12 Auschwitz	Auschwitz	107	44 polacchi	Poles	54
13 fratello	brother	106	45 donna	woman	53
14 notte	night	102	46 periodo	period	53
15 campi	camps	101	47 persona	person	53
16 persone	persons	99	48 piedi	feet	53
17 donne	women	98	49 acqua	water	52
18 famiglia	family	95	50 gruppo	group	52
19 guerra	war	90	51 camion	truck	51
20 momento	moment	90	52 uomini	men	51
21 Italia	Italy	88	53 appello	roll call	50
22 mesi	months	88	54 fame	hunger	50
23 italiani	Italians	85	55 posto	place	50
24 marito	husband	83	56 Germania	Germany	49
25 padre	father	83	57 mattino	morning	49
26 treno	train	80	58 viaggio	journey	49
27 tempo	time / wheather	79	59 moglie	wife	48
28 esempio	example	77	60 baracca	block	47
29 sera	evening	74	61 capo	Kapo	47
30 terribile	terrible	74	62 mano	hand	47
31 tedesco	German	71	63 vista	view	47
32 ebrei	Jews	70	64 anno	year	46
			65 fortuna	luck	46
			66 letto	bed	46
			67 scuola	school	46
			68 soldati	soldiers	46

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**“Our Hopes Are Not Lost Yet.”
The Jewish Displaced Persons in Italy: Relief, Rehabilitation and
Self-understanding (1943-1948)**

by Chiara Renzo

Abstract

This essay deals with the fate of Jewish Displaced Persons in Italy from the liberation of the Camp of Ferramonti di Tarsia, by the Allied Army in 1943, until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. It focuses on the creation of a complex network of agencies, organizations and individuals involved in assisting the Jewish DPs in Italy, in the framework of the post-war refugee crisis. The article discusses the approaches and ambitions of the rescuers (military authorities, UN agencies and representatives from the Yishuv) and the desires of the Jewish DPs themselves, who played an active role both in the administration of the refugee camps as well as in the political discourse regarding their resettlement in British Palestine. Through an analysis of hitherto unexplored archival sources, it will illustrate the development of new sense of belonging and of a renewed identity among the Jewish DPs.

Introduction

Jewish displacement in Italy: Rescuers’ Ambitions and Recipients’ Desires

A Network for the Assistance of the Jewish DPs: National, International and Voluntary Organizations

Rehabilitation and Self-understanding: Towards a New Identity

Conclusion

Introduction

World War II left a legacy that Europe had never experienced before: a refugee crisis of unique scale. Between 1939 and 1945, approximately 55 million people

were uprooted, forced to leave their homes, expelled and deported to forced labor and to concentration camps.¹

At the end of the war, 7 million refugees fell burden to the Allies, mainly in the occupied zones of Germany, Austria and Italy. In order to manage this multitude of people, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) prepared an outline plan for the control, care, repatriation and resettlement of refugees. Following the Liberation, they were gradually sheltered in temporary accommodations in refugee camps and assembly centers, often set up in former concentration camps or requisitioned buildings (such as schools, barracks, monasteries, etc.). The Allies adopted repatriation as the principal means to reduce quickly the number of refugees, who were classified “eligible” or “ineligible” for receiving international help according to their nation of origin. On the basis of the neologism “displaced person” (DP) coined by the Allies, only those who were Allied nationals or those who had been persecuted for religious, racial or political reasons, were recognized as eligible for international assistance; whereas those refugees originating from enemy countries were to remain the burden of their national governments.²

Among these men, women and children longing for home, the Jewish survivors comprised a minority that nonetheless constituted for many years a burning issue pending a definitive solution. Refusing the nationality line and the repatriation policy adopted by the Allies, the Jewish DPs strove to be recognized as a national collective with the right to make *‘aliyah* or to leave Europe and, in order to achieve these goals, they formed committees to represent themselves as a separate political entity.³

¹ Evgenii M. Kulisher, *Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes, 1917-47*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 305.

² On the displacement in post-war Europe see the pioneering works of Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 296-345 and Mark Wyman, *DP: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945-1951*, (Philadelphia: Balch Institute Press, 1989).

³ For an overview on the Jewish displacement in Germany, Austria and Italy, see among the others: Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzel, *Waiting for Hope: Jewish displaced persons in post-World War II Germany*, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001); Margarete Myers-Feinstein, *Holocaust Survivors in Postwar Germany, 1945-1957*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); *Escape through Austria, Jewish Refugees and the Austrian Route to Palestine*, eds. Thomas Albricht and Ronald W. Zweig, (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2002); Mario Toscano, *La 'Porta di Sion.' L'Italia e l'immigrazione clandestina ebraica in Palestina, 1945-1948*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990).

This position and the aspiration for leaving Europe shared by the majority of the Jewish DPs in the refugee camps throughout Europe found powerful expression in the ideological foundation of the *She'erith Hapleitah*, a biblical formula used by the Jewish DPs to refer to themselves and ambivalently translated as “the surviving remnant” and “the saved remnant”⁴. Though there are many interpretations of the initial use of this term, it is commonly understood by historiography as an obvious attempt to build a collective and transnational identity among the Jewish survivors, as pointed out by Zeev Mankowitz:

In a more limited sense *She'erith Hapleitah* referred to the collective identity of some 300,000 displaced persons in Occupied Germany, Austria and Italy who turned their backs on their former lives [...]. For some of the leaders of this unique community driven by a sense of historical responsibility, *She'erit Hapleitah* was also viewed as the saving remnant who were called upon to play a formative role in shaping the Jewish future.⁵

Meanwhile, the atrocities experienced by the European Jews slowly began to resonate worldwide in the public opinion, especially after the extensive coverage given by the media to the results of Earl G. Harrison’s mission. In 1945, Harrison was appointed by US President Truman to head an urgent inquiry regarding the situation of Jewish survivors in Germany and Austria. His description of the Jewish DPs’ condition was chilling, and his Report recommended that Great Britain modify the limitations on ‘*aliyah*’ decreed by the White Paper from 1939 regarding the British Mandate on Palestine, recognizing that “the only real solution of the problem lies in the quick evacuation of all non-repatriable Jews [...] to Palestine.”⁶ Hence, the publication of the Harrison Report linked the situation of the Jewish DPs in Europe to ‘*aliyah*’ in British Palestine and sparked a

⁴ The term *She'erith ha-Pleitah* as a biblical expression occurred in Genesis 32:9, First Chronicles 4:43 and Jeremiah 31:1. About the foundation of the *She'erith Hapleitah* in the concentration camps as well as about the establishment of committees of resistance, self-representation and mutual aid by the Jewish DPs in Germany, see: Zeev Mankowitz, *Life between Memory and Hope. The Survivors of the Holocaust in Occupied Germany*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); see also: Judith Tydor Baumel, *Kibbutz Buchenwald: Survivors and Pioneers*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997).

⁵ Mankowitz, *Life between Memory and Hope*, 2-3.

⁶ The full text of the Harrison Report was published in the New York Times on September 30, 1945. On this topic and for an analysis of the US response to the Holocaust, see: Leonard Dinnerstein, *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 34-38 and 292-304.

diplomatic debate between the US Government, which began to openly support the solution proposed by its delegate, and Great Britain, which aimed at securing the future of its Mandate on Palestine implementing the White Paper.⁷

During the months and years following the end of the war, the “Jewish question” interconnected not only with the political debate among the Allies, but also with the ambitions of the *Yishuv*, the general refugee crisis and the political, social and economic reconstruction of Europe, the development of new humanitarian approaches to control and take care of the refugees as well as the needs and desires of the refugees themselves.

There exists today an extensive literature on the history of the Jewish DPs that – while investigating a wide range of perspectives on the topic – centers in particular on the situation in Germany.⁸ In contrast, research regarding the Jewish DPs in Italy focuses almost exclusively on the organization by the *Mossad le-‘aliyah bet* of the illegal immigration of the Jewish refugees from Italian shores to Palestine and the attitude of the post-war Italian Government towards these clandestine departures.⁹ Though these studies still represents a landmark for the analysis of the Jewish DPs’ experience in Italy, they stress its diplomatic framework and its transitory dimension, while leaving several aspects unexplored.

⁷ For an analysis of the post-Holocaust policies adopted by Great Britain and the United States towards the Jewish DPs with particular reference to Germany, see: Arieh J. Kochavi, *Post-Holocaust Politics. Britain, the United States and the Jewish Refugees, 1945-1948*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 13-153.

⁸ On different aspect of the Jewish displacement in Germany, see for example: Mankowitz, *Life between Memory and Hope*; Kochavi, *Post-Holocaust Politics*; Lavsky Hagit, *New Beginnings: Holocaust Survivors in Bergen-Belsen and the British Zone in Germany, 1945-1950*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2002); Atina Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies. Close Encounters in Occupied Germany*, (Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), *Patt Avinoam, Finding Home and Homeland. Jewish Youth and Zionism in the Aftermath of the Holocaust*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2009); “We are here”: *New Approaches to Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany*, eds. Avinoam Patt and Michael Berkowitz, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2010).

⁹ The *Mossad le-‘aliyah bet* was an underground branch of the Jewish Agency in charge with the organization of the illegal departures of the Jews to Palestine challenging the restriction on ‘*aliyah* imposed by the British Mandate through the White Paper of 1939. On the *Mossad* in Italy, see: Maria Grazia. Enardu, “L’immigrazione illegale ebraica verso la Palestina e la politica estera italiana, 1945-’48,” *Storia delle relazioni internazionali* 1 (1986): 147-66; Toscano, *La «Porta di Sion»*; Jacob Markovizky, “The Italian Government’s Response to the Problem of Jewish Refugees 1945-1948,” *The Journal of Israeli History* 19/1 (1998): 23-39; Idith Zertal, *From Catastrophe to Power: The Holocaust Survivors and the Emergence of Israel*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

This essay deals with the fate of Jewish displaced persons in Italy starting from the liberation of the concentration camp of Ferramonti in 1943. It highlights the political, social and cultural developments that the Jewish DPs experienced in Italy, up to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. In particular, this paper analyses the complex network of organizations engaged in assisting the Jewish DPs, and sheds light on the way in which the new humanitarian techniques adopted in post-war Europe facilitated the aggregation of the Jewish DPs around a sense of belonging to *Eretz Israel*. In the peculiar framework of the refugee camps after the traumatic experience of the *Shoah*, Zionism - challenging the Allies' policy of repatriation - acquired the features of a powerful and functional ideology able to meet both the Jewish DPs' need to start a new life and playing an active role in the effort of the *Yishuv* to encourage the surviving remnants of European Jewry to make *'aliyah*.

Jewish displacement in Italy: Rescuers' Ambitions and Recipients' Desires

On the September 8, 1943, the Italian Government signed an armistice agreement, declaring the unconditioned capitulation of Italy thereby splitting the country into two areas. In Nazi-invaded north Italy, Mussolini founded his puppet Italian Social Republic (RSI) and, in the attempt to maintain his dictatorship, deported political opponents as well as national and religious minorities. In the gradually liberated southern regions, the Allied Military Government on Occupied Territories (AMGOT) provided immediate aid to civilians through a network of sub-commissions.¹⁰

For the Jews still under the Nazi occupied area and RSI controlled territories, the Italian armistice marked the “assault on Jewish lives”: more than 6,000 Jews (mostly Italians) were violently arrested, murdered, abused and deported from Italy to extermination camps.¹¹ In contrast, the Allies' landing in Italy and the consequent armistice led to the liberation of the Jews who had been interned in previous years as “enemy aliens” in Fascist concentration camps, located mainly in south Italy. The restrictive policy adopted by Mussolini from 1940 (when Italy

¹⁰ On occupied Italy see: David W. Ellwood, *Italy 1943-45*, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1985).

¹¹ The expression “assault on Jewish lives” is taken from Michele Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy: from Equality to Persecution*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 178-211; on deportation from Italy between 1943 and 1945, see Liliana Picciotto Fargion, *Il libro della memoria: gli ebrei deportati dall'Italia (1943-1945)*, (Milan: Mursia, 2002), 27.

joined the War) through 1943 led to the internment of thousands of non-Italian Jewish exiles who had made their way to Italy, but it was indeed the geography of their internment that paradoxically saved them from deportation and made them the first core of Jewish DPs in Italy.¹²

In tracing the Jewish DPs' experience in Italy, the liberation of the Fascist concentration camp of Ferramonti di Tarsia (Calabria) in September 1943 represents a sort of starting point.¹³ According to a report by Gertrude Clarke (Special Representative of the American Red Cross in Italy) there were by the end of November 1943, approximately 2,000 Jews in Ferramonti Camp, assisted by the military authority.¹⁴ This first group of liberated Jews formed the so-called "old refugees," which included German and Austrian Jews who escaped Nazi controlled territories during the 30s, Eastern European survivors of failed attempts of illegal migration to Palestine as well as several Yugoslav Jews interned starting from the Italian occupation of part of Yugoslavia in 1941.¹⁵ Between the last months of 1943 and early 1944, the continuing arrival on the shores of Apulia

¹² Between 1938 and 1943 the Fascist policy against the Jews in Italy experimented various phases, which eventually evolved in different types of internment, see Carlo Spartaco Capogreco, *I campi del duce. L'internamento civile nell'Italia fascista (1940-1943)*, (Florence: Giuntina, 1987); on the historical debate on the genesis and implementation of the Racial Laws in Italy, see moreover: Renzo De Felice, *Storia degli ebrei italiani sotto il fascismo*, (Turin: Einaudi, 1993), Michele Sarfatti, *Mussolini contro gli ebrei. Cronaca dell'elaborazione delle leggi del 1938*, (Turin: Zamorani Editore, 1994); Id., *The Jews in Mussolini's Italy*, in *Storia della Shoah in Italia. Vicende, memorie, rappresentazioni*, eds. Marcello Flores, Simon Levis-Sullam, Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, Enzo Traverso, (Turin: Utet, 2010).

¹³ On the history of the concentration camps built by the Fascist Government in Ferramonti di Tarsia, see: Carlo Spartaco Capogreco, *Ferramonti. La vita e gli uomini del più grande campo d'internamento fascista (1940-1945)*, (Florence: Giuntina, 1987); for an overview of statistical data and distribution of non-Italian Jews interned in Italy between 1940 and 1943, see, Klaus Voigt, *Il rifugio precario. Gli esuli in Italia dal 1933 al 1945*, (Scandicci: La Nuova Italia, 1996), vol. 2, 88-99.

¹⁴ *Letter from Gertrude Clarke to Mr. Philip R. Ryan, November 30, 1943*, NY AR193344/4/36/2/720, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Archives (hereafter, AJDC), Jerusalem-New York.

¹⁵ Between 1933 and 1945 a lengthy and constant movement brought around 20,000 Jews to look for a refuge in Italy in order to escape discrimination and persecution in Nazi occupied territories between 1933 and 1945. On the Jewish migration in Italy and on the Italian regulations regarding the treatment of the Jewish exiles in those years, see: Klaus Voigt, *Il rifugio precario. Gli esuli in Italia dal 1933 al 1945*, (Scandicci: La Nuova Italia, 1993) vol. 1; for an overview of the different origins and backgrounds of the Jews in Ferramonti, see, Capogreco, *Ferramonti*, 56-62, 98-108, 114.

of refugees escaping Yugoslavia increased both the number of non-Italian refugees and that of the “old refugees” on Italian soil.¹⁶

The northward advance of the Allied Army in Italy continually brought to light other Italian and foreign refugees displaced in the country because of the conflict, among them several thousands of Jews who barely succeeded in escaping deportation by hiding themselves in rural areas. It soon became necessary to regulate mass population movements in order to facilitate military operations. Therefore, in late 1943 AMGOT entrusted this task to two separate sub-commissions: the Italian Sub-Commission, in charge of assisting Italian refugees, in cooperation with the Italian authorities, and the DPs Sub-Commission, providing assistance to foreign refugees and stateless persons.¹⁷

The Ferramonti Camp was soon converted to a refugee camp, and - in order to accommodate more DPs - the Allied DPs Sub-Commission set up other refugee camps, assembly and screening centers in Apulia, Basilicata and Campania. Afterwards, the ending of the war in spring 1945 increased the refugee population and necessitated opening additional refugee camps in the newly liberated areas of the country.

Hence, a second wave of Jewish survivors reached Italy, they were the so-called “new-refugees” who managed to enter Italy through the Alpine passes, launching the “*Brichah*” movement (in Hebrew, “flight”). This seemingly ceaseless migration began in the spontaneous fleeing of individuals and small groups, and in a short time took on an organized form.¹⁸ This mass movement of Jewish survivors was generally carried out through illegal or quasi-legal means and involved Jews who wished to avoid repatriation as well as all those who attempted to return home after liberation only to be compelled to move again

¹⁶ Voigt, *Il rifugio precario*, vol. 2, 524-5.

¹⁷ *Provisional Directive Governing the Functions of Internees and Displaced Persons Sub-Commission*, UA – Headquarters Allied Commission (AMG), Reel n. 9A, A.M.G. OT, Refugees, July 1943 – October 1943, Archivio Centrale dello Stato (hereafter, ACS), Rome.

¹⁸ About the *Brichah*, see, Yehuda Bauer, *Flight and Rescue: Brichah*, (New York: Random House, 1970); about the entries of the Jewish refugees in Italy through the Alps passes, see: Cinzia Villani, “‘We have crossed many borders.’ Arrivals, presence and perceptions of Jewish Displaced Persons in Italy (1945-1948),” in *Tamid Kadima, Immer voerwArts. Der Jüdische Exodus aus Europa 1945-1948*, eds. Sabine Aschauer-Smolik and Mario Steidl, (Innsbruck, Vienna and Bozen, 2010): 261-77.

because of recurrent episodes of anti-Semitism.¹⁹ The *Brichah* movement involved some 250,000 Jews and was soon linked to the clandestine activities of the *Mossad le-‘aliyah bet*, whose main headquarters was in Italy. Notwithstanding the fact that not all of the Jews displaced in Italy opted eventually for resettlement in Palestine, in the collective imagination of the Jewish DPs, Italian harbors were seen as the jumping-off point for *Eretz Israel*, as exemplified in the memoirs of Shmoel Mordekhai Rubinstein, a Polish Jewish DP who reached Italy from Salzburg:

In Salzburg we found a camp for refugees ‘who were going’ to *Eretz Israel*. They continually talked about the soldiers from *Eretz Israel*, the emissaries from *Eretz Israel*, the ships of their political movements that sailed from Trieste to *Eretz Israel*, and so on. It seems that all you need to do was to reach Italy, once there you already were in *Eretz Israel* [...].²⁰

From 1945 until the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, an average of 15-16,000 Jewish DPs per year found accommodation in refugee camps or assembly centers in Italy. Though these numbers are small as compared to the numbers of Jewish DPs in Germany, the Jewish displacement in Italy was characterized by a high fluidity of arrivals and departures and constituted constantly the majority of the total number of DPs passing through Italy in those years.

The first report concerning the specific “conditions of the Jews in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia” was drafted by the DPs Sub-commission in January 1944. The estimated population of Jewish DPs assisted by the Allies at that time was just 5-6,000, but caring for these Jewish DPs began already to raise a critical problem for the Allies:

Jews [...] have no interest and no wish to take part in either local or national political life. On the contrary, most expresses a strong desire to

¹⁹ About anti-Semitism in Poland after 1945, see for example, Jan T. Gross, *Fear. Anti-Semitism In Poland After Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation*, (New York: Random House, 2006); Fabio Maria Pace, “L’impossibile ritorno: gli ebrei in Polonia dalla fine della Guerra al pogrom di Kielce,” in *Il ritorno alla vita e il problema della testimonianza. Studi e riflessioni sulla Shoah*, eds. Alessandra Chiappano and Fabio Minazzi, (Florence: Giuntina, 2007).

²⁰ Shmoel Mordekhai Rubinstein, *Memories*, available in Hebrew on line http://srmemo.blogspot.it/2008/08/blog-post_185.html (accessed on October 28, 2017).

be allowed to enter Palestine where they expect to be free from political influences and persecution.²¹

Before long, the Allies in Italy began to be aware of the singular “plight of the Jewish refugees,” whose claims were being systematically reported to the DPs Sub-commission by Jewish soldiers (in Hebrew, *hayalim*) and chaplains serving in the Allied Army.²² The Jewish soldiers acted as mediator between the military authorities and the Jewish DPs and were instrumental in facilitating a sense of community among the Jews in the refugee camps in Italy as well as in initiating an efficient assistance network on behalf of the Jews in Italy. Indeed, upon their arrival in the country, the Jewish soldiers attempted to reinstate the role of the Delegation for the Assistance of Jewish Refugees (known with the acronym DELASEM) with the purpose recruiting local help in rescuing the Jewish survivors, along with the other Italian Jewish institutions, in order to facilitate the reconstruction of the Italian Jewish communities.²³ Driven by humanitarian and political motivations, the Jewish soldiers were soon able to gain the trust and support of the Jewish DPs; to establish the first contacts between the “remnants” of the Diaspora and the Jews in *Eretz Israel*; to play a prominent role in the reconstruction of the Jewish communities in Italy; and to stress emigration to Palestine as the preferred solution to the Jewish DPs’ condition.²⁴

²¹ *Conditions of the Jews in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, 30 January 1944*, UA – Headquarters Allied Commission (AMG), Reel n. 104 F, Jews in Italy, December 1943 – March 1944, ACS, Rome.

²² *Jewish Refugees, 8 October 1943*, UA – Headquarters Allied Commission (AMG), Reel n. 599B Disposal Jewish Refugees, October 1943 – February 1944, ACS, Rome. The term “*hayalim*” is used throughout this article to indicate the Jewish soldiers of the *Yishuv* who voluntarily joined the Allied Army, with reference to both those who arrived in Italy in 1943 as part of various military units, and those who eventually merged into the Jewish Brigade in 1944, see: Yoav Gelber, *Toldot ha-hitnadvut*, (Jerusalem: Yad Itzhaq Ben Zvi, 1983).

²³ From its foundation in 1939 to 1943 when it was declared illegal and a large number of its officials were arrested or forced to escape Italy, DELASEM was the main Italian Jewish institution that assisted the Jewish refugees in Italy. It was primarily financed by American Jewry (first, by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee) and with many difficulties it continued to operate underground even during 1943-45, see: Settimio Sorani, *L’assistenza ai profughi ebrei in Italia (1933-1941). Contributo alla storia della DELASEM*, (Roma: Carucci, 1983); Sonia Menici, “L’opera del Joint in Italia. Un “Piano Marshall” ebraico per la ricostruzione, *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 69/2 (2003): 593-617.

²⁴ On the role played by the Jewish soldiers upon their arrival in Italy, see, Michele Tagliacozzo, “Attività dei soldati di Eretz Israel in Italia (1943-1946). Il corpo ausiliario dei soldati palestinesi nell’armata di liberazione inglese,” *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 2/ 69 (2003): 575-86; Dina Porat, “One Side of the Jewish Triangle in Italy: the Encounter of Italian Jews with Holocaust Survivors and Hebrew Soldiers and Zionist Representatives in Italy, 1944-1946,” in *Italia Judaica. Gli ebrei*

Within a few months of their arrival in Italy, the *hayalim*'s efforts resulted in the founding of the *Merkaz ha-Plitim* (in Hebrew, Centre for the Refugees), the first institution of reference for the Jewish DPs. The *Merkaz* established its headquarters in Bari, in the barrack that served as a club for the Jewish soldiers, and included several facilities for the DPs, such as a canteen, a clinic, a synagogue, a dormitory, a school for children, and a meeting-room.²⁵ The *hayalim* also supported the Jewish DPs' organizing themselves in *hachsharot* as alternative accommodation to the DP camps and with the view of training the Jewish survivors for resettlement in Eretz Israel.²⁶ Moreover, other facilities for the relief of the Jews were opened by the *hayalim* in gradually liberated regions and - following the establishment of the Jewish Brigade, on the 29th of October 1944 - the *Merkaz Ha-Plitim* changed its name to *Merkaz la-Golah be-Italia* (in Hebrew, Center for the Diaspora in Italy, also known as the *Merkaz la-Golah*).²⁷

The structure and nature of the information contained in the reports of the *Merkaz ha-Plitim* and the testimonies of the *hayalim* lead to reconsider and re-evaluate the role the *hayalim* played in 1943-44. These sources challenge the idea of an initial lack of guidelines from the *Yishuv* with respect to civilian rescue operations.²⁸ It appears that the soldiers of the *Merkaz ha-Plitim* established early-on a collaborative relationship with the Jewish DPs in Italy, while constantly updating the Jewish Agency on their activities. The *hayalim* clearly

nell'Italia unita 1870-1945. Atti del convegno internazionale (Siena, 12-16 giugno 1989), (Rome: Ministero Beni Culturali e ambientali, 1993), 487-513.

²⁵ *La-Merqaz Ha-Iny'aney Ha-Plitim Be-Yehidot Ha-Yivriyot, Ba'ri, 23 January 1944*, P118 E.E. Urbach Archives, File 11, Central Archives for the History of Jewish People (hereafter CAHJP), Jerusalem.

²⁶ *Hachsharah* (Hebrew, pl. *hachsharot*) is translated as collective or training farms. It was a form of collective living that followed the principles of the kibbutz and functioned as an agricultural self-supporting institution. Each *hachsharah* in post-war Europe was affiliated with a Zionist or religious youth movement from the *Yishuv* and served as ideological and practical training for the Jewish DPs longing for '*aliyah*. On the Jewish DPs and the youth Zionist movement after World War II with focus on Germany and Poland, see, Patt, *Finding Home and Homeland*.

²⁷ The restructuring of the *Merkaz* was agreed in Rome upon a conference of the representatives of the Jewish organizations, who met in order to plan a more organized structure of the *Merkaz* in view of the Nazi surrender. See the autobiography of a soldier of the Jewish Brigade involved in the rescue of the Jewish DPs in Italy from 1943: Hanokh Patishi, *Ma hateret Ba-madim: Ha-"Haganah" Ha-Ereṣ- Yišra'eli Be- ṣava' Ha-Briṭim 1939-1946*, (Tel Aviv: Misrad Ha-Bitahon, 2006), 170.

²⁸ From the archival point of view, the information and the documents related to the *Merkaz ha-Plitim* as well as the *Merkaz la-Golah* are scattered in many locations. This information resulted from an extensive research on the topic conducted by the author of the article in Israeli Archives.

stood out for their resourcefulness, but their actions can be fully grasped only by looking at the shift that occurred when the Zionist leadership became aware of the role the survivors would play in the Zionist struggle after the war and gradually reconsidered the principle of selective ‘*aliyah*.²⁹ Zvi Ankouri’s oral testimony on his experience as leading figure of the first units of Jewish soldiers that arrived at Ferramonti with the Allied Army in 1943 are illuminating on this aspect:

We felt that the different groups would have speak as one voice to the Allies and to the Jewish Agency regarding ‘*aliyah* certificates and relief funds. This meant coordination and a new political orientation. [...] They had to be given a new Zionist orientation.³⁰

It appears that the primary goal of the *hayalim* was to channel the Jewish emigration to Palestine. In this regard, in cooperation with the Jewish DPs in liberated Italy, the Jewish soldiers had already established in December 1943 the Joint Palestine Emigration Committee (JPEC), charged with the registration of the Jews willing to make ‘*aliyah* and the promotion and implementation of the Jewish immigration to Palestine. JPEC was headed by a board of eight Jewish DPs from Ferramonti and Bari refugee camps who were already affiliated and active in Zionist movements or served in important roles in Zionist institutions in their countries of origin.³¹

Whilst in January 1944 there were 1,300 Jewish DPs registered at the JPEC,³² only in May 1944 did the Supreme Allied Commander approved the appointment of a representative of the Jewish Agency, in charge of selecting immigrants for Palestine and of issuing immigration certificates subject to the prior approval of

²⁹ Yoav Gelber, “The Meeting Between the Jewish Soldiers from Palestine Serving in the British Army and the She’erit Hapletah,” *Sherith Hapletah, 1944-1948: Rehabilitation and Political Struggle, Proceedings of the Sixth Yad Vashem International Historical Conference*, eds. Israel Gutman and Avital Saf, (Jerusalem, October 1985), (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990), 60-79 About the attitude of the *Yishuv* towards the Holocaust survivors, see moreover, Dalia Ofer, *Escaping the Holocaust. Illegal Immigration to the Land of Israel, 1939-1944*, (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) and Zertal, *From Catastrophe to Power*.

³⁰ Zvi Ankouri (interview: Jerusalem, 1974), 8 (147), Oral History Division (hereafter OHD), Jerusalem.

³¹ *Joint Palestine Emigration Committee for Italy, Ferramonti, December 14, 1943*, P118 E.E. Urbach Archives, File 11, CAHJP, Jerusalem.

³² *Conditions of the Jews in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, 30 January 1944*, UA – Headquarters Allied Commission (AMG), Reel n. 104F, Jews in Italy, December 1943 – March 1944, ACS, Rome

the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR)³³. Accordingly, the Jewish Agency appointed as its official delegate in Italy Umberto Nahon, who was able to reach the country only in February 1945.³⁴ Despite the uncertain status of the Jewish Agency's role in Italy before Nahon's arrival, in May 1944 a ship carrying approximately 560 Jews left from Taranto port for Palestine.³⁵ Though it was one of the few ships authorized to sail for British Palestine, the relations with the *Yishuv* continued to intensify, especially with the arrival in Italy of the *shlihim*, the representatives of the political movement of the Jewish Agency.³⁶ They shared the same goals of the *hayalim*, but their intervention marked a sort of transition from the military to the civilian operations of the *Yishuv* in aiding the "remnants." On the one hand, their efforts definitely attributed to the *She'erith HaPleitah* a political factor able to influence the Zionist struggle for the establishment of a Jewish National Home and, on the other hand, successfully directed the Jewish DPs to evolve a sense of belonging to *Eretz Israel*.

As illustrated in the next sections, the enterprise of the *Yishuv* representatives developed in conjunction with the humanitarian missions of institutional and voluntary organizations that pursued a new approach in managing and assisting the refugees. In this framework, for the Jewish survivors in the DP camps, Zionism took on the particular character of an organizational and unifying ideological paradigm that in a pluralistic way was able to influence their lives while displaced.

³³ *Displaced Persons – Representation of IGCR and the Jewish Agency in Italy, and proposal to move displaced persons of Jewish extraction to Fedala, May 22, 1944*, UA – Headquarters Allied Commission (AMG), Reel n. 58A Jews and Policy, December 1943 – June 1944, ACS, Rome. IGCR coordinated under the military authority's supervision the activities of the representative governments of the UN who had the task to assist and repatriate their own national. About the IGCR, see Marrus, *Unwanted*, 171; Tommie Sjöberg, *The Powers and the Persecuted. The Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) 1938-1947*, (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991).

³⁴ *Memorandum submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine by. Dr. S. U. Nahon – Representative in Italy of the Jewish Agency for Palestine*, P239 Archivio U. S. Nahon, File: 14, CAHJP, Jerusalem.

³⁵ *Immigration Jews to Palestine ex Italy, May 23, 1944*, UA – Headquarters Allied Commission (AMG), Reel n. 58A Jews and Policy, December 1943 – June 1944, ACS, Rome.

³⁶ *Duah Me-Pe ulat Merkaz ha-Pliṭim Be-Bari Me-15 Be-Y ànwàr 1944 ád 15 Be-Marš 1944, March 28, 1944, S25/4719, CZA, Jerusalem.*

A Network for the Assistance of the Jewish DPs: National, International and Voluntary Organizations

The administration of the displaced persons after the war provided a testing ground for the rise of new humanitarian techniques and ideologies. Thus, the aid network in post-war Europe faced the DPs crisis by means of a completely innovative approach that combined for the first time immediate relief actions with long-term physical, moral, social, cultural and educational rehabilitation projects, with the purpose of guiding the DPs towards “normalization.”³⁷

In the particular context of Italy, a new stage in the administration of the refugee crisis and a fundamental turning point for the Jewish displacement was sparked by the liberation of Rome in June 1944. It marked the establishment of a coalition government composed mainly of anti-fascist parties eager to achieve a new position in international politics as well as the beginning of the complicated reconstruction of the main Italian Jewish communities and institutions.³⁸

The urgency of solving the post-war crisis prompted a successful cooperation among military authorities, institutional agencies and private organizations, through a system of mandates and agreements. At a national level, the establishment of the new Italian government led also to the foundation of the High Commissioner for Refugees, who took over the administration of the refugee camps billeting Italians, as well as the Italian refugees’ reintegration in the country.³⁹ Instead, at the international level, the Allies had prepared well before

³⁷ For an analysis of the European displacement as a landmark for the development of a new humanitarian approach, see, Liisa H. Malkki, “Refugees and Exile: from «Refugee Studies» to the National Order of Things,” *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1995): 495-523; Daniel G. Cohen, “European Displacement and the Birth of Modern Humanitarianism in the Aftermath of World War Two,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 3 (2008): 437-49; Id., *In War’s Wake. Europe’s Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 58-78; Silvia Salvatici, *Nel nome degli altri. Storia dell’umanitarismo internazionale*, (Bologna, Il Mulino: 2015), 185-192.

³⁸ On the establishment of the post-war government in Italy, see Elena Aga-Rossi, *L’Italia nella sconfitta: politica interna e situazione internazionale durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale*, (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 1985), 125-90. About the reconstruction of the Italian Jewry after World War II, see Guri Schwartz, *After Mussolini: Jewish Life and Jewish Memories in Post-Fascist Italy*, (London and Portland, OR, Vallentine Mitchell, 2012).

³⁹ For an analysis of the management of the refugee crisis in Italy between 1944 and 1951, see: Silvia Salvatici Silvia, “Between National and International Mandates: Displaced Persons and Refugees in Post-War Italy,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 49/ 3 (2014): 514-36; on the administration of the national refugees by the Italian Government between 1944 and 1947, see: Giacomo

the end of the War a specialized rescue program and had established in November 1943 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), dealing with the urgent economic and social questions expected to arise in Europe after the War, including the predictable refugee crisis.⁴⁰ Starting from September 1944, UNRRA provided Italy with limited aid (food supplies, medical help, welfare service for children and mothers) and was in charge of housing, feeding, guaranteeing medical care and assisting in repatriation and resettlement the DPs eligible for receiving international help.⁴¹

The general picture of the refugees' situation in Italy became clearer when UNRRA published in May 1946 the results of its "Eligibility Survey." It emerged that out of 18,553 persons interviewed, only 7,920 – mostly Jews – had been accepted in UNRRA camps, whereas the other 10,633 remained under the Allies' responsibility.⁴² By the end of 1946, out of a total number of more than 40,000 refugees in Italy, UNRRA was assisting 17,095 Jews "not desiring to return to their country of origin," of whom 7,152 were in camps, 5,943 in *hachsharot* and 4,000 in towns.⁴³

While groups of Jewish DPs were scattered in almost all Italian regions, it appears that the largest groups were located in four DP camps in Lecce province (i.e. Santa Maria al Bagno, Santa Maria di Leuca, Santa Cesarea Terme and Tricase Porto). Others Jewish survivors were accommodated in several transit camps in Bari area, in Rome area (Cinecittà DP Camp and several *hachsharot* nearby Castel Gandolfo, Ostia, Ladispoli and Grottaferrata), in small DP camps in Tuscany and Marche, in Piedmont (in particular, the DP camps and *hachsharot*

Canepa, "Rifare gli italiani. Profughi e progetti per il welfare (1944-47), *Meridiana. Rivista di Storia e Scienze Sociali* 86 (2016), 57-78.

⁴⁰ For an analysis of the development of an international plan for the rescue of post-war Europe that led to the establishment of UNRRA, see: Ben Shephard, "Becoming Planning Minded': The Theory and Practice of Relief 1940-1945," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43/ 3 (2008): 405-19.

⁴¹ Because of Italy's status as a cobelligerent country, the UNRRA mission in Italy was initially a matter of debate and discussion. The UNRRA Council approved it only in September 1944, see Silvia Salvatici, "'Not enough food to feed the people.' L'UNRRA in Italia (1944-1945)," *Contemporanea. Rivista di Storia dell'800 e del '900* 1 (2011): 83-99.

⁴² *Eligibility Survey, May 1, 1946, Attachment V: Eligible and Ineligible Displaced Persons in Unrra-ACC Camps*, War Record Office, WO 204/10837, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Kew – London.

⁴³ *Estimated Jewish Refugees in UNRRA Camps, February 18, 1947*, NY AR194554/4/44/2/628, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York.

in Rivoli e Grugliasco), in Lombardy (such as in Milan area and Cremona DP camp), in nearby Genoa and in Reggio Emilia DP camp.⁴⁴ This distribution of the Jewish DPs remained largely unchanged at least until spring 1947, when UNRRA closed the large refugee camps in Lecce province and the residents were transferred northward. The closure coincided with the announced end of the UNRRA mission in Italy as well as with the restoration of Italian sovereignty in 1947. Henceforth, another temporary organization of the United Nations - the International Refugee Organization (IRO) - was charged with the definitive and specific operational task of bringing about “a rapid and positive solution of the problem of *bona fide* refugees and displaced persons” in post-war Europe by repatriation or by resettlement.⁴⁵

Along with military authorities, government representatives and international refugee agencies, numerous voluntary organizations were active in assisting the DPs after 1945. As a matter of fact, the cooperation between institutions and voluntary organizations led to the creation of a network that in many cases was able to guarantee a high standard of assistance as well as to alleviate and improve the workload of the intergovernmental and governmental agencies. In the specific case of the Jewish DPs in Italy, the most effective contribution came from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, also known as “Joint” or JDC. The goals of the JDC mission in Italy were delineated in early 1945, when an agreement with UNRRA established that JDC would act as a specialized

⁴⁴ This list of location is the result of a research conducted by the author of this article regarding the Jewish displacement in Italy, based on several unpublished primary sources. Indeed, there is currently no detailed map of DP camps, assembly centers and *hachsharot* accommodating Jewish DPs in Italy between 1943 and 1948. Nevertheless, there are several studies about specific places, see, Sara Vinçon, *Vite in transito. Gli ebrei nel campo profughi di Grugliasco (1945-1949)*, (Turin: Silvio Zamorani, 2009); Cinzia Villani, “Milano, via Unione 5: un centro di accoglienza per displaced persons ebrae nel secondo dopoguerra,” *Studi Storici* 50/2 (2009): 333-70; Stefania Pirani, *Storia dell’haksharà di Fano dal 1945 al 1948 attraverso i documenti e le interviste ai testimoni*, (Bologna: Patron Editore, 2008); Fabrizio Lelli, “Testimonianze dei profughi ebrei nei campi di transito del Salento,” in *Per ricostruire e ricostruirsi. Astorre Mayer e la rinascita ebraica tra Italia e Israele*, ed. Marco Paganoni (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2010), 111-9.

⁴⁵ In July 1947, between the 80 and 85% of the refugees and DPs who came under the mandate of IRO were living in Germany, Austria and Italy. In these countries, out of a total number of around 800,000 DPs, there were 154,333 Jewish DPs receiving care and maintenance by the newly established UN agency. In particular, the Jewish DPs in Italy under the mandate of IRO were 17,047 and represented almost the 60% of the total number of DPs assisted by the UN agency, see: Louise W. Holborn, *International Refugee Organization: A Specialized Agency of The United Nations. Its History and Work, 1946-1952*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), 47 and 199.

Jewish agency providing supplementary facilities and services to all Jewish DPs within the UN agency mandate. In post-war Italy, the JDC – though maintaining itself as an apolitical organizations – was a resolute ideological supporter and the main financier of the (often Zionist-oriented) rehabilitation programs for the Jews in DP camps as well as *hachsharot*, and acted as liaison between the UN agencies and the Jewish DPs.⁴⁶

The endeavor to provide aid as well as to rehabilitate the Jewish survivors in DP camps so they would be capable of leading a productive life challenged the Allies' post-war plans, the Jewish Agency's purposes and the policies of the international and voluntary organizations. In this multifaceted scenario, the Jewish DPs did not remain passive "recipients" of the political and humanitarian strategies adopted by the above-mentioned rescue network. Instead, they themselves became involved in their own rehabilitation.

In order to shed light on this aspect of the Jewish displacement in Italy, the following section of this article will focus on the rehabilitation activities carried out in the DP camps, on the tension between the (ambiguous and often non-coinciding) politics of the "rescuers" and the desires of the Jewish DPs as well as on how this situation shaped the remarkable features of the Jewish displacement in Italy.

Rehabilitation and Self-understanding: Towards a New Identity

Following the gradual stabilization in the management of the DPs after the war, the establishment of regional and local committees among the *She'erit Hapleitah* in Germany and Austria as well as the political orientation undergone by the Jewish displacement in Italy, the Jewish DPs themselves founded in November 1945 the Organization of the Jewish Refugees in Italy (OJRI). This entity – that served as the official administrative and political organization representative of the Jewish DPs in the country – was the result of two further motivating forces. On the one hand, the refugee agencies – "hewing to the model of active welfare"⁴⁷ - advocated the formation of DP committees in order to include the refugees in the administration of the camps. On the other hand, this inclination towards

⁴⁶ Letter from Benjamin N. Brook to American Joint Distribution Committee, November 30, 1945, NY AR194554/4/44/2/629, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York; *JDC. Program in Italy – 1946, 18 February 1947*, NY AR194554/4/44/2/628, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York.

⁴⁷ Anna Holian, *Between National Socialism and Soviet Communism. Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2011), 48-9.

self-representation and organization begun with the liberation of Ferramonti was further encouraged by the *hayalim*, who sponsored soon Zionism as leading ideology. Indeed, a centralized organization of the Jewish DPs in Italy would help in reducing the workload of the international missions, in giving the DPs the chance to renew their purposefulness and guaranteeing them a certain extent of independence as well as the opportunity of being spokespersons of their own needs.

According to the leaflet of invitation to the First Conference of the Jewish Refugees in Italy (Rome, November 26-28 1945), OJRI's main goals were to

re-educate them [i.e. the Jewish DPs] for life in civilized society and develop their sense of social responsibility; sponsor the creation of institutions for mutual aid; educate them to productive work; satisfy their cultural and spiritual needs; fight against phenomenon of demoralization among the refugees [...]; re-awaken their sense of human dignity, their self-confidence and in general to give them guidance in their return to a normal way of life; promote agricultural and professional training in view of emigration to Palestine.⁴⁸

It is evident that for the Jewish DPs' leaders, moral rehabilitation and a renewed sense of self-respect could be achieved only through a Zionist-oriented education which sponsored the ideals of mutual aid, productive work, and *'aliyah* as guideline for starting anew. As pointed out by Atina Grossmann, the "Zionists, both the emissaries from Palestine and the young leaders of kibbutz groups, were determined to look ahead rather than dwell on the effects of trauma."⁴⁹

With the motto "The Eternity of Israel Will Never Fail, Our Hopes Are Not Lost Yet,"⁵⁰ the First Conference of OJRI institutionalized the Jewish DPs presence in Italy and started an official political discourse among the Jewish DPs in the country. The Conference contributed to a worldwide recognition of the precarious condition of the Jewish survivors and of the obstacles to their *'aliyah*. With the establishment of OJRI, the Jewish survivors in Italy claimed an active role in determining their own future, motivated by the "urgent necessity to

⁴⁸ *Conference of the Jewish Displaced Persons in Italy, November 26-28, 1945*, L16/521, CZA, Jerusalem.

⁴⁹ Grossmann, *Jews, Germans, and Allies*, 158.

⁵⁰ *Opening Speech by L. Garfunkel at the Conference of the Jewish Refugees in Italy, Rome, November 26, 1945*, L16/521, CZA, Jerusalem.

improve the situation of the Jewish DPs in Italy, to hasten their emigration and settlement in Palestine, and to assist them in their efforts towards rehabilitation and ultimate emigration.”⁵¹ In accomplishing these goals, Zionism filled the Jewish DPs’ need for an ideology and soon permeated their lives in the refugee camps, accelerating the process of self-understanding undertaken by the Jewish survivors. Furthermore, Zionism became the most important element of cohesion: for those Jewish DPs who did not wish to be resettled in *Eretz Israel*, it nevertheless became a powerful ideology, supporting their urgency to reaffirm their Jewish identity; whereas, for those who longed to make *‘aliyah*, Zionism represented the concrete opportunity to start a new life after the war. Indeed, in contrast to the marginality produced by the displacement, nationality as well as a national project became a leading parameter determining group belonging in the refugee camps.⁵²

Zionism was fostered by OJRI who received the constant support of the Jewish Agency through its delegates as well as the help of the JDC, which became the major sponsor of OJRI activities and acted as liaison with the camp administrators. Under the supervision of the UN agency, the cooperation between the Jewish DPs’ self-representative organizations, the *shlihim* and the JDC focused on improving the condition of the DPs’ life, their care and their health; on implementing the return to manual labor; and on managing educational programs in order to elevate the DPs’ cultural and mental level. All these purposes - in particular, those related to productivity and culture - were bent towards training the Jewish DPs in view of their expected resettlement in Palestine through a bottom-up education process. The joint work of this Jewish network facilitated launching a Zionist-oriented education program, whose best expressions were the so-called *hachsharah* movement, the vocational training and a wide-ranging cultural program.

The *hachsharah* scheme – initiated by the *hayalim* in 1943-44 – represented the primary means “to prepare young people for future life in Palestine.”⁵³ *Hachsharah* groups were organized according to the age of the residents and their

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² On this aspect, see also Hagit Lavsky in her analysis of the Jewish DPs’ experience in Bergen Belsen. She wrote about “functional Zionism” with reference to “the national leaning [...] the Jewish survivors used, discovered, interpreted and implemented as a renewed kind of Zionism in the context of their own experiences and struggles.” Hagit Lavsky, “The Experience of the Displaced Persons in Bergen Belsen. Unique or Typical Case?” in “*We are here: New Approaches to Jewish Displaced Persons in Postwar Germany*,” eds. Patt and Berkowitz, 246.

⁵³ *Report on the Jewish Activities in Italy, January 8, 1945*, S25/5279, CZA, Jerusalem.

affiliation to a specific Zionist movement. OJRI managed this program in close collaboration with the *Merkaz He-Halutz* (Hebrew for the “Pioneer’s Center”), established by the *Merkaz La-Golah* in January 1945 in agreement with the Zionist youth movements in order to select and lead the Jewish DPs in *hachsharot*. However, the main sponsor of these collective farms was the JDC, which obtained recognition for the *hachsharot* from UNRRA and IRO that agreed to consider them as self-governing organizations and to grant international assistance to their residents, who were treated as “out-of-camp” DPs⁵⁴. Indeed, JDC officers chose the *hachsharot* as “the policy for Italy,” stressing that “the *hachsharah* community type of living offers an excellent opportunity to help these people become re-orientated to normal community living and to help rehabilitate them to undertake constructive and productive efforts.”⁵⁵

Providing work and vocational training programs in the DP camps were a means toward the wider goal of rehabilitating the victims of the war and impacted as well on migration policies.⁵⁶ Even in this field, the UN agencies and the Jewish

⁵⁴ Letter from Jacob L. Trobe to Mr. H. Katzki, February 19, 1947, G 45-54/4/13/14/IT.107, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York.

⁵⁵ Report of a Field Visit to Italy, August 12-27, 1947, NY AR194554/4/44/7/651, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York; Letter from Benjamin N. Brook to Julian L. Tomlin, December 15, 1945, NY AR194554/4/44/12/656, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York. It is quite impossible to give a precise estimation of the population residing in *hachsharot* in post-war Italy, mainly because of the high mobility of the Jewish DPs within country and across its borders. It is even complicated to establish the exact number of *hachsharot* set up in Italy, since they were often established or closed according to the arrivals and departures of Jewish DPs. Nevertheless, according to several JDC archival sources I analyzed, the JDC aided during 1945 approximately 40 *hachsharah* establishments, housing altogether about 4,000 persons. In early 1946, the Jewish DPs living in almost 70 *hachsharot* numbered 7,000, of a total refugee population of 26,600. One year later, in February 1947, the number of Jewish DPs organized in collective farms reached its peak: of a total number of 24,638 Jews, 7,469 were housed in 77 *hachsharot*, 10,673 in camps and 6,496 in towns. This number remained static until the establishment of the State of Israel in April 1948, when the JDC estimated 7,256 Jews in 74 *hachsharot*. Exactly one year later, only 29 *hachsharot* were still active in Italy, hosting 2,577 DPs. The last *hachsharah* hosting Jewish DPs, in Castel Gandolfo near Rome, was closed in 1951. For an analysis of the *hachsharah* system in Italy between 1945 and 1948, see also: Arturo Marzano, “Post-War Relief and Rehabilitation. The Hachsharot for Jewish DPs in Italy (1945-48),” in *Italian Jewish Networks in the Early Modern and Modern Period*, eds. Francesca Bregoli, Carlotta Ferrara degli Uberti and Guri Schwarz, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming).

⁵⁶ About rehabilitation through work in refugee camps, see, Daniel G. Cohen, “Regeneration through Labor: Vocational Training and the Reintegration of Deportees and Refugees, 1945-1950,” in *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History*, vol. 32 (2004), 368-85; on employment and vocational training in the DP camps in post-war Germany, see Silvia Salvatici,

organizations worked together offering extensive work programs with the common goals of reducing the risk of idleness and black-marketing in the refugee camps and allowing the DPs to acquire vocational skills that would grant them further opportunities of employment as well as better chances of resettlement. A pamphlet concerning the activities of the JDC between 1945 and 1946 emphasized these aspects:

[...] the process of engaging in purposeful labor and study develops at an early stage a spirit of self-respect and hope on the part of the student. [...] Apart from such practical achievements, however, there is a unique therapeutic value in these activities which must not be overlooked. Every trainee, who feel that he is making progress toward a new life, is an investment in the welfare of Jewry at large.⁵⁷

In the particular case of the Jewish DPs, the stress placed on work and productivity was associated also with Zionist ideology that glorified manual labor, and agriculture in particular, and sponsored a direct participation of the Jews in “building” the Jewish National Home. In *hachsharot* and DP camps, a considerable number of residents were engaged in cooking, house-cleaning, laundry, etc. as well as in taking part in vocational training workshop of agriculture, carpentry, tailoring, plumbing, fishing, building construction.⁵⁸

Even the cultural activities among the Jewish DPs in Italy did not follow a blueprint, but rather they followed the haphazard lines of development of the general situation of the Jewish refugees. Educational activities of one kind or

Senza casa e senza paese. Profughi europei nel secondo dopoguerra, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), 199-254.

⁵⁷ *J.D.C. Aid for Vocational Training, July 24, 1947*, G 45-54/1/1/4/ADM.162, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York.

⁵⁸ The high mobility of the Jewish DPs made it difficult to establish long-term workshop training as well as the coming and going of the DPs prevented many to participate in a training course for sufficient time to acquire new skills. From this point of view, the situation ameliorated in 1947, with the beginning of the IRO mission that dealt with rather static DPs and with the activity in Italy of the Organization for Rehabilitation through Training (ORT). ORT was a Jewish specialized organization which provided work program in order to support the Jewish resettlement, see: Leon Shapiro, *The History of ORT. A Jewish Movement for Social Change*, (New York: Schocken Books, 1980); Jack Rader, *By the Skill of Their Hands: The Story of Ort*, (Geneva: World Ort Union Centre International, 1970); Sarah Kavanaugh, *ORT, the Second World War and the Rehabilitation of Holocaust Survivors*, (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008); *ORT and the Rehabilitation of Holocaust Survivors*, eds. Katarzyna Person and Rachel Bracha, (London: World ORT, 2012).

another originated early-on, either spontaneously or, more often, through the effort of the Jewish soldiers who were “anxious to bring the message of the *Yishuv* and world Jewry to the pitiful remnants of Europe’s Jewish community.”⁵⁹ The establishment of a Culture and Education Department of OJRI aimed at filling in the educational gap in the younger Jewish DPs caused by the six-year war and develop *ad hoc* programs, with the emphasis on providing the DPs in Italy a “national education.”⁶⁰ Starting from 1946, the Jewish DPs’ representatives in cooperation with JDC were able to plan a comprehensive educational program, with the support of UNRRA and IRO. In particular, JDC played a direct role in the DP camps, where it supported a successful program, as confirmed by the Director of the JDC Educational Department in 1947:

the educational programme in Italy cannot be confined to administrative routine, it must be a creative one. No other country in Europe affords such opportunities for educational and cultural activities [...] Compared with the cost of the other phases of our programme, the money spent for educational and recreational purposes is most productive of morale building values and the most appreciated.⁶¹

In 1947, one year after the establishment of its Culture and Education Department, OJRI was managing 9 schools for almost 800 students and 8 kindergartens for 252 children in 10 refugee camps in Italy. For these schools, OJRI prepared special study programs based on the educational system developing at the same time in the *Yishuv*. The study program was thus an intensive one; most of the lessons were given in Hebrew and students were encouraged to discuss topic related to life in *Eretz Israel*.⁶²

At the beginning of summer 1946, OJRI founded also an Art Department, which dealt with dramatic and musical activities, individual as well as groups of artists. A special installation - supported by JDC and coordinated by the Art Department of OJRI - hosted only Jewish artists displaced in Italy: it was the *Kibbutz Omanut* (“Art,” in Hebrew) in Castel Gandolfo, near Rome. The institution had a capacity of 35 residents, and accommodated painters, sculptors, musicians, singers, dancers, writers and journalists. Their task was to prepare material, train instructors, stimulate and organize activities in the field of art as

⁵⁹ *Various Reports, September 17, 1946*, NY AR194554/4/44/2/628, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York.

⁶⁰ *Conférence of the Jewish Refugees in Italy, November 26-28, 1945*, L16/521, CZA, Jerusalem.

⁶¹ *Contents: Country – Italy, February 18, 1947*, NY AR194554 / 4 / 44 / 2 / 628, AJDC, Jerusalem-New York.

⁶² *Ibid.*

well as to conduct dramatic groups, orchestras, choral groups, etc. that toured the camps and the *hachsharot* at frequent and regular intervals.⁶³

This overview on the flourishing of such a “creative” and wide-ranging cultural and educational program helps us to understand Italy not only as a place where the Jewish DPs passively waited for their resettlement. Instead, the above-depicted situation testified to the active and enthusiastic role of the Jewish DPs and their representative institutions in cooperating with different actors for the implementation of a suitable comprehensive rehabilitation plan.

Conclusions

Notwithstanding the high mobility and the different backgrounds and ambitions of the Jewish refugees, the Jewish DPs across post-war Italy moved together on the path towards the re-definition of their Jewish identity. The extraterritoriality of the refugee camps, the yearning for a new life as well as the fundamental support of the Jewish voluntary organizations and the influence exercised by the *Yishuv* contributed to the creation of a successful environment wherein the “surviving remnants” elaborated their personal experiences and shaped a new collective national identity.

The Jewish DPs’ (more or less) convinced affiliation with Zionism ascribed to the condition of Jewish displacement a clear political dimension. The active participation as well as the determination of the Jewish DPs in defining their future is evidence of the fact that Zionism became “the main available language of hope” for those Jews yearning to recreate a familiar environment and longing for a sense of home.⁶⁴

The DP camp became a dynamic place where its inhabitants shared a common past and actively strove to secure themselves a better future. Thus, the displacement represented for the Jewish survivors a sort of *in-between* that marked the slow transition from the diasporic past towards a normal life in *Eretz Israel*, as well as in other countries. In this framework, DP camps, assembly centers and *hachsharot* were powerful meeting places for the Jewish DPs and gave birth to a vibrant “community in transit.”

⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ This expression is taken from Cohen, *In War’s Wake*, 127.

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**Notes and Reflections on the Italian Law instituting the Holocaust
Remembrance Day. History, Memory and the Present**

by Michele Sarfatti

Abstract

The “[Holocaust] Remembrance Day” was established in Italy by a bill made into law in 2000, following a years-long debate. The law covers chiefly the Fascist and Nazi anti-Jewish persecution from 1938 to 1945, but also the deportation of political opponents and of Italian POWs, and likewise considers non-Jewish Italians who rescued Jews. The date chosen for the day of commemoration is the January 27. The historical events, the categories of victims and the date specified in the law’s final text are the result of a complex process of elaboration and carry a deep meaning. The law’s text contains words and concepts that relate to a democratic national civic memory.

The Italian law is part of a continental process. Compared to its French and German equivalents, it appears both poorer and richer.

In the Italian civic calendar, the “[Holocaust] Remembrance Day” can be considered alongside other commemorations that mark historical occurrences, chiefly “Liberation Day,” established in 1946 and celebrated on April 25; also the “Memorial Day” established in 2004 for Italian victims in the border territory between Italy and Yugoslavia, which is celebrated on 10 February.

In Italian society, the January 27 is a deeply-felt commemoration day; numerous events are organized every year for schools and for the citizenry. The activities for schools are expressly mentioned within the law and have raised the question of the relationship between history and memory (and the present).

Each topic is presented and analyzed through its own specific sources: newspaper articles, parliamentary debates, documents of organizations, legislative texts, popular information material, statistical data, personal involvement, etc.

Introduction

In 2000 the Italian Parliament instituted the *Giorno della Memoria* [Remembrance Day], to be celebrated on the anniversary of the liberation of the

Nazi extermination camp at Auschwitz on January 27, 1945.¹ By mixing history, memory and the present, the law raises many complex issues.

The first of these issues is the official name chosen for the for day. The title of the Italian law reads: “Institution of the ‘Remembrance Day’ in memory of the extermination and persecution of the Jewish people and of Italian political and military deportees in the Nazi camps.”² In the law’s title the words *Giorno della Memoria* [Remembrance Day] are emphasized and separated from the rest of the title by quotation marks, thus indicating that this, and only this is the name for the day of commemoration, without further specification, such as might have been: “Remembrance Day for the Victims of the Shoah,” or “Remembrance Day for Nazi and Fascist crimes,” etc.

This succinct and clear-cut name identified that “Remembrance” as all-encompassing and absolute, assigning to it a supremacy, almost a monopoly, somehow, within national civic memory.

As will be said further on, this choice of name, combined with other aspects, has given rise to manifold tensions with the remembrance of other events, most notably with the pre-existing public remembrance of the Liberation from Fascism and the end of World War II, which has been celebrated on April 25 since 1946, and the new public memory of the events (that will be outlined later) in the border area between Italy and the Balkans, officially established in 2004

¹ Legge n. 211 del 20 luglio 2000 per l’istituzione del “Giorno della Memoria” in ricordo dello sterminio e delle persecuzioni del popolo ebraico e dei deportati militari e politici italiani nei campi nazisti, *Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana*, n. 177, July 31, 2000. Tullia Catalan, “La journée de la mémoire en Italie: le rôle des institutions entre centre et périphérie (2000-2013),” *Revue d’histoire de la Shoah* 206/3 (2017): 85-105; Andrea Pugiotto, “La memoria della Shoah in Parlamento: i nodi problematici della legge n. 211 del 2000,” *Il Giorno della Memoria all’Università di Ferrara. Iniziative realizzate dal 2002 al 2014*, eds. Marcella Ravenna, Giuditta Brunelli, (Florence: Giuntina, 2014), 125-38; Rebecca Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust. The Dilemmas of Remembrance in France and Italy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); David Bidussa, *Dopo l’ultimo testimone*, (Turin: Einaudi, 2009); Robert S. C. Gordon, “The Holocaust in Italian Collective Memory: Il giorno della memoria, 27 January 2001,” *Modern Italy* 11/2 (2006): 167-88; Goffredo De Pascale, “Viaggio di una legge,” *Diario*, (supplement to issue n. 4), January 27, 2001, 12-8.

² [“Istituzione del ‘Giorno della Memoria’ in ricordo dello sterminio e delle persecuzioni del popolo ebraico e dei deportati militari e politici italiani nei campi nazisti”]. The translation is by Gordon, “The Holocaust in Italian Collective Memory,” 169; but in my own text I have used the term “Remembrance Day” instead of “Day of Memory,” in accordance with international usage.

with the institution of a *Giorno del Ricordo* [Memorial Day], to be celebrated on February 10.

One should add that between 2002 and 2017 the Italian Parliament instituted other “Memorial Days” or, more rarely, “Remembrance Days” dedicated to the victims of the earthquake in 2009 (April 6), to the seamen lost at sea (September 9), to the victims of immigration (October 3), to the victims of environmental and industrial disasters (October 9), to the servicemen and servicewomen fallen in international peace missions (November 12); and has defined the 9 November “Day of Liberty (in memory of the fall of the Berlin wall).” In 2007 Parliament established the “Day of Memory” for the victims of terrorism, to take place on May 9,³ and in 2017 the “National Day of Memory and Engagement” in memory of Mafia victims, to be held on March 21,⁴ thus confirming a date already celebrated in civil society. The latter two celebrations are very popular in Italy, but we should keep in mind that they revolve around a recent past and present reality, not around something that happened back during the Second World War. Recently, in December 2017, the Parliament established the “Day in Memory of the Righteous of Humanity,” of which more will be said further on.

All these laws have nullified the monopoly on memory that in 2000 had been assigned to the Shoah and to the deportees. Leaving aside the enormous difference between the kind of victims and of events that are commemorated, one can say that the law on the January 27 served as a trailblazer, in the sense that it set an example to be followed, and was not a solitary achievement.

As already mentioned, in 2004 the Italian Parliament passed a law titled: “Institution of the ‘*Giorno del Ricordo* [Memorial Day]’ in memory of the victims of the *foibe*, of the Istrian-Dalmatian Exodus, of the events along the eastern border, also awarding testimonials to the relatives of the *infoibati*.”⁵ The

³ Legge n. 56 del 4 maggio 2007 per l’istituzione del “Giorno della Memoria” dedicato alle vittime del terrorismo e delle stragi di tale matrice, *Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana*, n. 103, May 5, 2007.

⁴ Legge n. 20 dell’ 8 marzo 2017 per l’ Istituzione della “Giornata nazionale della memoria e dell’impegno in ricordo delle vittime delle mafie, *Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana*, n. 58, March 10, 2017.

⁵ Legge n. 92 del 30 marzo 2004 per l’istituzione del ‘Giorno del ricordo’ in memoria delle vittime delle foibe, dell’esodo giuliano-dalmata, delle vicende del confine orientale e concessione di un

foibe are sinkholes and caves in the Karst Plateau, into which were sometimes thrown, during and after the Second World War, the bodies of victims of the political or nationalistic repression carried out by Yugoslavs; exodus refers to the emigration of Italians from the territories of the Julian March and of Dalmatia that after 1945 were handed over to Yugoslavia. In the law's title, the words "*Giorno del Ricordo* [Memorial Day]" are emphasized by quotation marks, which means they are the official name of the celebration, without anything added or specified. The day chosen for the commemoration is the anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty between Italy and the Allies on February 10, 1947, which assigned Istria/Istra and the towns of Fiume/Rijeka e Zara/Zadar to Yugoslavia, and established the Free Territory of Trieste.

A comparative reading of the two laws on the January 27 and on the February 10 shows that the first ends expressing the hope that "similar events may never occur again," whereas the second focuses only on the past. It also inserts into Italian public life a harsh criticism of an international treaty which, without going now into the historical situation that determined it and its actual contents, or into how it is nowadays viewed by historians, was in any case aimed at ensuring a lasting peace.

In post-war Italy, the memory and the historical awareness of the *foibe* victims had long been neglected. That there is a law acknowledging their significance is therefore to be commended; what is unacceptable is the nationalistic rancour that pervades it.

Italians are aware that, among all the commemorations that have been established in these early years of the 21st century, the two of the January 27 and February 10 are, from a historical point of view, the most important. Both Members of Parliament and public opinion, however, were well aware that the latter law was intended as a response to the first, following the equation Hitler = crimes of the Right, Tito = crimes of the Left. The approval of both laws evidences the violent clash in the country and in Parliament itself between Left and Right, and the extent to which both sides were able to win votes in the in-between and even in the opposite area. Contrary to the law on the January 27, the one on the February 10 highlights the failure in building up, and therefore

riconoscimento ai congiunti degli infoibati, *Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana*, n. 86, April 13, 2004; Giovanni De Luna, *La Repubblica del dolore. Le memorie di un'Italia divisa*, (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2011), 74-81.

the lack of, a solid national identity, democratic in nature, capable of coming to terms with the official past, which was Fascist, Imperialistic and allied with the Third Reich, but also fought alongside the Allies and in the end supported the Resistance, and with the population's past, which included nationalism, Fascism, racism and anti-Semitism, but also anti-Fascism and anti-anti-Semitism.

As for the law of 2004 establishing the “Memorial Day,” it should also be mentioned that the following year Slovenia and Croatia instituted two celebrations, equivalent and opposite to the Italian one, to be held on 15 September and 25 September respectively, and dedicated to the reunification (or annexation) of Istria/Istra, Fiume/Rijeka and Zara/Zadar. The date chosen by Slovenia is that of the day the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 came into force, the Croatian date refers to the day the Resistance issued a proclamation about territorial unity. Both days are celebrated as national festivities, not as days of remembrance and grieving.⁶

Without wishing to apportion blame for having started this conflict, the fact that three European countries have chosen different dates and opposing contents for one and the same event highlights the great obstacles encountered on the common path towards shared European values, identities and memories.

By oversimplifying we may say that in every country the great tragic events of the past can be divided into four great categories: that which our country or at any rate our predecessors have inflicted on other countries or other peoples, what others have inflicted on us, what we have inflicted on ourselves, what others have inflicted on others.

Within this – clearly simplistic – pattern the Italian law on the January 27, in so far as it includes also the persecution against Italian Jews carried out by the Fascist regime, partakes also of the category “what we have done to ourselves,” whereas the law on February 10 belongs only to the category “what others have done to us.”

If we add the failure in 2006 of the proposal to institute in the Italian civic calendar a day dedicated to the crimes committed by Fascist Italy in Ethiopia in

⁶ Patrizia Audenino, *La casa perduta. La memoria dei profughi nell'Europa del Novecento*, (Rome: Carocci, 2015), 109-12; Guido Crainz, “Il difficile confronto fra memorie divise,” in *Naufraghi della pace. Il 1945, i profughi e le memorie divise d'Europa*, eds. Guido Crainz, Raoul Pupo, Stefania Salvatici, (Rome: Donzelli, 2005), 188-91.

the Thirties and in the Balkans during the war,⁷ which would have been a day dedicated to “what we have done to others,” we must conclude that the law on the January 27 has been an entirely exceptional gesture and that after it official Italy has retreated to the commemoration of wounds suffered at the hand of others, displaying just how limited is its capacity for ethical dimension.

After all, a comparison between the speeches in commemoration of the Second World War by the highest authorities of the State in Italy and in Germany shows how the former, contrary to the latter, have almost always kept silent about the national responsibilities in the conduct of war and in the occupation of territory, “remembering with great pathos crimes suffered while omitting all references to those committed.”⁸

If we now analyze in detail the Italian law on the January 27, we must first observe that the word “Shoah” – employed in the text of the 2000 law – is the one most frequently used nowadays in Italy when referring to the persecution of Jews. Its use is constantly expanding. Its first mention in an Italian legislative text actually is in the law instituting the “Remembrance Day [*Giorno della Memoria*].” The term arrived in Italy in the wake of the sensation over Claude Lanzmann’s film by that title, which was circulated in the country as early as 1985 and was dubbed in Italian in 1987. A factor in the diffusion of the term was its gradual adoption by the Holy See as a form of respect for the victims (on September 26, 1985 John Paul II actually mentioned it as film title).⁹

Also, the term Holocaust, despite being widely used, particularly following the 1978 American TV series by that name, which was broadcast in Italian in 1979, had never truly taken root in Italy. This was due also to the fact that in Italian the word evokes only ancient religious practices and implies no reference to massacres, as it does in English.

One should also add that in Italy the murderous persecution at the time was aimed only at Jews, not at Roma and Sinti or other ethnic minorities; therefore

⁷ Filippo Focardi, “Il passato conteso. Transizione politica e guerra della memoria in Italia dalla crisi della prima Repubblica ad oggi,” in *L’Europa e le sue memorie. Politiche e culture del ricordo dopo il 1989*, eds. Filippo Focardi, Bruno Groppo, (Rome: Viella, 2013), 73.

⁸ Aline Sierp, *History, Memory, and Trans-European Identity. Unifying Divisions*, (London: Routledge, 2014), 66.

⁹ http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/it/speeches/1985/september/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19850926_ex-deportati-guerra.html (accessed September 15, 2017).

employing a word belonging to the Hebrew language has not given rise to situations in which victims of the genocide might feel excluded or placed in competition among themselves.

In order to understand the reasons behind the choice of the January 27 as the date for the commemoration, one needs to briefly outline the history of the Shoah in Italy. There were two distinct stages, which I have named “the period of the attack on Jewish rights” and “the period of the assault on Jewish lives.” The first took place under the Kingdom of Italy and the Fascist dictatorship from the summer of 1938 to the summer of 1943; the second was carried out under Nazi occupation and under the new Fascist government of the Italian Social Republic, from September 1943 until the Liberation (that is until June 1944 in Rome and until April 1945 in Northern Italy). Italy was perhaps the only European country in which these two stages of persecution were clearly circumscribed in time, without overlaps (this makes Italian events particularly interesting to those who wish to study the specific features of each stage).

The main anti-Jewish laws were passed by Benito Mussolini’s dictatorship in September and November 1938; the Nazi and Fascist orders for arresting Italian Jews were issued in mid-September and on November 30 1943 respectively; the biggest roundup of Jews was the one carried out by Nazi police in Rome on 16 October 16, 1943. The great majority of victims of the Italian Shoah were murdered in the extermination camp at Auschwitz-Birkenau.¹⁰

These are the main chronological and geographical references the initiators and the deciders of the Italian “Remembrance Day” might have considered when choosing the date for the commemoration.

The idea of instituting in Italy a “Remembrance Day” was first broached by a journalist, Ricardo Franco Levi, in two articles published in the daily newspaper *Il Giorno* on February 23 and October 15, 1993.¹¹ He mentioned the French decree

¹⁰ Michele Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini’s Italy. From Equality to Persecution*, trans. by John and Anne C. Tedeschi, (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 2006); Liliana Picciotto, *Il libro della memoria. Gli Ebrei deportati dall’Italia (1943-1945). Ricerca della Fondazione Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea*, 2nd ed., (Milan: Mursia, 2002).

¹¹ Ricardo Franco Levi, “Olocausto, scegliamo la data per ricordarlo,” *Il Giorno*, February 23, 1993; Ricardo Franco Levi, “Cinquant’anni fa l’olocausto in Italia. Lo ricorderemo?” *Il Giorno*, October 15, 1993; Michele Sarfatti, “Giorno della Memoria,” *Per non dimenticare. Newsletter Associazione Figli della Shoah*, November 4, 2000.

issued but a few days earlier, on February 3, establishing a “journée nationale commémorative” of the racist and anti-Semitic persecutions carried out by French authorities between 1940 and 1944, to be held on July 16,¹² and requested that Italy too should “dedicate a day to the memory of what happened during the racist and anti-Semitic persecution,”¹³ “just as the values of Liberation and Resistance are celebrated on April 25.”¹⁴ Levi suggested that the date should be October 16, the day of the Rome roundup in 1943, which had been similar to the one carried out in Paris on July 16, 1942. What scant debate followed these two articles took place mainly in the Jewish press.¹⁵ In an interview to the *Corriere della Sera* the jurist Alessandro Galante Garrone suggested that the commemoration should be set for November 17, on the anniversary of the main anti-Jewish law passed by the Fascist regime in 1938.¹⁶

In the autumn of 1996 Ricardo Franco Levi took up again his proposal, this time in the *Corriere della Sera*, again citing the October 16 as the suitable date.¹⁷ Shortly after that I entered the debate myself, in support of the proposal but suggesting the date of November 30, the day the Italian Social Republic in 1943 issued the decree ordering the arrest of the Jews.¹⁸

On both occasions the debate centered on whether to opt for the most massive roundup operation, which had been carried out by Nazi police (with only bureaucratic assistance from Italian police), or for a significant decision taken by Fascists on their own, either in 1938 or in 1943. In short: which event and whose responsibility should be emphasized?

In 1996 the proposal was better received than in 1993, and the need of an *ad hoc* bill began to be discussed. Meanwhile Tullia Zevi, President of the *Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane* [Union of Italian Jewish Communities], had entered the debate and prompted a reflection that took into account present times and not just the history of persecution. She voiced the opinion that the date and the

¹² Décret n. 93-150 du 3 février 1993 instituant une journée nationale commémorative des persécutions racistes et antisémites commises sous l'autorité de fait dite “gouvernement de l'État français” (1940-1944), *Journal officiel de la République française*, n. 29, February 4, 1993.

¹³ Levi, “Olocausto, scegliamo la data per ricordarlo.”

¹⁴ Levi, “Cinquant'anni fa l'olocausto in Italia. Lo ricorderemo?”

¹⁵ “Cinquant'anni. E dopo?” *Shalom*, November 30, 1993, 21-4; “50 anni: e dopo?” *Shalom*, December 31, 1993, 16-7.

¹⁶ Dario Fertilio, “Giornata dell'Olocausto. Quella proposta divide,” *Corriere della Sera*, April 22, 1993.

¹⁷ Ricardo Franco Levi, “Un ‘Giorno della Memoria,’ per gli ebrei e tutti i perseguitati,” *Corriere della Sera*, October 16, 1996.

¹⁸ Michele Sarfatti, “L'olocausto? Sul calendario,” *L'Unità*, October 22, 1996.

law's text should not fuel further controversy and differentiation between the remembrance and awareness of the persecution and the specific deportation suffered by Jews and the remembrance and awareness of the specific deportation suffered by political opponents of Nazism and Fascism.¹⁹ The *Associazione nazionale ex deportati politici* [National Association of Former Political Deportees], which had also Jewish survivors of Auschwitz among its members, was in favor of the proposal, but requested that the commemoration be called "Deportee Day," meaning that it should be dedicated to all deportees, whether "political" or "racial."²⁰ The date they suggested was May 5, the anniversary of the liberation in 1945 of Mauthausen, the concentration camp that had been the main destination for Italian political deportees, and of the Red Cross's arrival in the camp at Terezin.²¹

The debate – in which I too continued to take part – was complex. The solution that brought it to a close mixed past history, its present significance, tensions of the present and the future. Based on the fact that some Italian political deportees had been for some time interned at Auschwitz,²² it was deemed that the day of that camp's liberation – the January 27 – might unite both categories of victims, without lessening the gravity of the persecution suffered by Jews, and without at the same time forgetting the repression suffered by political opponents. I don't remember if at the time anybody pointed out that Primo Levi had mentioned the arrival of Soviet soldiers at Auschwitz on January 27 both towards the end of *If this is a man*, and at the onset of *The Truce*; however, those passages with the mention of the date were already quite well-known.

Meanwhile, in early 1996 Germany had proclaimed the January 27 "Day of Remembrance of the Victims of National Socialism,"²³ and I remember feeling at the time that this proximity between the two former Axis allies, however different their specific roles had been, was not without interest.

In February 1997, the MP Furio Colombo, of the *Democratici di Sinistra*, submitted to the Lower Chamber a motion urging the government to institute the new commemoration day; the following month Senator Athos De Luca, of the Green Party, introduced to the Senate an actual bill on this subject. The motion submitted by Colombo retained the suggested date of the October 16

¹⁹ Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust*, 177-8.

²⁰ Associazione nazionale ex deportati politici, "Ordine del giorno approvato dal Consiglio nazionale del 29-30 ottobre 1996," *Triangolo rosso*, February, 1997.

²¹ Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust*, 175-6; De Luna, *La Repubblica del dolore*, 68-9, 188.

²² Giovanna D'Amico, "La deportazione dei politici italiani ad Auschwitz," in *Auschwitz-Birkenau*, eds. Marcello Pezzetti, Bruno Vespa, (Rome: Gangemi, 2010), 28-33.

²³ "Proklamation des Bundespräsidenten," January 3, 1996; *Bundesgesetzblatt*, 17 (1996).

and considered anti-Jewish persecution in all its stages, the bill introduced by De Luca was in favor of the January 27 and concerned both Jewish and political deportees. Both submissions had to face a very troubled journey through Parliament and were finally abandoned.

Eventually Colombo succeeded in crafting a new bill, centered on the date of the January 27, and introduced it to the Lower Chamber on January 20, 2000. There followed a very tortuous parliamentary debate, during which some right-wing MPs even went as far as to request that the commemoration be extended to include “all acts of violence and massacres perpetrated in the name of oppressive ideologies before, during and after the war of 1939-1945” or at least the “hundreds of thousands of Italian prisoners in Russia.”²⁴ Colombo, however, managed to bring his proposal to conclusion and the bill was approved without significant alterations by the Lower Chamber on March 28, 2000 and by the Senate on the following July 5, thus becoming national law.²⁵

Among the changes effected in Parliament to Colombo’s proposal, the most important was the provision that the events for “Remembrance Day” should take place “particularly in schools of each category and level;” this is an aspect I will examine further on.

In regard to the timing within the European context, the idea of an Italian “Day of Remembrance” was first put forward after (and in consequence of) the French decree of 1993; it was first introduced to the Italian Parliament after the 1995 resolution by the European Parliament calling for a “European Day of Remembrance of the Holocaust” (a resolution which ascribed the responsibility for the Shoah to Nazism only)²⁶ and after the German proclamation of 1996; it was finally submitted again to in the Italian Parliament in early 2000, after Italy in June 1999 had joined the Task Force for International Cooperation on

²⁴ See the texts of a bill submitted to the Senate on February 3, 2000 and of the speeches in the Lower Chamber of March 27 and 28, 2000 in:

<http://www.parlamento.it/japp/bgt/showdoc/frame.jsp?tipodoc=Ddlpres&leg=13&id=5558>;
<http://leg13.camera.it/dati/leg13/lavori/stenografici/sed702/so30.htm>;
<http://legislature.camera.it/dati/leg13/lavori/stenografici/sed703/s140.htm> (accessed September 15, 2017).

²⁵ Catalan, “La journée de la mémoire en Italie,” 86-92; Pugiotto, “La memoria della Shoah in Parlamento,” 126-8; Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust*, 171-81, 221-30; Gordon, *The Holocaust in Italian Collective Memory*, 169-72; De Luna, *La Repubblica del dolore*, 67-71; De Pascale, “Viaggio di una legge,” Giovanni De Luna, “Giusto ricordare la Shoah ma non per decreto-legge,” *La Stampa*, August 2, 2000; Michele Sarfatti, “Chi vuole annegare la Shoah?” *L’Unità*, March 6, 2000.

²⁶ European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 1995 on a day to commemorate the Holocaust, *Official Journal of the European Union*, July 3, 1995.

Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, after the government of the UK in October 1999 had initiated consultations about establishing a “Holocaust Remembrance Day” (later called National Holocaust Memorial Day) on January 27, and before the first meeting of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust on January 26-28, 2000; it was approved a few months after the said Stockholm meeting and after the European Parliament on March 16, 2000 had “encourage[d]” Member States to mark “Shoah Day” on the January 27.²⁷ The parliamentary readings of the Italian bill took place at the same time or slightly later than those of the new French bill which changed the name of the 16 July commemoration to “Journée nationale à la mémoire des victimes des crimes racistes et antisémites de l’État français et d’hommage aux ‘Justes’ de France,”²⁸ but I have not found any trace of reciprocal influence between the debates in the two Parliaments.

Looking back after twenty years upon on the Italian debate in 1997-2000 and on the right-wing proposals to equate Nazi extermination camps with Soviet gulags and the Jews murdered in the gas chambers with the invading and defeated Italian soldiers in Russia, one may observe that these juxtapositions prove the lack of a shared democratic judgement on the history of Fascist Italy. I do feel, however, that they were also the unintended consequence of renaming the two years from 1943 to 1945 as “civil war.” This renaming, put forward by a famous Italian book,²⁹ has unfortunately obscured the definition of the Resistance as “anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi insurrection.”

The law’s text, in Robert Gordon’s translation, reads:

Institution of the ‘Day of Memory’ in memory of the extermination and persecution of the Jewish people and of Italian political and military deportees in the Nazi camps. Article 1. The Italian Republic recognizes the day of 27 January, date of the pulling down of the gates of Auschwitz, as the “Remembrance Day [*Giorno della Memoria*],” to

²⁷ European Parliament Resolution of 16 March 2000 on countering racism and xenophobia in the European Union, Official Journal C, December 29, 2000
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2000-0122+0+DOC+XML+Vo//EN> (accessed September 15, 2017).

²⁸ Loi n. 2000-644 du 10 juillet 2000 instaurant une journée nationale à la mémoire des victimes des crimes racistes et antisémites de l’État français et d’hommage aux ‘Justes’ de France, *Journal officiel de la République française*, July 11, 2000; Clifford, *Commemorating the Holocaust*, 212-3.

²⁹ Claudio Pavone, *Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità nella Resistenza*, (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1991).

remember the Shoah (extermination of the Jewish people), the racial laws, Italy's persecution of its Jewish citizens, Italians who underwent deportation, imprisonment and death, as well as those, with differing positions and allegiances, who opposed the extermination project and, risking their own lives, saved others and protected the persecuted. Article 2. On the occasion of the 'Remembrance Day' (for which see art. 1) there will be organized ceremonies, initiatives, meetings and shared moments of recounting of events and of reflection, particularly in schools of all categories and levels, on what befell the Jewish people and the Italian military and political deportees in the Nazi camps, so as to preserve for the future of Italy a memory of a tragic, dark period in the history of our country and of Europe, in order that nothing similar might ever happen again.³⁰

The focus of the Italian "Remembrance Day" therefore is on a main event, which the law itself refers to as either Shoah, or anti-Jewish laws, or "Italy's persecution" of Jews, and also on three categories of persons: Italian and European Jewish victims, Italian victims of deportation for political or military reasons, people "with differing positions and allegiances" who risked their own lives to save Jews. If we compare this text to those of the 1993 French decree and of the 1996 German decree, we see that the French "day" refers only to the racist and anti-Semitic persecution carried out by French authorities from 1940 to 1944, whereas the German "day" refers to all the victims of Nazism throughout the European continent. The Italian law on the contrary does not mention either the Fascist governments, or the people who were victims of Italian Fascism outside of Italy. Seen from another viewpoint, the Italian law is on one hand similar to the

³⁰ [*Istituzione del 'Giorno della Memoria' in ricordo dello sterminio e delle persecuzioni del popolo ebraico e dei deportati militari e politici italiani nei campi nazisti. Articolo 1. La Repubblica italiana riconosce il giorno 27 gennaio, data dell'abbattimento dei cancelli di Auschwitz, 'Giorno della Memoria', al fine di ricordare la Shoah (sterminio del popolo ebraico), le leggi razziali, la persecuzione italiana dei cittadini ebrei, gli italiani che hanno subito la deportazione, la prigionia, la morte, nonché coloro che, anche in campi e schieramenti diversi, si sono opposti al progetto di sterminio, ed a rischio della propria vita hanno salvato altre vite e protetto i perseguitati. Articolo 2. In occasione del 'Giorno della Memoria' di cui all'articolo 1, sono organizzati cerimonie, iniziative, incontri e momenti comuni di narrazione dei fatti e di riflessione, in modo particolare nelle scuole di ogni ordine e grado, su quanto è accaduto al popolo ebraico e ai deportati militari e politici italiani nei campi nazisti in modo da conservare nel futuro dell'Italia la memoria di un tragico ed oscuro periodo della storia nel nostro Paese e in Europa, e affinché simili eventi non possano mai più accadere"]; English translation from Gordon, "The Holocaust in Italian Collective Memory," 169-70; see note 2.*

French approach in that it centers on the anti-Jewish persecution, and on the other hand follows one aspect of the German law, in that it mentions the victims, including political deportees and military internees.

I still view it as negative that the law fails to mention explicitly Fascism and its responsibilities, even more so if one considers that the word “Nazi” appears both in the title and in the text,³¹ because the absence of such a mention shows that the Italian Parliament of 2000 lacked a shared historical awareness and a shared national identity.

Over time, however, while maintaining this view, I have come to value the presence of the words “Italy’s persecution of Jewish citizens,” insofar as they do anyhow point to the responsibility of one part of the country, and include those people who participated in the persecution despite not being ideologically Fascists. As far as I know, the law on the January 27 is the only Italian law that, through the words “the Italy’s persecution,” contains a drastic condemnation of an event in the nation’s past; the importance of this is enormous, given the widespread reluctance to judge our own past by the same criteria applied when judging the past of other countries or peoples.

As for the date, I continue to consider it regrettable that no date specific to the history of the nation was chosen. On this also, while I still maintain this opinion, I have however added a different conclusion, based on the considerable response to a specific statistic in Liliana Picciotto’s *Libro della memoria* concerning the persons responsible for the arrest of Jews in Italy: 2444 arrests were carried out by Germans, 1951 by Italians, 332 by both and 2079 by persons whose nationality has not been ascertained.³² Since the vast majority of those arrested was deported (by German police) to Auschwitz-Birkenau, and since the Italian Social Republic was aware of this,³³ it follows that the date of the liberation of that extermination camp is not irrelevant to the question of Fascist responsibilities.

The inclusion of rescuers differentiates the Italian law from the 1993 French decree, from the German decree and from the European Parliament resolution of 1995; moreover, having been included as early as January 20, 2000, in Colombo’s draft, it anticipated the declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust concerning the commitment to “honor those who stood against it

³¹ Michele Sarfatti, “La Shoah senza fascismo?” *L’Unità*, April 7, 2000.

³² Picciotto, *Il libro della memoria*, 29.

³³ Sarfatti, *The Jews in Mussolini’s Italy*, 178-202.

[the Holocaust],” a wording that includes also Jewish rescuers.³⁴ The way in which they are described in the Italian law echoes the Yad Vashem’s definition of “Righteous among the Nations.” The purpose of the words “as well as those, with differing positions and allegiances,” is to include the rescuers who were Fascist. Historically, we can say that such did indeed exist, and that in some cases – given the situation of war and dictatorship – it was precisely their political affiliation that made their rescue action and its successful outcome possible. From a politico-historical point of view we can remark that the phrase “differing positions and allegiances” was an unprecedented mention in the text of an Italian law of a positive behavior on the part of Fascists, and thus enabled right-wing MPs to vote in favor of the bill.

On another level, since the wording used includes only those who directly opposed the purpose of the Shoah, it disregards all those who risked their lives fighting as partisans to put an end to Nazi-Fascism and therefore also to the anti-Jewish persecution. Thus, along with the absence of any mention of Fascism’s responsibilities, we are also confronted with the absence of any mention of the merits of anti-Fascism. And the words “as well as those” in the phrase “as well as those, with differing positions and allegiances,” is too slender a reference to the full context of that time.

The wording used, moreover, does not even mention Jewish rescuers, that is those victims of persecution who doubly risked their lives to protect other victims of persecution. Ignoring them is not only “not right,” it also has a serious consequence in that it portrays the Jews of the time solely in the role of victims.

As to rescuers in general and the risks they incurred, it needs to be made clear that sheltering a Jew and assisting him while he lived in hiding was not punishable by death, although it is true that rescue actions entailed risks, in some cases even mortal risks.

In themselves, the rescuers are not a category of victims, such as Jews or other deportees. By including them in the text, the law has acquired a further educational role, implying that disobeying criminal rules is both possible and meritorious.

The Italian law on the January 27 also refers to political prisoners and members of the military who were deported by Nazi German authorities in 1943-1945. The “politicals” were opponents of the Third Reich and of the Italian Social Republic and many of them were murdered in the concentration camps. In previous

³⁴ *Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust*, January 28, 2000, <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/about-us/stockholm-declaration> (accessed September 15, 2017).

decades their memory had not found a proper place within the Resistance, due to a tendency to favor the memory of partisans who died in battle.

The “military internees” were soldiers and officers taken prisoner in Italy and in the occupied territories, mainly in the Balkans. The latter, especially, had fought an often merciless war of aggression, only to become themselves the victims of a half-allied and half-enemy foreign army. In the law on the “Day of Remembrance” there is not the slightest hint at the complexity of those events. This absence goes hand in hand with the silence about the victims of Fascist wars and occupations, so that the national politics of remembrance that has developed in Italy on this subject – leaving aside the just acknowledgement of the soldiers’ sufferings after September 8 1943 – is centered exclusively on “what others have done to us,” and is the entire opposite of the national memory politics that has emerged in the former Axis ally.

From a technical point of view, the Italian “Day of Remembrance” occupies an intermediate ground between the March 8, Women’s Day, that has no support whatsoever in legislation, and the May 1 and April 25, which are official holidays, when workplaces and schools are closed.

The second section of the law on the January 27 assigns a specific task to the latter, by directing that “ceremonies, initiatives, meetings and shared moments of recounting of events and of reflection” must be organized “particularly in schools.” This emphasizing of the school sphere was inserted into the law’s text during the debate in Parliament.

I have been unable to ascertain fully how this addition came about. We may consider that the resolution on a day to commemorate the Holocaust adopted in 1995 by the European Parliament urged member States to organize on that day “activities which recall the Second World War and the Holocaust and illustrate the dangers of totalitarian and racist ideologies to young people in particular;”³⁵ and that the declaration of the representatives of European governments adopted at the Stockholm Forum of January 26-28, 2000 – that is before the start of the parliamentary debate on the bill introduced by Colombo – proclaimed: “We will promote education about the Holocaust in our schools and universities.”³⁶

I believe, however, that this addition to the bill was influenced mainly by the course initiated in previous years by the Minister of Public Education, Luigi

³⁵ European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 1995 on a day to commemorate the Holocaust, *Official Journal of the European Union*, July 3, 1995.

³⁶ *Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust* (January 28, 2000), <https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/about-us/stockholm-declaration> (accessed September 15, 2017).

Berlinguer, of the *Partito Democratico della Sinistra*, who in 1996 had changed the history curriculum in the three stages of the Italian school system, decreeing that the last year of each should be entirely devoted to learning about the 20th century.³⁷ (In 2004 the new minister, Letizia Moratti, of Forza Italia, cancelled contemporary history from the curriculum of the first stage – ages 6 to 11 – and greatly restricted it in the other two).³⁸ In October 1998 Minister Berlinguer – two years after his reform of the history curriculum and on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Fascist anti-Jewish laws of 1938 – decided to promote and fund projects in upper secondary schools aimed at studying the anti-Semitic persecution and including at the end a “visit to one of the Nazi extermination camps.”³⁹ The initiative was called *Il 900. I giovani e la memoria* [The 20th Century. The Young and Memory], was repeated the two following years and then rendered permanent from October 2002. I believe it was this context that originated the change in the text that singled out schools as the main venue for implementing the new law.

In this respect, we should reflect upon the fact that the title of the 2000 law refers to “remembrance” and that the activities suggested for schoolchildren include “reflection,” and also “recounting,” but none of the terms more suited to schools, such as teaching, learning, research, study. Moreover, for some years now the contest between schools held by the ministry is called *I giovani ricordano la Shoah* [The Young Remember the Shoah].” As if teenagers and children should not begin by engaging in the study of the Shoah, in order to develop first an awareness and finally the memory of it. Whereas the Stockholm Forum emphasized the need to “promote education,” Italy requires its young to “remember,” without first “knowing.” (On another level, it should be kept in mind that even the Stockholm declaration of 2000, as already the European Parliament declaration of 1995, attributes the responsibility for the Shoah to Nazism only).

I believe that this prevalence of an approach based on memory over one based on teaching is at the root of serious historical errors, such as for instance the widespread mention by Italian schoolchildren and teachers of the “yellow star” [*Judenstern*] in connection with the history of the Shoah in Italy, although it was

³⁷ Decreto ministeriale n. 682, (November 4, 1996); it came into force in the school year 1997-1998.

³⁸ Decreto legislativo n. 59, (February 19, 2004), Definizione delle norme generali relative alla scuola dell’infanzia e al primo ciclo dell’istruzione; Allegato B – Indicazioni nazionali per i piani di studio personalizzati nella Scuola primaria, *Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana*, n. 51, Supplement n. 31, March 2, 2004.

³⁹ Circolare del ministro della Pubblica istruzione [Circular issued by the Ministry of Public Education], October 9, 1998, n. 411, cited in *Il 900. I giovani e la memoria*.

not used in this country, and of entirely inappropriate gestures, such as the compulsory minute silence in memory of the victims, held in various schools on the January 27 since 2002 at the request of the Ministry of Education led by Letizia Moratti,⁴⁰ of unions and of teachers' associations, who clearly have not stopped to consider that any teaching of the Shoah and of other crimes against humanity must inevitably have an anti-authoritarian and anti-rhetorical content.⁴¹ The "memory of the Shoah" cannot be a "duty," nor can it be a substitute for the study of it.

As a matter of fact, the general guidelines issued to the Italian national school system have not, until now, placed any great importance on the study of the Shoah. As mentioned already, in primary school contemporary history as a whole is not included in the curriculum, the national guidelines for lower secondary school (ages 11 to 14) don't even mention Fascist anti-Jewish persecution and Nazi extermination, and only for some types of upper secondary schools (ages 14 to 19) there is a cursory mention of "the Shoah and other genocides of the 20th Century."⁴² As of late 2017, however, the Minister of Education, University and Research Valeria Fedeli, of the *Partito Democratico* [Democratic Party], was engaged in setting up specific guidelines for the teaching of the Shoah, so as to issue them on the occasion of the 80th anniversary of the anti-Jewish laws of 1938 and before Italy assumes the Chairmanship of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (formerly the Task Force for Education, Remembrance and Research) in 2018-2019. As for the history books on contemporary history used in lower and upper secondary schools, several researches have shown that even today they contain omissions and misrepresentations on the subject of anti-Jewish persecution, particularly on the persecution carried out by Italian Fascism.⁴³

⁴⁰ Circulars issued by the Head of the Department for Territorial Services and for the Development of Education in the Ministry of Education, University and Research, January 14, 2002, n. 37 and by the Director General for Communications of the said Ministry, January 23, 2002, n. 171.

⁴¹ Communiqué by the main teachers' unions, in *27 gennaio. Giornata della memoria*, [2005], which mentions that the proposal had been launched three years earlier.

⁴² Maila Pentucci, "Metodologia, percorsi e strumenti per una didattica della Shoah," in *Carissimi Primo, Anne ed Elie. Studi e interventi per la Memoria della Shoah nelle università, nelle scuole e nei musei d'Italia*, ed. Clara Ferranti, (Macerata: Eum, 2016), 164-5.

⁴³ Francesca Costantini, "L'histoire des juifs à l'époque fasciste dans les manuels scolaires italiens de l'enseignement secondaire de premier et deuxième cycle," *Revue d'histoire de la Shoah* 206/3 (2017): 257-72; Alessandra Minerbi, "La Shoah nei manuali delle superiori," in *Dopo i testimoni. Memorie, storiografie e narrazioni della deportazione razziale*, eds. Marta Baiardi, Alberto Cavaglion, (Rome: Viella, 2014), 327-41; Antonio Gioia, *Guerra, Fascismo, Resistenza*.

The calendar of civil celebrations in Italy includes various important dates. Among them, the one thematically closest to the January 27 is the April 25, anniversary of the 1945 partisan insurrection in Milan and in other towns of Northern Italy. On April 22 1946, when great celebrations were already being prepared in Milan, the government decreed that April 25 should be a “national holiday,” as it was the anniversary of the “total liberation of the Italian territory.”⁴⁴ This decision was confirmed three years later by a general law on national holidays.⁴⁵ The choice of April 25 was meant to emphasize the military and political role of Italian anti-Fascism in defeating Italian Fascism and German Nazism, although victory was obtained with the essential contribution of the Allies and although the war on Italian territory ended officially on May 2.⁴⁶

On April 25 schools and most places of work are closed. The most important event nation-wide is the great march that takes place in Milan. Over the decades the participation in the various events across the country has decreased. In the mid-Nineties, when parties that had no connection with the legacy of the Resistance or even had roots in Fascism rose to power and formed the government, participation in the Milan march rose again.⁴⁷

With the exception of this event in Milan, popular participation in the Day of Resistance continued to fall. This decline has very complex causes, including the failure of movements and personalities that are direct heirs of anti-Fascism to engage in the creation of places and buildings dedicated to the knowledge of the causes and the reality of Fascism and anti-Fascism – such as, for instance, a great

Avvenimenti e dibattito storiografico nei manuali di storia, (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2012), 247-61; Lidia Gualtierio, “La Shoah e le leggi razziali italiane,” in *C’è manuale e manuale. Analisi dei libri di storia per la scuola secondaria*, eds. Lidia Gualtierio and others, (Viterbo: Sette città, 2010), 24-30; Antonio Frecina, “La Shoah nei manuali delle scuole medie inferiori,” also Paolo Visentin, “La Shoah nei manuali delle scuole medie inferiori,” and Mariarosa Davi, Patrizia Guantieri, “La Shoah in alcuni manuali di storia di scuola superiore,” all published in *Pensare e insegnare Auschwitz. Memorie storie apprendimenti*, eds. Gadi Luzzatto Voghera, Ernesto Perillo, (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2004), respectively 135-40, 141-3, 144-9; Antonella Ferraris, “Il dovere della memoria. I manuali e l’antisemitismo,” *Quaderno di storia contemporanea* 16/14 (1993): 119-31; Giovanni Battista Novello Paglianti, Laura Wofsi Rocca, “Lezione di storia: le leggi antiebraiche nei manuali degli anni Ottanta,” *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 65/ 1-2 (1988): 495-500.

⁴⁴ Decreto legislativo luogotenenziale n. 185, (April 22, 1946), Disposizioni in materia di ricorrenze festive, *Gazzetta ufficiale del Regno d’Italia*, n. 96, April 24, 1946.

⁴⁵ Legge n. 260, (May 27, 1949) Disposizioni in materia di ricorrenze festive, *Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana*, n. 124, May 31, 1949.

⁴⁶ Maurizio Ridolfi, *Le feste nazionali*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003), 200-3; Cristina Cenci, *Rituale e memoria: le celebrazioni del 25 aprile*, in *Le memorie della Repubblica*, (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1999), 345-7.

⁴⁷ Focardi, *Il passato conteso*, 71.

national didactic history museum – aimed at providing roots for awareness and memory.

At the same time, as we have seen this decline in the importance of the April 25, we have witnessed the intrinsic force shown by the January 27, inspired by the unparalleled gravity of the Shoah. The April 25 also suffers from not having a law that requires schools to treat the subject. However, as there is no specific research on this aspect, it is hard to determine if the January 27 has somehow contributed to the partial decline of the April 25, or if it has counteracted it through its anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi message.

Leaving aside the differences between the two and the specific nature of each, clearly the participation in both celebrations is related to the fact that both commemorate a liberation (even if the liberation of Auschwitz on January 27 did not immediately put an end to the Shoah), while the scant appeal of the “Memorial Day [*Giorno del Ricordo*]” arises from the fact that its date and the reason underlying it do not offer an opportunity for leaving behind the old conflict.

At the end of 2017 a new official celebration has been added to the Italian calendar. On December 7, 2017, a law instituting on March 6 the “*Giornata in memoria dei Giusti dell’umanità* [Day in Memory of the Righteous of Humanity],” that is of those who “in whatever time and whatever place have done good by human lives, have fought for human rights during genocides and have defended the dignity of the human person,” was approved by the Parliament.⁴⁸

The day is universal in scope and concerns human rights and humanity. However, since the term “righteous” has been borrowed directly from the one employed by the State of Israel and by Yad Vashem, one may be forgiven for supposing that the rescuers of Jews will quite often be the focus of the March 6 events, as after all already happens with the celebrations taking place in some locations following the “support” declared by the European Parliament in favor of the institution of a “European Day of Remembrance for the Righteous.”⁴⁹ There is a serious risk that the joint presence of this celebration and that of the January 27 will determine a prevalence of the memory of non-Jewish Italian rescuers over the memory of the persecutors, the persecuted and the indifferent; a

⁴⁸ Legge per l’istituzione della Giornata in memoria dei Giusti dell’Umanità (forthcoming in *Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica italiana*).

⁴⁹ European Parliament, Declaration of 10 May 2012 on support for the establishment of a European Day of Remembrance for the Righteous, *Official Journal of the European Union*, September 10, 2013.

prevalence that is bound to be damaging in a country with such a poor shared awareness of its own past.

The main features in the way the “Remembrance Day [*Giorno della Memoria*]” is celebrated are: the great number of events that take place throughout the country, and the differences between events meant for schools and those meant for the citizenry, as well as between those with a serious approach and those with a rhetorical approach.

The law on the January 27 is not centralistic: instead of a national celebration it institutes a great number of “ceremonies, initiatives, meetings and shared moments of recounting of events and of reflection.” Being a law, all authorities and branches of the State, from the President of the Republic to the mayors, are required to apply it. Since 2009 the initiatives of the highest national authorities are coordinated by the Coordinating Committee for the Celebrations in Memory of the Shoah established by the Office of the Prime Minister, whose members are the representatives of various ministries, of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities and of the *Fondazione Centro di Documentazione Ebraica Contemporanea* [Foundation Contemporary Jewish Documentation Centre – CDEC]; the Committee’s name mentions only the anti-Jewish persecution.

Besides the numerous events held by central and local authorities there are those organized by cultural associations, political movements, sports clubs, etc. Then there are all the activities carried out by schools, theatre performances, book launches, the expansion of websites; finally, ample space is devoted to the occasion by newspapers and TV-channels. In some cases, the study trips or “lay pilgrimage[s]”⁵⁰ of schoolchildren to the extermination camp of Auschwitz-Birkenau (or to the concentration camps of Dachau or Mauthausen), to the Italian camps at Fossoli and Trieste, to Jewish and Holocaust museums in Italy and in other European countries take place just towards the end of January.

The Jewish Communities give ample support, but leave the main responsibilities for handling and organizing the day to public authorities, because the January 27 is a celebration instituted by a national law, not a Jewish “day.” The Communities themselves organize instead ceremonies on the anniversary of the main episode of persecution in the various towns (in Rome on the October 16) or on *Yom Ha-Shoah*.

Over the years, the event organized by the Office of the President of the Republic on January 27 has taken on an ever increasing importance. It includes conferring

⁵⁰ Laura Fontana, “Are trips to Auschwitz the panacea for a history sick society? A case study of Holocaust teaching: the Italian memorial trains to Auschwitz,” *Jednak Ksiazki*, 6 (2016): 96.

decorations on former political deportees, awarding the prizes for the schoolchildren's competition on the anti-Jewish persecution initiated by the Ministry of Education, University and Research, and introductory speeches by the President and by an intellectual.

As a whole, the events for the January 27 are undoubtedly more numerous and attract a greater audience than those for the 10 February. A comparison with the April 25 is harder to establish, because while the Day of Liberation is experiencing a constant decline in local events, participation in the great national march in Milan remains high.

After 2001 there was also a march in Milan for the January 27; attendance however dwindled rapidly and the march was discontinued after 2009.⁵¹ Its termination suggests that the kind of mobilization generated by the liberation of Auschwitz is different from that generated by the liberation from Fascism.

As no analytical research has been carried out on all these events, either for a single year or extending over several years, I must confine myself to a certain amount of random data all referring to 2015. The regional authority of Apulia has set up a project called *Il Mese della Memoria* [Remembrance Month] that includes over 50 events throughout the entire region.⁵² The regional authority of Tuscany on the other hand has published a general list of over 120 events initiated by the authority itself or by other organizations and associations,⁵³ and even so the list is very much incomplete, as for instance it does not include 25 events that can be found in a separate list about Pisa and its territory.⁵⁴ As to the events in Tuscany, most of them focused on the Shoah, and only a tiny number concerned political and military deportees, the persecution of Roma or of gays (neither of which, by the way, are mentioned in the law on the January 27), Jewish history and culture before and after the Shoah, or the Resistance. No event in Apulia or Tuscany centered on the rescuers of Jews, who actually are

⁵¹ David Bidussa, "Attorno al Giorno della Memoria," in *Storia della Shoah in Italia. Vicende, memorie, rappresentazioni*, eds. Marcello Flores, Simon Levis Sullam, Marie-Anne Matard-Bonucci, Enzo Traverso, (Turin: Utet, 2010), vol. 2, 558.

⁵² I Presìdi del Libro, "Mese della Memoria 2015 – VII edizione. Programma," <http://www.regione.puglia.it/web/files/Servizio%20Stampa%20G.R./PROGRAMMA.pdf> (accessed September 15, 2017).

⁵³ Regione Toscana, "27 gennaio. Giorno della Memoria 1945/2015," <http://www.regione.toscana.it/documents/10180/12221233/Giorno+della+Memoria+2015.+Programma+delle+iniziative+in+Toscana/f2972d8a-396d-4db4-82a2-fc68d89c52aa> (accessed September 15, 2017).

⁵⁴ Prefettura di Pisa, Comune di Pisa, "27 gennaio. Giorno della Memoria. Programma 2015," http://www.provincia.pisa.it/uploads/memoria_2015_depliant_Pisa_def.pdf (accessed September 15, 2017).

mentioned in the law. Mine, however, are only cursory comments; and it should be kept in mind that in 2015 neither of those regions had a center-right government.

As I already said, we still need to take a census and assess all events that take place every year throughout Italy during the Day or Month of Remembrance.

What I have listed here, at times all too briefly, are some of the main questions arising from and surrounding the Italian law on “Remembrance Day” and its implementation.

Generally speaking we can say that to interrogate it involves reflecting upon manifold relationships of a historiographical, or ethical, or didactic nature: between history and memory, between awareness and memory, between historical narrative and present-day politics, between anti-Semitism and the history of Italy, between “uniqueness” of the Shoah and “normality” of human history, between responsibility of the Nazi State and party and responsibility of other States and other anti-Semitic parties (including – as stated in the law – the Italian State, not just Fascism), between supplying knowledge and enforcing remembrance, and so on and so forth.

All scholars who have written about “Remembrance Day” have stressed the need to rescue it from “a mix of perfunctory routine and rhetoric,”⁵⁵ and not to perceive it as “the settlement of a debt” (David Bidussa).⁵⁶

Anna Rossi Doria has emphasized that it is not clear “if the January 27 is meant to be an occasion for remembrance or for knowledge: the two obviously diverge. [...] Increasingly, no distinction is made in the celebrations for ‘Remembrance Day’ between the two [remembrance and history] or, even worse, the first is taken as a substitute for the latter, decontextualizing the narrative or the testimony, thus risking at every turn to fall into one of two opposite and specular errors, the banalization of the Shoah or seeing it only as something done by diabolical monsters.”⁵⁷

I am also persuaded, as I have already said, that it is necessary to reaffirm that for individuals, and particularly for schoolchildren, no “duty” to remember the Shoah can exist. And that within history we should avoid monumentalizing

⁵⁵ Antonella Castelnuovo, Sara Valentina Di Palma, “Il senso del ricordo e il ruolo della memoria. Considerazioni sulla giornata europea della memoria,” *La rassegna mensile di Israel* 77/ 1-2 (2011): 48.

⁵⁶ David Bidussa, “La politica della memoria in Italia. Appunti sulla storia e la pratica del Giorno della Memoria,” *Annali del Dipartimento di storia*, 3 (2007): 90.

⁵⁷ Anna Rossi Doria, *Sul ricordo della Shoah*, (Turin: Zamorani, 2010), 32-3.

those events, a process that, arising from a lack of critical discernment, tends to perpetuate it.

Moreover, as already said, we must continue to assert that in school knowledge must definitively prevail over memory, whatever the law may seem to suggest.

Essentially, those who put into practice the Italian law on the January 27 must employ part of their resources to carry it out properly and to defend the law from the risks inherent to the law itself.

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The Attitude toward Bereavement in Everyday Life in the Jewish Agricultural Settlements of *Eretz Israel*, from the First *Aliyah* to the 1920s

by Devorah Giladi and Yossi Goldstein

Abstract

This article explores attitudes toward death and bereavement in the Jewish agricultural settlements of Eretz Israel (Land of Israel) from the First Aliyah (1881) to the 1920s, based primarily on newspapers of the period. The sources indicate that whereas members of the First Aliyah viewed death as a failure of the Zionist act and strived to conceal it to the best of their ability, the pioneers of the Second Aliyah effected a revolution in this realm, articulating a perspective that viewed death in the name of the Zionist act with pride and veneration as an attribute of the “new Jew.” This positive attitude focused on the casualties of Jewish guarding who were killed during clashes with Arabs, but also went further. Overall, the Zionist pioneers perceived blood as a means of actualizing the relationship between the Jew and Eretz Israel and expressed a desire to saturate the Land with their blood. The height of this process was the well-known pre-death utterance of Yosef Trumpeldor – a defender of the Jewish settlements in the Upper Galilee in the 1920s – that “it is good to die for our homeland.” This positive attitude toward sacrifice remained a prominent attribute of Zionism for many years to come.

Introduction

Background: The “New Jew,” Myths, and Nation Building in Nineteenth Century Europe

The Attitude to Bereavement in the *Moshavot* of the First *Aliyah*: Death as Failure

The Attitude toward Bereavement among the Pioneers of the Second and Third *Aliyot*: The “Beautiful Death” of the Guards

***Yizkor*: The First Zionist Book of Remembrance**

The Fatalities of Malaria in the Eyes of the Pioneers

Conclusion

Introduction

The initial decades of Zionist settlement in *Eretz Israel* (“The Land of Israel”) from 1881 and 1929 were characterized by a high mortality rate stemming primarily from illness. In this article, we survey the attitude within the Jewish public in *Eretz Israel* toward different kinds of death, as articulated in the newspapers and literature of the time. We do not delve into the major causes of death in the *Yishuv* during the period in question, as reflected in the archives of individual settlements and the *Chevra Kadisha* (the Jewish “Sacred Society” that prepared and guarded dead bodies prior to burial) but rather shed light on the public attitude toward the bereavement and death with which Jews in the country coped in their everyday lives. We excluded World War I and the violent events of 1920-21 and 1929 from our discussion, as these were exceptional occurrences and not part of everyday life in the *Yishuv*. Dying for the sake of a principle is an extreme act reflecting the attitude toward that principle. The attitude toward bereavement within the Jewish *Yishuv*, therefore, offers insight into attitudes toward the Zionist undertaking as a whole and the changes that occurred in the *Yishuv* during the period in question. In this way, exploring this attitude provides new insight not only into this historical period but also into Israeli bereavement, the roots of which reach back to it.¹

For the sake of background, we begin by briefly discussing the Zionist aspiration to create a “new Jew,” the need for myths in the establishment of nations, and the myth of the fallen soldiers that was commonplace in Europe at the time.

Background: The “New Jew,” Myths, and Nation Building in Nineteenth Century Europe

The leaders of the Zionist movement sought a solution to the problems of the Jewish People, and in doing so they did not limit themselves to simply finding a piece of land. As an integral part of the Zionist ethos, they also identified a need for far-reaching change in Jewish life – change that would facilitate a reshaping of the individual Jew and Jewish society and the negation of the Diaspora. One manifestation of this approach was the call for a change in the way Jews treated

¹ On Israeli mourning see Rut Malkinson and Eliezer Witztum, *Loss and Bereavement in Israeli Society*, (Jerusalem: Kanna, 1993), 231-50 [in Hebrew].

their bodies. Nationalist movements in nineteenth century Europe, and most prominently the German and Austrian movements, placed great emphasis on the connection between national rebirth and physical rebirth. It was in this spirit that the nationalist sports clubs of the era were first established. Influenced by these ideas, Theodor Herzl and Max Nordau, the leaders of political Zionism, spoke repeatedly of the physical change the Jews would need to undergo as part of their nationalist rebirth. Nordau, a psychiatrist and writer, coined the term “muscular Judaism” (*Muskeljudentum*), reflecting a desire to create a strong, rooted, fighting Jew who was connected to nature and the soil and whose character would restore the Jewish heroism of ages past.² The cultivation and promotion of sports activity reflected a repudiation of Jewish tradition, which had always prioritized the spirit over the body.

From there, it was only a short distance to a change in attitude toward death. In the 1880s, while addressing the ill state of the Jewish People, Zionist leader Yehuda Leib Pinsker argued that the problem was that Jews were unable to die.³ The ability to sacrifice life, to give death meaning, stemmed from the individual’s belonging to a national community. In the absence of a Jewish national community, Jews were denied the possibility of dying a meaningful death, or, in the words of Uri Cohen, a “beautiful death.” One innovation of Zionism was the possibility of “dying a beautiful death.” At the second Zionist Congress in 1898, fiery speeches were delivered in support of a Jewish physical rebirth. “Our People’s hope lies in blood and muscles,” asserted Israel Zangwill, a leader of the Zionist movement in Britain, “not in bitter weeping.” These words highlight the fact that Jewish physical development was not a goal in itself but rather a prelude to the willingness to spill blood in order to fulfill the hopes of the people. Nordau wrote in a similar spirit to the members of Bar-Kochba Berlin, the first all-Jewish sports club in Central Europe, which was established immediately following the congress: “Bar-Kochba was a hero who was not willing to accept defeat. When victory abandoned him, he knew how to die. Bar-Kochba is the last historical embodiment of the Jews who were knowledgeable in war and who laughed at the sound of the javelin.” In his words to these athletes, Nordau articulated a vision of death as preferable to defeat in battle. After all, it was defeat, not death, that amounted to humiliation and failure, “for, to be a

² Michael Stanislawski, *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle: Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism from Nordau to Jabotinsky*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

³ Uri Cohen, *Survival: The Concept of Death between the World Wars in Eretz Israel and Italy*, (Tel Aviv: Resling, 2007), 222-3, 240 [in Hebrew].

Zionist,” he maintained elsewhere, “means doubly and triply to be a fighter.”⁴ To summarize, many Zionist leaders believed that physical education played an important role in Zionism and that the body needed to be trained to wage war for the future of the people. They also held that part of their physical rebirth was the possibility of dying a beautiful death, as well as the freedom from fear of such a death. Their statements do not define the enemy with which they needed to do battle. However, European experience reflected the fact that nations won independence through war.

This approach to the Jewish body helped shape Zionist myths and memory. Memory studies scholar Yael Zerubavel argues that new societies, like Zionism, have needed the creation of myths and memory to instill in the individual a sense of belonging to the community, to emphasize their shared past, and to legitimize their shared future. In many cases, the myths that have occupied the core of memory have dealt with physical phenomena requiring explanation – such as disasters – with the goal of enabling people to come to terms with the hardships of life.⁵ Historian George Mosse has addressed “the myth of the fallen soldier” according to which the nation states in Europe transformed their fallen soldiers into mythical figures. This process proved to have some logic to it, as the creation of myths regarding young adults who lost their lives enabled many people to come to terms with their deaths, justified them, and gave them meaning. In this way, the myth succeeded not only in concealing from public consciousness the fact that war was a phenomenon of mass death but also transformed it, in memory, into an extolled and inspirational past. One example of this phenomenon was World War I, which was fought in horrifying conditions and caused casualties on an unprecedented scale, but which nonetheless is still perceived as a noble event. The fact that war was waged in the name of the nation lay at the heart of its conception as a positive event. A significant step in the ritual of the fallen soldier was the nationalization of death through the neutralization of its personal meaning and an emphasis on its national meaning.⁶ The national communities, which aspired to class equality, were able to find it in the adulation

⁴ Todd Presner, *Muscular Judaism*, (London-New York: Routledge, 2007), 56, 182-4, 217.

⁵ Yael Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israeli National Tradition*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 3-13.

⁶ An extreme example of this notion could be seen in France in 1801, in the planning of a building in which the ashes of soldiers who fell in battle were to be mixed with the ashes of the great leaders of France. The plan’s point of departure was that there would be no more need for cemeteries, and that from that point on, all members of the nation would be buried together.

of the death of the simple soldier.⁷ In conclusion, Mosse observed that transforming the dead into myth led society to feel obligated to the nation and willing for sacrifice. This helps explain the central need for Zionist martyrs in the early days of Zionist settlement in *Eretz Israel*. The Jewish immigrants to the Land, created a new society, and were in need of myths on which to build it. In the context of our discussion, the myths in question were the myths of heroism and sacrifice.

The Attitude to Bereavement in the *Moshavot* of the First *Aliyah*: Death as Failure

Known in Hebrew as *moshavot* (colonies), the Jewish settlements that were established in *Eretz Israel* during the First *Aliyah* (1881-1903) suffered from many hardships, some of which took a toll in human life. The primary cause of death in the *moshavot*, however, was undoubtedly malaria.⁸ Although we possess no systematic record of those who died of malaria during this period, evidence indicates that the illness resulted in death on an immense scale. In Hadera, a *moshava* established in 1881 in the northern Sharon region of *Eretz Israel* near the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, malaria took the lives of 240 of the settlement's 540 residents during its first two decades in existence.⁹ In Yesud Hama`ala, a *moshava* established eight years earlier in the southern Huleh Valley, it was reported that during the settlement's first 28 years in existence, half of its inhabitants died of malaria.¹⁰ Indeed, in 1913, it was asserted that the number of graves in the settlement's cemetery was double that of its inhabitants.¹¹ According to Rabbi Alter Ashkenazi, who was born in Yesud Hama`aleh in 1899: "There was not a home among us that was spared bereavement... Entire families were wiped out by the illness."¹² In a February 1884 letter written in response to a request for a report on the health situation in *Eretz Israel*, Dr. Hilel Yaffe, the well known physician of the *moshavot*, wrote as follows: "The most widespread

⁷ George Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3-38.

⁸ Yaffa Szekely, *Daily Life in the Hebrew Colonies in Palestine (Eretz Israel), 1882-1914*, Ph.D. dissertation, (University of Haifa, 1998), 23-33 [in Hebrew].

⁹ Yaffa Szekely, "Courage or Madness? Why was Hadera not abandoned despite the terror of malaria?," *Hakhan* 1 (2004), 6 [in Hebrew].

¹⁰ M. Amittai, "Yesud Hama`aleh," *Hapoel Hatzair*, November 8, 1912, 12 [in Hebrew].

¹¹ M. Amittai, "Yesud Hama`aleh," *Hapoel Hatzair*, March 14, 1913, 14 [in Hebrew].

¹² Shaul and Ruth Dagan, *On the First Road to Zion*, (Haifa: The Arison Foundation, 1998), 119 [in Hebrew].

illness in the country is malaria...I know of no place that is free of malaria.”¹³ Despite the high mortality rate, the newspapers of the period make almost no reference to the phenomenon. This is particularly surprising, as the *moshavot* were a topic of interest and as the Jewish press in *Eretz Israel* and abroad frequently contained news about them.

To understand the reason for this omission, we consider various references to the situation in Hadera. After the settlement's first year in existence, it came to be known as a settlement that was plagued by malaria. Moshe Smilansky, one of Hadera's first settlers, recounted the reactions of the surrounding area and the dilemma created by the understanding that Hadera was a place of death:

We were helpless...Friends came...from all the *moshavot* bearing advice and a prayer: leave this place, save your lives...It became known in the Diaspora, and it impacted the entire country...A Land that bereaves its inhabitants. But no one left...And some of us said: we prefer to die in Hadera than to live without it.¹⁴

Smilansky's words reflect the fact that the dilemma had to do not only with personal risk but also, and in equal measure, with the fear of giving *Eretz Israel* a bad name and scaring off potential Jewish immigrants. An article published in the Warsaw-based Jewish newspaper *Hatzfira* in 1891 placed blame on the *moshava*: “The *moshava* Hadera has ruined the *Yishuv*. Most of its inhabitants have left it...Some have left the earth, and the *moshava* will be their grave”¹⁵ In this way, the author explicitly charged the *moshava* with responsibility for tainting the *Yishuv*'s reputation.

In 1898, two young men died in Hadera during the same week: Shlomo Botakowsky and Reuven Goldberg. Their deaths left the settlement panicked and in shock. An article about the two in *Hatzfira* dealt not with their commemoration or the mourning of their deaths but rather with who was to blame for the settlement's very existence:

¹³ Hillel Yaffe, *Generation of Pioneers: Memoirs, Diaries, and Letters*, (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1983), 140-2 [in Hebrew].

¹⁴ Moshe Smilansky, “The Founding of the Moshava Hadera,” in *Memories of Eretz Israel II*, ed. Ehud Yaari, (Ramat Gan: Massade, 1974), 717-8 [in Hebrew].

¹⁵ A Passerby (*Over Oreach*), “In Our Brothers' Colonies in the Holy Land,” *Hatzfira*, October 16, 1891, 892 [Hebrew].

Blame for the establishment of Hadera rests on the shoulders of Hovavei Zion [the name of the first Jewish national movement, which was established in the Pale of Settlement in 1881]. Their emissaries purchased this site from those who were selling it...After they did so, it was incumbent upon them to do everything in their power to save its farmers.¹⁶

The author then went on to blame the settlers who did not abandon the settlement, charging them with responsibility for the tragedy that befell them.

In an essay titled “The *Yishuv* and its Custodians,” Zionist ideologue Ahad Ha’am, who was among the leaders of the movement in its early days, levelled serious charges of responsibility for the deaths, primarily at the leadership of *Hovavei Zion* and Baron Edmond de Rothschild (who financially supported the initial Jewish national colonies in *Eretz Israel*), but also at the inhabitants of the *moshavot* themselves. It was the support of the organization, he reasoned, that prevented the settlers from leaving, and for this reason responsibility for their deaths rested on its shoulders: “We are all custodians, lovers, and supporters of the *Yishuv*. It is a mistake for us to proclaim that this blood was not spilled by our hands.” At the conclusion of the essay, he called for the immediate cessation of all support and for allowing the settlers to face their own fate; in this way, those who did not survive would be responsible for their own failure or death:

And if there are some among them...who do not know how to use the means of existence at their disposal, fail, and fall – their blood shall be on their own head. They will fall and will not be an obstacle to their brothers who are better than them! This will not be doing a disservice to the *Yishuv*. On the contrary, the *Yishuv* will be strengthened by the fall of those who are faltering and who lack the skills to exist.¹⁷

Honing in on Ahad Ha’am’s criticism of the inhabitants themselves, he clearly regarded the settlers, who found themselves in a place beleaguered by swamps and malaria, as individuals who had failed on a personal level and who were contributing to the failure of the *Yishuv* as a whole.

¹⁶ Ever Hadani (Aharon Feldman), *Hadera*, (Tel Aviv: Massade, 1950/51), 139 [in Hebrew].

¹⁷ Ahad Ha’am, “At the Parting of the Ways” II, *Yidisher Ferlag* (Berlin, 1921), 268-70 [Hebrew]

These were words written about Hadera by external sources. We now turn to the markedly different manner in which the issue was addressed by the settlers themselves, who appear to have regarded it as their responsibility to protect the reputation of *Eretz Israel* in general and the *moshava* in particular. For this reason, they fastidiously abided by a principle of external denial. Following the harsh words published about them in *Hatzfira*, a farmer from Hadera published a disavowal of the report and a denial of the presence of the disease within the *moshava*, complaining that the paper had been responsible for giving the *moshava* a bad name and asking why it did not publicize each instance of the ill dying in Jerusalem. “As a farmer of Hadera,” he concluded, “I say that we are as strong now as we were in the past...that people die in all the *moshavot* and in all countries as they do throughout the country, for those who are born [ultimately] die.”¹⁸ Numerous letters written by settlers in Hadera contained requests for assistance from different figures within the *Hovavei Zion* movement, although none made any mention of malaria. Instead, they referred only to the economic situation. The only letters that explicitly described the health situation were sent to Rothschild, and subsequently to the JCA (Jewish Colonization Association), whose operations he funded, in request of assistance in draining the swamps.¹⁹

Internally, the settlers of Hadera expressed a different sentiment. Their justifications for holding on to the site reflected unwavering faith and complete acceptance of their fate. One settler, Chava Rotman, recounted that when she asked her husband why they had not left the settlement, he answered: “Here is where we will live, Chava, and here is where we will die. Whatever our fate is, we will bear it silently.”²⁰ The residents of Hadera resolved not to leave their *moshava* for religious and ideological reasons, despite the high price they might pay. It was a decision that those around them did not understand, but this did not deter them. Settling in Hadera was an act that cannot be assessed using rational criteria. The settlers believed that the reestablishment of Jewish settlement in *Eretz Israel* was an essential stage of saving the Jewish people, and they saw themselves as the People’s emissaries. In our opinion, this faith is the

¹⁸ A farmer of Hadera, *Hamelitz*, November 10, 1898, 4 [Hebrew].

¹⁹ Szekely, “Courage or Madness?” 29.

²⁰ Y.L. Schneerson, *In the Words of the Founders*, (Tel Aviv: Am Hasefer, 1963), 125 [Hebrew].

only convincing explanation for the settlers' decision to steadfastly remain in the settlement, in which people continued to die of malaria for four decades.²¹

Another much less common form of death during this period was being killed by Arabs in the course of a robbery. Aharon Feldman described the situation as follows: "The Galilee – which was then beyond the Sambation – was a forsaken place where everyone was ill with malaria and the Bedouin killed and butchered without mercy."²² This description, which related to malaria and murder together, attests to the fact that murder was regarded as part of the misfortune of a neglected land lacking a concerned government and was not at all viewed in a nationalist context. For this reason, those who died from malaria were treated identically to those who were murdered.

Overall, the *moshavot* with high mortality rates were accused of tainting the reputation of the *Yishuv*, of intransigence and useless sacrifice, of being "an obstacle in the path of their brothers who are better than them," and of indifference and backwardness. It is also clear that the settlers internalized this criticism and therefore concealed their true situation.

But there was another reason they may have played concealed those who died of malaria. The settlers of the First *Aliyah* sought to establish settlements consisting of Jews who worked the land and enjoyed the fruits of their labor. Settlers who were pale and ill were ill-suited for this model, which is why they expressed no pride in or reverence for those who died from malaria in their settlements. Only years later, once the swamps and the disease were relegated to history, did the residents of the *moshavot* begin to take pride in the hardships they suffered and to commemorate those who had been lost in the process.²³

²¹ Hadera was only one example of settlements in which death was viewed as proof of personal failure and harm to Zionism. See, for example, "A Letter from the Upper Galilee," *Ha'achdut*, March 21, 1913, 16-8 [in Hebrew].

²² Aharon Feldman (Ever Hadani), *Settlement in the Lower Galilee: 50 Years of History*, (Ramat Gan: Massade, 1955), 208 [in Hebrew].

²³ Moshe Smilansky, a founder of Hadera and later of Rehovot, published a book of memoirs regarding the first settlers, but only in the 1950s. Moshe Smilansky, *Family of the Soil*, 4 vols, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1954). In his memoirs, Shalom Rabinovitch, who worked in Hadera, recalled an encounter with a farmer who asked him whether the heavy price paid by those who lived there was worth it. He answered as follows: "The more difficult, bitter, and dangerous the conquest, the dearer, more pleasant, more important, and more beloved the accomplishment." Szekely, "Courage or Madness?" 30. This response is consistent with the myth that was common in the

Before moving on to the next historical period, we draw attention to a phenomenon that is not directly related to bereavement but that is undoubtedly related to it on an indirect level: Jewish emigration out of *Eretz Israel*, which was a common phenomenon during the period in question. The scope of the phenomenon remains unclear, and our understanding of it is based on wide-ranging estimates and conjectures of between 30% and 70%.²⁴ Nonetheless, it was clearly a widespread phenomenon that may be understood as reflecting the response to bereavement which was difficult to find in the written sources. Although emigration is a fact of life in all immigrant societies and consistently accounts for a percentage of those who fail to be absorbed into society, large-scale emigration may also be a response to the difficult realities of the society in question. In the present context, it appears to have been an outcome of a reality that, as a result of the factors described above, could not be expressed in words.

The Attitude toward Bereavement among the Pioneers of the Second and Third *Aliyot*: The “Beautiful Death” of the Guards

Zionism began with the First *Aliyah*. The immigrants of this period chose to settle in agricultural settlements and, in doing so, achieved an existential revolution in their own lives. This change was reflected in the term “the new Jew,” which was prominent in many realms of Jewish life in the *moshavot*. Young residents related to their bodies differently than their elders (Herzl was deeply impressed by the sight of the youth of Rehovot exercising and riding horses), engaged in agriculture, and established new areas of settlement. Still, according to historian Boaz Neuman, Zionism as a movement calling for a revolutionary internal change in all realms of life did not come into existence until the pioneering Second *Aliyah*.²⁵ “The Pioneers were the first to identify

1930s, at the time it was written. In this way, it can be understood as reflecting a later view of the settlers.

²⁴ Yehoshua Kaniel, “Jewish Emigration from Palestine during the Period of the First and Second *Aliyot*,” *Cathedra* 73 (1994): 115-28 [in Hebrew].

²⁵ Numerous historians have sought to undermine the image of the pioneering *Aliyah*, claiming that it was only an image, and perhaps even a myth. One of the major arguments in this context has been statistical, resting on the fact that the pioneers were actually negligible in number and accounted for only 16% of the Second and Third *Aliyot*. Neuman maintains that despite this fact, the pioneers were a minority that shaped the Zionist experience, and that as such, their words should be assigned a great deal of significance. Boaz Neuman, *Pioneering and Desire in Early Zionism*, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2009), 18-9 [in Hebrew].

existence in *Eretz Israel* with existence in general. From their perspective, being in *Eretz Israel* meant more than being in a defined, concrete place. As far as they were concerned, it meant being.²⁶ Even if we do not completely accept Neuman's analysis, we cannot ignore the heroism that accompanied every pioneering act – heroism that was not openly articulated during the First *Aliyah*. We suppose that the residents of the *moshavot* regarded their act of settlement as a revolution, for had this not been the case, they would never have been willing to make as many sacrifices as they did. This, however, was a sentiment that they did not express. This may have been because they were not confident enough in the correctness of their path to boast about it. It may have also stemmed from the fact they were endowed with less historical fluency and consciousness and kept their thoughts to themselves. In any event, the pioneers were the first to clearly, precisely, and directly formulate their ideology, which meant that they also shaped the Zionist attitude toward death. In this section, we focus on two aspects of this attitude: the struggle against the country's Arab inhabitants and the struggle against malaria.²⁷

During the First *Aliyah*, the issue of security encompassed little more than the relations between the *moshavot* and neighboring localities. The causes of tension in this context included disputes over land and water and acts of robbery, and the weapons used – typically clubs, whips, and other such implements – were meant to frighten, not to kill. The *moshavot* suffered from incessant theft but nonetheless tried to avoid quarrels which they would have to pay for in blood. One of the major revolutions in Jewish life in *Eretz Israel* that took place during this period was the establishment of organizations that raised the banner of guarding as a national goal. The first such group was “Bar-Giora,” which was founded in 1907 and expanded into “Hashomer” in 1909. The Jewish guarding organizations sought to advance the independence of the *Yishuv* by assuming

²⁶ Neuman offers numerous examples establishing the fact that Zionism as a fundamental revolution began during the Second *Aliyah*. In the realm of labor and guarding, most inhabitants of the *moshavot* did not work the soil and did not do their own guarding. The pioneers, in contrast, aspired to work with their own hands and to guard their own property. In the spiritual realm, the writings of many pioneers contain numerous expressions of a desire to be reborn in *Eretz Israel*, as well as references to a desire for the land. *Ibid.*, 12, 42-3.

²⁷ Also important in this context are two other aspects of loss which we do not address in this article. One of these is suicide, which became an issue during the Second and Third *Aliyah*, and which has been researched at length. See Gur Alroey, “Pioneers or Lost Souls? – The Issue of Suicide in the Second and the Third Aliya,” *Yahadut Zmanenu* 13 (1999): 209-41 [in Hebrew]. Another is firearm accidents, which, according to Rogel, occurred frequently in Hashomer. See Nakdimon Rogel, “Who killed Abraham Joseph Baral?,” *Cathedra* 69 (1993): 165-74 [in Hebrew].

responsibility for the guarding of Jewish settlements, including all the dangers this entailed. The idea of Jewish guarding was so revolutionary at the time that some have identified it as the initial nucleus of the IDF, and its members as the first soldiers of the state of Israel, decades before its establishment.²⁸ Other scholars, such as Gur Alroey, have played down these groups' actual contribution to the *Yishuv*.²⁹

Neuman argues that the establishment of the guarding organizations endowed the Jews, for the first time in many years, with the possibility of dying a "beautiful death." During the First *Aliyah*, no one was characterized as having died a "beautiful death." It was a concept that emerged on a large scale later, in the semantics of the pioneers. Neuman described the pioneers' relationship with the land as a "desire" that could be actualized in various ways, including labor, guarding, studying the land, and watering the land with blood. The spilling of blood now appeared in pioneering texts as a desire and as something that constituted a bond to the land, with no explanation of the political context. Death on the soil of *Eretz Israel* was perceived as death with a sense of belonging, and therefore a beautiful death – a death that was not final and that conferred life in *Eretz Israel*. "In dying on the soil of the Land," Neuman explains,

the *Halutzim* did not die, because a "beautiful death" replaced mortal life with immortality. And through their deaths they bestowed life: they bequeathed the Land of Israel. The pioneers' blood seeped into the ground and constituted it as Jewish soil. Even after death, their legacies continued to pulse among living *halutzim*. Their lives were recorded forever in the history of the renaissance and the redemption of the Land of Israel, through the trees and forests planted in their names, the memorials established to commemorate them, and a historiography that glorified their lives and acts.³⁰

²⁸ Mordechai Naor, "Burly, Courageous, and Imbued with Zionist Awareness: The 100th Anniversary of the Establishment of Bar-Giora and Hashomer," *Et-Mol* 198 (Adar II 5768 / March-April 2008), 4 [in Hebrew].

²⁹ Gur Alroey, "The Servants of the Settlement or Vulgar Tyrants? 100 Years of the Hashomer Association: A Historical Perspective," *Cathedra* 133 (2009): 77-104. [in Hebrew]

³⁰ Neuman, *Land and Desire in Early Zionism*, 114. The above quote is taken from the English edition of Neuman's book: *Land and Desire in Early Zionism*, (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2011), 95.

Perhaps the purest expression of the beautiful death of the Zionist pioneer was Trumpeldor's legendary pre-death utterance "it is good to die for our homeland," which, after his death, continued to reverberate throughout the Jewish pioneering world. Even earlier, Trumpeldor himself had written about the essence of the "beautiful death" in a letter to a friend: "I want to die a beautiful death, in joy, as befits a Jew dying for the Land of Israel."³¹ It was in response to the events that occurred at the settlement of Tel-Hai in northern *Eretz Israel* on March 1, 1920 that the willingness to die in battle as opposed to retreating was made the object of praise after centuries of exile. This was why the reactions to the affair were so dramatic. According to historian Anita Shapira, after the events at Tel-Hai, it became common practice to refer to the Land as a "homeland" as opposed to an "ancestral land."³²

The Zionist pioneers understood death in *Eretz Israel* as a central component of the Jews' return from exile – not as a tragedy but rather as a manifestation of the return to the living. Blood was the source of the rebirth of *Eretz Israel*, and the determined pioneers ensured the life of their comrades and the existence of the pioneering enterprise. Using the writings of the Zionist pioneers, we now turn to the question of why, in their view, blood needed to be spilled in *Eretz Israel*. *Hashomer's* motto was a distinct expression of the belief that blood was what would revive the Jewish People.³³ For Israel Shochat, the leader of the organization, it was an iron-clad rule that victory could not be achieved without blood and sacrifices.³⁴ He explained the group's motto as follows: "*Hashomer* made its motto 'in blood and fire Judea fell and in blood and fire Judea shall rise,' as its approach was to not spare its blood when it could be used to buy freedom."³⁵ Indeed, evidence attests to the fact that guards did not spare their own blood.³⁶ Esther Becker spoke of her induction conversation when she joined Bar-Giora, in which she was told: "We are in need of men and women members who will be capable of giving their life for the sake of this goal...But know one thing: those who join the organization will not come out alive."³⁷ In 1914, Zionist

³¹ Menachem Poznansky, *From the Life of Yosef Trumpeldor*, (Jaffa: Histadrut, 1922), 201 [in Hebrew].

³² Anita Shapira, *The Sword of the Dove*, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1993), 144 [in Hebrew].

³³ Kovetz *Hashomer*, (Tel Aviv: Labor Movement Archive, 1937), 58 [in Hebrew].

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 432-3.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 434.

³⁶ "Meir Hazanovitch, of blessed memory," *Hapoel Hatzair*, May 30, 1913, 16 [in Hebrew].

³⁷ Esther Becker, "From the Life of the Hashomer Family," in *The Second Aliyah Book*, ed. Bracha Havas, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1947), 511 [in Hebrew].

leader Chaim Weizmann proclaimed: “We Jews have not yet sacrificed enough, and this is why we currently hold only two percent of the land in the *Eretz Israel*.”³⁸ According to this statement, it was the intensity of the willingness to sacrifice that determined the scope of accomplishment. Based on the above, we can conclude that the Zionist pioneers clearly perceived the willingness to sacrifice as a necessary condition for the possibility of fulfilling their vision. Through sacrifice Jews made it to Israel, and through more sacrifice they would achieve more successes. This does not provide a rational answer to the question of why it was necessary to spill blood, but it does attest to the fact that the pioneers believed that it was.

In addition to this belief in its necessity, blood as perceived by the Zionist pioneers sealed the bond between the Land and the pioneer, and sealed the right to and ownership of land. “With his blood,” said Yosef Salzman’s comrades after his death, “we reestablished our covenant with Kinneret.”³⁹ Blood was understood as sanctifying the land,⁴⁰ and Ya’akov Zerubavel, another *Yishuv* leader, expressed fear and humiliation at the possibility of “a foreigner stepping foot on land that was watered with the blood of Jewish fatalities, who fell while on guard.”⁴¹ And according to David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Jewish *Yishuv* in *Eretz Israel* from the 1930s onward, “had we not watered the Land with our blood, we would not be standing on it today...We are spilling our blood and living here.”⁴² That is to say, the bond between pioneer and land was actualized after blood was spilled on it.

As a result of this significance, the spilling of blood was regarded not only as a necessity but also as a desire and as something to which to aspire. Yosef Nachmani, head of the Defense Committee for the Upper Galilee, expressed this sentiment with clarity: “We wish to die and to water it with our blood...Every inch of soil in our Land is dear to us, and we are willing to sacrifice our lives for

³⁸ Meir Hazan, “In their Death they Bequeathed: from Degania to Nahalal,” *Alpayim* 26 (2004), 97 [in Hebrew].

³⁹ Shimon Kushnir, *Men of Nebo: From the Story of the Second Aliyah* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1968), p. 150 [in Hebrew].

⁴⁰ “Yaakov Feldman,” *Ha’achdut*, December 12, 1913, 27 [in Hebrew].

⁴¹ Ya’akov Zerubavel, “Guarding and Labor” (1910/11), in *In the Days of War and Revolution: Memories and Writings from the Path of Life, 1913-1921*, ed. Ben-Zion Dinur, (Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1966), 300 [in Hebrew].

⁴² David Ben-Gurion (December 14, 1917), *From a Class to a People* (Tel Aviv: Aynot, 1954/55), 38 [in Hebrew].

it.”⁴³ Zerubavel identified watering the Land with blood, alongside agricultural settlement and labor, as a sign of redemption.⁴⁴ But it was not only a desire of the pioneers; as they saw it, their blood, along with their sweat, was also the desire of the Land itself. “After a respite of hundreds of years,” wrote Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, “the Land of Canaan has once again set forth to taste the blood of its children.”⁴⁵ In the aftermath of the murder of Moshe Barsky, Yosef Salzman, and Ya’akov Feldman, Shmuel Dayan, a prominent member of Kibbutz Degania, wrote as follows:

O soil of our homeland: are you still thirsty for our blood? Were you not saturated by the blood of our ancestors, from the day you were placed in our hands?...We will soften it with blood and sweat and wet it with the dew of our adolescence, which will renew its youth. It will remember us...Our heroes have arisen and we will be redeemed.⁴⁶

According to this view, the Land thirsted for the blood and sweat of Jews, for whom it had yearned during their years in exile.

The Zionist pioneers viewed blood spilled in *Eretz Israel* as fundamentally different from blood spilled in the Diaspora. In contrast to the positive attitude toward blood as a factor facilitating rebirth and a connection to the Land, blood in the Diaspora was perceived as drowning the Jews. Neuman explains that this attitude toward blood was linked to the pioneers’ attitude toward the Diaspora in general. The pioneers viewed the Diaspora as a space without footholds in which the wandering Jew lived, detached and eternal. In this spirit, they depicted Diasporic space as saturated with blood. The Diaspora was drunk with Jewish blood, and the Jews were being washed away in rivers, torrents, and baths of blood.⁴⁷ “We are being destroyed and drinking blood – for no reason, with no purpose, without intention,” wrote Ben-Gurion. “Just as there is no reason for our life, there is no reason for our death...and there is no benefit and no payment

⁴³ Letter from Nachmani to Kalvariski, February 1920, in Nakdimon Rogel, *The Tel-Hai Affair: Documents on the Defense of the Upper Galilee, 1919/20*, (Jerusalem: Hasifria Hatzionit, 1994), 206 [in Hebrew].

⁴⁴ Ya’akov Zerubavel, June 1911, in Israel Bartal, Zeev Tzahor, and Yehoshua Kaniel (eds.), *The Second Aliyah: Sources*, (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1997), 367 [in Hebrew].

⁴⁵ Avner (Yizhak Ben-Zvi), “די יפן-ער לעקציאן,” *Yidisher Arbeter*, May 14, 1908, 3 [in Yiddish].

⁴⁶ Shmuel Dayan, *In Days of Vision and Seige*, (Tel Aviv: Massade, 1952/53), 230 [in Hebrew].

⁴⁷ Neuman, *Pioneering and Desire in Early Zionism*, 96-7.

for the stream of our blood.”⁴⁸ These descriptions highlight the contrast between blood spilled in the Diaspora and blood spilled in Eretz Israel: in the Diaspora, it was an obstacle, drowning what Eliezer Joffe called “a non-people without a land,”⁴⁹ in reference to the Jew’s lack of its own place and a national existence. In Eretz Israel, Jews were creating a place for themselves and forging a bond between Jews and Eretz Israel.⁵⁰

***Yizkor*: The First Zionist Book of Remembrance**

Within the overall attitude toward bereavement, we now turn our attention to what is considered to be the first Zionist book of commemoration: *Yizkor*. The idea of the book was proposed by Yehoshua Radler Feldman, a Hebrew language writer and Second *Aliyah* activist who wrote under the pseudonym “Rabbi Binyamin.” The book’s aim, as he understood it, was to commemorate a number of guards who had been killed. Historian Jonathan Frankel, however, maintains that the intentions of the book extended well beyond the realm of personal commemoration to include the creation of a pantheon of Jewish heroes aimed at educating a generation.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Ben-Gurion, Nisan 20, 5675 (April 4, 1915), in *From a Class to a People*, 14. According to Uri Cohen, these words were evidence that Ben-Gurion possessed a deep understanding of the change in the view of Jewish death engendered by Zionism. Cohen, *Survival*, 234.

⁴⁹ Eliezer Joffe (1919/20), *The Writings of Eliezer Joffe I*, (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1947), 49 [in Hebrew].

⁵⁰ The perception of the Jewish blood being spilled in the Diaspora as a large wave threatening to drown the People as a whole was based on more than the notion of negation of the Diaspora; it was also an expression of a historical period that was replete with waves of pogroms. According to Anita Shapira, this had a profound psychological impact on Jewish youth: “The Jews’ sense of security and survival continued to be undermined, and these anxieties were to remain persistent throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The feeling ‘All the world is my gallows’ was not a rhetorical flourish but rather a description of the psychological truth and state of mind of the contemporaries who experienced the violence firsthand, and whose psyches bore its scars. This fundamental fact is important for understanding the mentality of the generation that reached maturity at the turn of the century. People realized that pogroms were a permanent, recurring phenomenon and that Jewish blood could be spilled at will. They concluded that Jews would continue to be under ever-increasing threat. This became the dominant mood and somehow had to be dealt with, an answer had to be found.” (Shapira, *The Sword of the Dove*, 61-2). The above English excerpt is taken from Shapira, *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 35-6.

⁵¹ Jonathan Frankel, “The ‘Yizkor’ Book of 1911: A Note on National Myths in the Second Aliya,” in *Religion, Ideology and Nationalism: Essays Presented in Honor of Yehoshua Arieli*, eds.

The task of editing the project was undertaken by Hebrew writer and Hovavei Zion activist Alexander Ziskind Rabinovich and Hebrew writer Yosef Haim Brenner. Rabinovich and Brenner published repeated requests in the workers' newspapers for others to take part in the writing, but, according to Feldman, they received no response.⁵² The book, which was eventually published in 1911, contained few words of personal commemoration of the deceased and many essays and literary texts, primarily about death on the altar of the homeland. The book commemorated eight individuals, seven of whom were killed in clashes with Arabs, and one who died of illness.

The small amount of information that appeared in the book regarding the lives of the deceased emphasized the fact that they had not been afraid to sacrifice their lives in order to save Jewish lives, or even Jewish property or dignity. The most heroic image in this context was that of Yehezkel Nisanov, who was attacked by thieves attempting to steal his cart and, instead of fleeing, chose to put up a fight and was killed in the process. "It was of course better for him to be killed than to give the Arabs his mules," wrote Israel Giladi. "I am your example, Nisanov would say, that a Jewish worker should not allow his dignity to be disgraced, even if they take his life, for the dignity of his people and its future depends on it."⁵³

Rabinovich and Rabbi Binyamin, who were considered moderate in outlook, began the book with a preface that amounted to a call for peaceful relations with the Arabs of *Eretz Israel*. They explained the difference between those who had died of malaria and those who had fallen in battle, whose deaths were tragic in that they were unnecessary and unnatural.⁵⁴ There was a contradiction between this call for peace and the idea of close relations between the two peoples on the one hand, and the rest of the book, which explicitly encouraged death in battle against them, on the other hand.⁵⁵ Later in the book, Rabbi Binyamin himself wrote as follows:

Hedva Ben-Israel et al., (Jerusalem: Historical Society of Israel and Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 1986), 355-84.

⁵² Yehoshua Radler Feldman (Rabbi Binyamin), "About Yizkor," *Hapoel Hatzair*, January 24, 1911, 12 [in Hebrew].

⁵³ Israel Giladi, "Memories," in *Yizkor*, ed. Alexander Ziskind Rabinovitch, (Jaffa, 1911), 16.

⁵⁴ *Ibid*, iv-v.

⁵⁵ Members of the Second *Aliyah* often spoke about the national collision between Jews and Arabs that was destined to occur in *Eretz Israel*. Although in practice consistent Arab activity

It pained me to hear...about these new graves...But I must admit, the sorrow gradually dissipated...It is good for a man to have his kidneys pierced by an arrow in his youth...Happiness and beauty is not found in many days. Happiness belongs to he whose days are numbered.⁵⁶

Later in the book, the glorification of death became even more explicit.⁵⁷ Writer and teacher Kadish Yehuda Silman wrote that one of his most powerful childhood memories was his mother's tears during the *Yizkor* prayer. These tears, he explained, stemmed not from sorrow but were rather tears of emotion. Memory of the dead, he maintained, arouses emotion in the People. The spilling of blood is what imbues a people with historical memory, and it is therefore what returns a People to their land. The concluding words of Silman's essay assert that the motivation to immigrate to *Eretz Israel* is actually the desire to be killed there: "You should know that we, the young, were brought to *Eretz Israel* by one old poem: Not fire and not sun, but rather our blood, Zion, will redden your mountains."⁵⁸

Although the messages conveyed by *Yizkor* are identical to those that have already been discussed above, in *Yizkor* they were concentrated in one book and explicitly formulated: Death in *Eretz Israel* was among the signs of the renaissance of the People, and it should not be recoiled from; the bond to the Land was to be forged with blood, which means that there could be no future in the Land without the spilling of blood; The Land was in need of Hebrew blood, and Jews aspired to water the Land with their blood.

The book's publication sparked debates in the Hebrew-language press over whether there was a need for commemoration, and, if so, whom to commemorate. Ya'akov Zerubavel claimed that the book lacked a clear message and was skeptical of the call for peace voiced in its introduction. From his

against Zionism had not yet emerged, relations between neighbors often boiled over into local clashes, which became increasingly frequent with the rising Arab antagonism resulting from the mounting Jewish immigration to the country. Shapira posits that their activist approach stemmed not only from the reality in the country but was also influenced by their lives in the Diaspora. The uprising against the dire conditions and defenselessness of Jews in Eastern Europe, in conjunction with Russian revolutionary principles that justified the use of force as a means of achieving historic change, made them militant. Shapira, *The Sword of the Dove*, 106, 147.

⁵⁶ Rabinovitch, *Yizkor*, 4.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

perspective, such a message had no place in a book calling for sacrifice in war. He also maintained that death in war was nothing unusual and should therefore be taken for granted:

If Jewish life and Jewish productivity begin here, there will also be Jewish heroes who will know how to die. To know how to die – this is something we still need to learn...New graves are a sign that new life is evolving in the Land, not a life of suffering but a life of healthy people...whose love for life will not ask why, who know how to fall in war.⁵⁹

He then expressed opposition to the portrayal of the fallen as exceptional individuals. “Such people can be, and should be, every member of our People,”⁶⁰ Zerubavel wrote, and then offered his own explanation of why the book’s statement was not sufficiently clear: because most of the potential dead are still alive.

Perhaps the book is not yet necessary, as this is only the beginning...It is still too early to commemorate the individuals, as they will be followed by many more...Perhaps this is why the memory of the casualties in the book is so frail and pallid, because their most important part remain among the living.⁶¹

Because he saw the outcome of death in war as something that should be taken for granted, Zerubavel objected to the mythology of the fallen. His desire for the Jewish People to “learn how to die” is perhaps the most explicit expression possible of the notion of “the beautiful death” as a major part of the process of rebirth.

Additional criticism was levelled by Brenner, who, as we noted, initially served as one of the project’s chief editors, along with Rabinovich, but soon abandoned the undertaking. Subsequent essays he authored expressed criticism of the book and rejected the criterion of a violent death at the hands of Arabs for the selection of the figures included in the book. They also rejected the notion that the guards were the heroes of Zionism. However, he was more critical of the attempt to turn

⁵⁹ Ya`akov Zerubavel, “Yizkor – Fragments of Ideas,” *Ha`achdut*, January 2, 1912, 32 [in Hebrew].

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

the fallen into mythological figures. Every Zionist act in *Eretz Israel* was carried out based on never-ending conversation, he explained: “Have you ever seen a case in which people are climbing on a mountain cliff...bumping into something, and falling, while someone else will not stop talking about them during the act?” He believed that *Yizkor* reflected this kind of excessive dramatization, which he regarded as disproportionate in light of the small number of the fallen and the fact that they were not exceptional individuals but rather normal people: “Even this small handful is indicative of the extent to which we hasten to make history and to sanctify things.”⁶² Brenner disassociated himself from all efforts to attribute global historical importance to the death of the guards or to transform them into saints or heroes and refrained from creating myths in general. He had joined the editorial effort in order to commemorate young men who had been killed. When he realized that it was a project of mythologization, however, he stepped down on the grounds that such talk was premature in Zionism so few years after its inception.

The book’s producers responded to Brenner’s arguments. Rabbi Binyamin denied that an effort had been made to create a myth and held that the project had always been one of personal commemoration. However, because of the lack of cooperation on the part of the friends of the deceased, the majority of the book had indeed been written by writers.⁶³ Rabinovich published an angry response to Brenner’s criticism. “The writer sighs at the fact that some writers hastened to tell the readers that the workers who were killed in *Eretz Israel* are sacred...In his opinion, we should have waited hundreds of years to do so,” he countered. “Who dares to doubt the sanctity of the young men whose souls we commemorated in *Yizkor*, who died heroically for our sacred land and spilled their blood on it?”⁶⁴ Rabinovich objected to Brenner’s criticism, arguing that the young men who had been killed were sacred and should be commemorated as such.

But the book’s impact was not limited to the debate it sparked in *Eretz Israel* over how to relate to the fatalities of guarding. In 1916, *Yizkor* was published in Yiddish in the United States under the editorship of Alexander Cheshin, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, and Ya`akov Zerubavel, with the aim of increasing the public support

⁶² Yosef Haim Brenner (Bar-Yochai), “Additional Sighs of a Writer,” *Hapoel Hatzair*, June 21, 1912, 11-2 [in Hebrew].

⁶³ Feldman, “About *Yizkor*,” 12.

⁶⁴ Alexander Ziskind Rabinovitch, “On the Sighers,” *Hapoel Hatzair*, July 12, 1912, 11 [in Hebrew].

for Zionism.⁶⁵ Also incorporated into this edition were Ben-Gurion's memoirs from guarding at Sejera, which constituted the book's central and best formulated section. In these memoirs, Ben-Gurion clearly made a concerted effort to excite the imagination of the Jewish youth. The joyful accounts of a group of teenagers living together without adult supervision, entertaining themselves by bearing arms, and salvaging lost Jewish dignity *vis-à-vis* the Arabs gives the impression of Zionist propaganda aimed at Jewish youth around the world.⁶⁶ According to Uri Cohen, Ben-Gurion's memoirs emphasized not his past as a worker but his experience in *Hashomer*, based on his understanding that, as a Zionist leader, he needed to be part of the process of dying a Zionist death. In his memoirs, he highlighted the "beautiful death" of the guards:

Those who died out of a stronger and nobler love of life...are the dead who are celebrated among those living the colorless, everyday life of the Jewish world. They gave death a goal and meaning that justifies the death of the sacred. In their own death, they learned that there is something to die for. May the lost gaze of the People come to rest on their silent graves...milestones of life...May it illuminate for [the People] the path to itself.⁶⁷

In this manner, the fallen guards did not disappear; they remained among the living by illuminating the path for others, as opposed to those who were not willing to make the sacrifice, who lived but who were considered to be dead in their drab lives. On the other hand, guards were guards; their sacrifice was not made out of enthusiasm but rather out of a lack of choice, and this is what distinguished them from the Imperialists.⁶⁸

Ben-Gurion wrote to Ben-Zvi and informed him that the book had made a great impression and that its publication had been followed by *Yizkor* evenings in cities throughout the United States. The *Hashomer* Fund had done good work, and the book's editors, and particularly Ben-Gurion himself, were now covered by the press and invited to lectures and poetry evenings devoted to the Jewish

⁶⁵ Alexander Cheshin, Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, Ya'akov Zerubavel (eds.), *Yizkor* (New York, 1916) [in Yiddish].

⁶⁶ This edition, it should be noted, was never translated into Hebrew. We can assume that jovial accounts of malaria and adolescent elation from work appeared more believable from a distance, and not among the Jews of *Eretz Israel*.

⁶⁷ Cohen, *Survival*, 236.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 235.

longing for *Eretz Israel*. The book sold out just a few weeks after its publication, and a new edition was released, this time reaching even beyond the borders of the United States. The stories of the Jews being killed in the war for their Land, during the World War, proved that Jews could also fight for their land and freedom and inspired supportive public opinion throughout the Jewish world.

Overall, those who assumed the task of producing the first edition of *Yizkor* – the task of creating a pantheon of national heroes for the Jewish People – had succeeded. Whereas the effort raised questions and debate among the Jews in *Eretz Israel*, it was received with great emotion elsewhere. The negligible number of dead among the Jewish guards during the period in question, and the national struggle that underlay the book – though not in an explicit manner in the reality of the time – gives the impression of the dedication of a memorial before there was anyone to commemorate. It was intended more for future fatalities than for those who had already died. But as a consciousness-shaping force it was a success: the members of *Hashomer* became heroes, the group became the aspiration of the Zionist pioneering youth and, for decades to come, death on the altar of the homeland would be perceived as the height of the pioneering act and a distinct symbol of the new Jew.

From the realm of mythology, we now return to reality. Though the message of sacrifice was clear and concise in *Yizkor*, in reality there were misgivings. The list of casualties from guarding continued to grow, raising the question of whether they were actually necessary. After a series of events resulting in the death of guards, a debate began in the Jewish press over whether or not the sacrifices being made for the protection of property were worthwhile and justified. In 1911, Ya`akov Rabinovitch felt that the price of Jewish guarding had become too heavy to bear. In a cautious article that reemphasized that he was not in favor of terminating Jewish guarding, he nonetheless called for an effort to reduce its casualties: “Are we truly so rich in forces that we can sacrifice Jewish life for the sake of a sheaf or a horse?...Just as the principle of Jewish guarding is dear to us, another principle should be dear to us as well: that of not increasing the sacrifices.”⁶⁹

In 1913, a Jewish guard by the name of Shmuel Friedman was knifed to death, and his body was mutilated near Rehovot. Following the murder, Yosef

⁶⁹ Ya`akov Rabinovitch. “In the Cities and the *Moshavot*,” *Hapoel Hatzair*, June 27, 1911, 4-5.

Aharonovitch wrote that the risk to the lives of the guards was too great and that they sometimes needed to know how to fall back and save themselves:

In the current wild state of the Land, he [the guard] is not capable of distinguishing between the theft of a bunch of grapes and the murder of a person... We must remember this situation, and we must be cautious about executing our sons over a bunch of grapes... The continuous war of defense requires...an approach that recognizes the value of human life... The time has come to loudly proclaim this bitter truth: many of those who have fallen in the fields of our *Yishuv* in recent years have been injured by the approach of squandering as opposed to the approach of saving.⁷⁰

The debate was present in the lives of the workers, and notices of the death of members reflected their views on the matter. For example, a notice regarding the death of Meir Hazanovitch asked: “Do we have the authority to accept these sacrifices? Is this not an unattonable loss to the world?”⁷¹ In contrast, a notice regarding the death of a guard named Levitan contained the following pronouncement: “A casualty was killed over a sack of almonds, just as Yehezkel Nisanov was for a pair of mules, and here lies his greatness.”⁷² In his memoirs, Zvi Nadav penned a personal response to the charge that the guards did recognize the value of human life: “Deep in my heart, do I truly want blood? I see before me a picture of spilled blood...and without anyone to protest. No! In no way do I want blood...Nothing weighs heavier on a man’s heart than the spilling of blood.”⁷³ A broader consideration of the landscape, however, reveals that these were marginal voices. The more common responses to the death of guards were veneration of their willingness to sacrifice and education to follow their path.⁷⁴ This dynamic was reflected perhaps most distinctly in the widespread admiration of Yosef Trumpeldor.

⁷⁰ Tmidi (Yosef Aharonovitch), “Matters of the Hour,” *Hapoel Hatzair*, August 1, 1913, pp. 3-4 [in Hebrew].

⁷¹ Alexander, “At the Grave of Meir Hazanovitch,” *Ha’achdut*, May 30, 1913, 20 [in Hebrew].

⁷² “Commemoration of Souls,” *Ha’achdut*, August 7, 1914, 35 [in Hebrew].

⁷³ *Sefêr Hashomer: Divrei Haverim*, (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1957), 92 [Hebrew]. This source was published decades after *Hashomer* was active, which raises questions about its reliability.

⁷⁴ In *Hashomer Hatzair* youth movement chapters, *Yizkor* was read again and again in an effort “to educate a generation of heroes.” The name chosen for the movement was also explained in this spirit: “We called ourselves guards (*shomrim*). Most importantly, we wanted that name as an expression of our desire: to be like the guards who sacrificed their blood for their land and their

The Fatalities of Malaria in the Eyes of the Pioneers

As shown above, dying from malaria was viewed as a stinging failure and a hazard that threatened to give *Eretz Israel* a bad name. However, along with the changing attitude toward Zionist sacrifice, the attitude toward this kind of death also continued to evolve to the point of being considered heroic.⁷⁵ Zionism advocated healing the Jewish body, whereas malaria revealed its great vulnerability. It was an epidemic that sowed fear among the Jews in *Eretz Israel*, and efforts to “heal” *Eretz Israel* of malaria and to drain the swamps were symbolic of a general effort for change. Malaria was also linked to the issue of Jewish settlement: the elimination of malaria facilitated the expansion of Jewish settlement, and the expansion of settled land would decrease mosquito breeding grounds and, in turn, the areas plagued by malaria. In this way, Zionism played a role in defeating malaria; as the former expanded, the latter declined. *Yishuv* physicians characterized the success in eradicating the disease as a success in the building of “our national home” (in the words of Prof. Kligler, the leading expert on malaria during the Mandate period). In this sense, contracting and even dying from the disease was regarded as proof of Zionist patriotism and a stage in rebuilding the Jewish body.⁷⁶

The workers’ struggle for the ability to take part in the draining of the Kabbara swamps was a testament to both their attitude toward the fight against malaria and their understanding of sacrifice in general. The Kabbara swamps ran along the foothills of the Carmel Mountains, accounting for one of the largest marshlands in the country. The adjacent *moshava* of Zikhron Yaakov had suffered severely from malaria as a result of these marshlands and for many years had sought to take action to drain them. In 1924, the draining operations began under the direction of the PJCA (Palestine Jewish Colonization Association) and

People.” Yael Weiler, “The Fascinating World of *Hashomer Hatzair*,” *Cathedra* 88 (1998), 91-2 [in Hebrew].

⁷⁵ Exceptional in this context was the death of children from malaria, which was common in a number of settlements during the Second and Third *Aliyot*. These young fatalities were hidden in an extreme manner and buried without a gravestone in order to prevent the emergence of doubts regarding the righteousness of their path and the arousal of fear among potential immigrants. Muki Tzur, “The Culture of Memory and Commemoration in the Early Days of Settlement,” *Ariel* 171-172 (2005), 14 [in Hebrew].

⁷⁶ Sandra Sufian, *Healing the Land and the Nation*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 21-36.

based on the funding of Baron Edmond de Rothschild. Approximately 600 workers were brought in for the draining operations, from Egypt and from throughout *Eretz Israel*. When a group of Jewish workers requested to join the effort, the foreman refused on the grounds that “the Baron truly loves his fellow Jews and is not interested in turning Kabbara into a Jewish cemetery.”⁷⁷ The workers were furious and embarked on a struggle for their right to work draining the swamps. A worker from Nahalal explained the reason for the struggle as follows:

When I passed the Kabbara swamps...and I saw the Egyptians...standing there and digging in them...I said that a miracle had occurred here – the same miracle that occurred at the Dead Sea: the Jews crossing on dry land and the Egyptians walking behind them and drowning in the water. But we do not want miracles. We want to enter the Land not through a miracle. And if we need to traverse oceans and lakes, we will traverse them ourselves. And if, heaven forbid, we need to drown, it would be best for one of our own to drown than for an Egyptian or some other non-Jew to drown on our behalf...It is important for us that this work, the work of conquering the land in Eretz Israel, will be done with our own hands. The work of draining the Kabbara swamps is a historic undertaking, and we must play at least a part at the forefront of our historic act...We wish to stand up to our necks in water in the Kabbara swamps and to feel the pangs of creation. This is not difficult work, and we have no fear of death...We defeated the swamps of Nahalal and Nuris...And we must also be first and on the front lines of the swamps of Kabbara. And if sacrifices are required of us, we will make them. Then, we will feel more healthy and heartened than if we simply heard that someone else died on our front. It is our obligation and our right to die there, as this will safeguard our right to live here.⁷⁸

The workers, therefore, viewed it as both their right and obligation to drain the swamps themselves, based on their desire for complete independence and to be those who “healed” the land. They were not deterred by the danger. On the contrary, the draining of the swamps was a right they wished to safeguard for the

⁷⁷ Yosef Yudelevitch, *The Memoirs and Impressions of a Man of the Second Aliyah*, (Tel Aviv: A Moses, 1974/75), 54-6 [in Hebrew].

⁷⁸ . Ben-Barak, “At the Swamps of Kabbara,” *Hapoel Hatzair*, November 13, 1924, 15 [in Hebrew]. See also Y.S., “The Right to Conquer,” *Hapoel Hatzair*, November 13, 1924, 3 [in Hebrew]

Jewish People and to not share with other peoples. In their view, only someone who died on his land could live on it.⁷⁹ Kligler attempted to combat this approach, repeatedly telling the pioneers that there was no reason to die in order to be patriots. Although death by malaria was romantic, he argued, it was unnecessary. Moreover, if they learned to protect themselves from the disease they would also prevent others from dying from it. Heroism, he believed, meant not dying from malaria but rather fighting it. In the course of the 1920s, his approach gradually gained credence, and the indifference toward the disease continued to decline.⁸⁰

Nonetheless, during the period in question, the belief that watering the Land with Jewish blood was a positive act spread and came to apply not only to guarding but to death by malaria, which also came to be seen as a beautiful death in the name of the homeland.

Conclusion

In this article, we considered the attitude toward bereavement in the Jewish agricultural settlements in *Eretz Israel* between 1881 and the 1920s. Zionism, we observed, called for extensive wide-ranging changes in the life of the Jewish People – including changes in attitudes toward death in the context of Zionism – which, it was believed, would help create a “new Jew.”

The *moshavot* of the First *Aliyah* suffered from high mortality rates, primarily as a result of malaria, although these fatalities received almost no mention in the newspapers and literature of the period. We reviewed the criticism that was leveled against the malaria-plagued settlements for tarnishing the reputation of the *Yishuv*, and against the settlers as failures. The inhabitants of the *moshavot* internalized this criticism and came to view death as a failure that needed to be concealed for the sake of the success of the *Yishuv*. Internally, the settlers remained steadfast in their *moshavot* based on their belief in the importance of the act, despite the risks involved, but took no pride in the sacrifices. A broader view reveals that the First *Aliyah* placed less of an emphasis on the values of the

⁷⁹ Indeed, malaria took a heavy toll on those who were engaged in draining the swamp: each day, 30-40 laborers were absent from work due to illness. There were also many instances of death. Shmuel Avitzur, “The Swamps of Kabbara and Dov Kublanov, Exterminator,” *Ariel* 55-56 (1988), 52-4 [in Hebrew].

⁸⁰ Sufian, *Healing the Land and the Nation*, 35-7.

“new Jew” than those who came after them. This, we hold, was one attribute of this wave of immigration, which brought about a meaningful revolution in *Eretz Israel* but did little to explain its values.

The pioneers among the immigrants of the Second and Third *Aliyot*, on the other hand, tended to formulate the values of the “new Jew” with characteristic frankness. A prominent element of this notion was the assertion that, in *Eretz Israel*, Jews could die a “beautiful death.” This meant a death for the sake of the nation and the homeland, which preserved the bond between the deceased and the nation, provided the living with an example of a willingness for sacrifice, and encouraged the continuation of the national undertaking. For the pioneers, the notion of “watering the Land with blood” was an expression of the bond between the pioneer and the Land. It was an essential stage, they maintained, as national hopes could be fulfilled only after blood was spilled. Blood, they argued, constituted the basis of an alliance between the People and the Land and, like sweat, would determine the borders of the country. They also claimed that the Land, from its part, also longed for Jewish blood. For all these reasons, the Zionist pioneers regarded the spilling of blood not only as a necessity but as something to strive for.

These notions found distinct expression in the publication the *Yizkor* book in commemoration of the fallen guards of *Hashomer* in Jaffa in 1911, and in other parts of the world in the years that followed. The book waged a Zionist campaign, based on the veneration of the fallen, to transform the casualties of *Hashomer* into a myth. In addition to this approach, there were other voices in *Eretz Israel* that called for the guarding organizations to make a more concerted effort to protect the lives of their members. These voices attested to concerns that the mythological approach to sacrifice went too far and could lead to belittling of the value of the protection of human life.

The change in attitude toward sacrifice in the Jewish settlements in *Eretz Israel* also resulted in a change in the attitude toward malaria. This lethal disease, which the settlers attempted to conceal during the First *Aliyah*, subsequently became a heroic symbol of the Jewish People’s healing of the Land. The Pioneers’ struggle to take part in the draining of the swamps was indicative of the fact that they perceived this work, and the dangers it involved, as an important aspect of the renaissance of the Jewish People.

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David I. Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini. The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 549

by Raffaella Perin

I have had the privilege to discuss and review David Kertzer's book in several occasions, praising above all the author's style and the huge amount of archival and bibliographical sources employed.¹ Given my studies on Catholic anti-Semitism in Modern History I have always focused my analysis especially on the way Kertzer dealt with this specific topic. Nonetheless, when I was invited to ponder again on this book I thought it might have been the opportunity for me to underline something new brought to light by this important research on the relationship between Church and State in Italy in the 20s and 30s; namely, the unprecedented attention put on biographical details of the "characters" involved in the plot. I wondered if the author's stylistic choice to linger on apparently secondary private aspects, conveying a sort of spy story atmosphere, was not only an esthetic quirk but instead played a role in his historiographical judgment. In other words, I tried to guess how better we can understand the reasons that underpinned the policy of the Holy See and the Fascist government by trying to recreate the climate in which all decisions were taken, which was in my opinion one of most laudable efforts of the author.

In 2006, the records produced by Pius XI's Curia, held in the Vatican Secret Archives, were completely opened to scholars. From then onwards numerous books and conference proceedings were published in Italy and abroad, pointing out historians' strong interest for the position of the Holy See in the international arena in the decades between the two world wars.² It was precisely

¹ "Forum Essay," *The Catholic Historical Review* 102/4 (2016): 799-813; *Il mestiere di storico*, 8/2 (2016): 191.

² See at least Emma Fattorini, *Pio XI, Hitler e Mussolini: la solitudine di un papa*, (Turin: Einaudi, 2007); Hubert Wolf, *Papst und Teufel: Die Archive des Vatikan und das Dritte Reich*, (München: C.H. Beck Verlag, 2008) Lucia Ceci, *Il papa non deve parlare: Chiesa, fascismo e guerra d'Etiopia*, (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2010); Id., *L'interesse superiore. Il Vaticano e l'Italia di Mussolini*, (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2013); and the conference proceedings *Pius XI: Keywords. International Conference Milan 2009*, eds. Alberto Guasco and Raffaella Perin (Berlin: LIT, 2010); *Le gouvernement pontifical sous Pie XI: pratiques romaines et gestion de l'universel*, ed. Laura Pettinaroli (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 2013); *Pie XI, un pape contre le nazisme? L'encyclique Mit brennender Sorge (14 mars 1937). Actes du colloque international de Brest, 4-6 juin 2015*, eds. Fabrice Bouthillon and Marie Levant (Brest: Dialogues, 2016); *Il pontificato di Pio*

the opportunity to work on new documents, together with the perceived necessity to renew historiographical methods in order to face a changing globalized world, that Ratti's papacy became soon the occasion to move from a traditional national perspective to a transnational one. European, American, but also Russian and Israeli scholars built up networks that encouraged scientific dialogue on several important questions concerning ideologies, political relations and religious matters.

David Kertzer's book fits among these new studies on Pius XI's pontificate. The author's expertise in Italian history is well known,³ and we can probably consider his latest work a sort of fine-tuning of his research on the relations between the Holy See and the Italian State.

Moving in medias res, it is useful to notice the main editorial differences between the American and the Italian edition. The first one concerns the title: Rizzoli – the Italian publisher - made the unoriginal choice to emphasize in the main title the opposition between the “pope” and the “devil,” formerly variously employed by many publishing houses to indicate on the one hand Pius XI or Pius XII, and on the other hand Mussolini or Hitler.⁴ The English title is maybe more faithful to the narrative style kept by the author, who stresses his analysis on the two main protagonists, Pius XI and Benito Mussolini, and puts them at the center of the history of the Church and State relationships. To be honest, there is another slight difference in the subtitle: “The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe” becomes in the Italian edition “Mussolini and Pope Pius XI. The secret relations between the Vatican and Fascist Italy” [*Mussolini e Papa Pio XI le relazioni segrete fra il Vaticano e l'Italia fascista*]. The last one conveys a sort of restriction on Italian affairs whereas the original title is again closer to the author's effort to include them in a wider context. The second evident difference is the lack, in the Italian edition, of the maps of Rome and of Vatican City together with the “cast of characters” included at the very beginning of the book in the American version, as to introduce a theatrical (historical) play. Such

XI nella crisi europea / Der Pontifikat Pius XI. im Kontext der europäischen Krise, ed. Raffaella Perin (Venice: Edizioni Ca' Foscari, 2016), <http://doi.org/10.14277/978-88-6969-092-1>

³ David I. Kertzer, *The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara*, (London: Picador, 1997); *The Popes against the Jews. The Vatican's role in the rise of modern anti-semitism*, (New York: Knopf, 2001).

⁴ For example Wolf, *Papst und Teufel*: Michael Phayer, *The Catholic Church and the Holocaust, 1930-1965*, (Bloomington (IN): Indiana University Press, 2001).

elements would have probably made many Italian scholars feel uncomfortable, given our well-known unfamiliarity to this kind of popular writing style.

In accordance with the choice to fictionalize the story, the book opens with a “Prologue”⁵ instead of an “Introduction,” and the first scene put in front of the reader’s eyes is the one of the moribund pope intent on writing - on the night of January 31, 1939 - his very last speech, which he would have had to pronounce on February 11, namely in the day marking the tenth anniversary of the Lateran Accords. Hence, the prologue looks more like an epilogue resembling the ancient Greek novels in which the end was already known to the public but what really mattered was the development, what happened in-between. Still, in the few initial pages we can already learn several traits of Pius XI and Eugenio Pacelli’s characters, which influenced many of their political decisions, and the high tension raised in 1939 in the relationship between Achille Ratti and Mussolini. Besides, anticipating a topic deepened in the third part of the book, the author accurately describes which steps Pius XI made to be sure his speech would be kept secret and finally spread to the Italian episcopate in the designated moment. I will discuss this issue later on.

Skimming through the book it is worthy to briefly summarize the content of each of the three parts into which it is subdivided. The first part – “Act one” if we wanted to follow a play’s scheme – is dedicated to the Twenties, from the nearly simultaneous election of Pius XI and Mussolini’s seizure of power until the signature of the Lateran Accords. The second part deals with the challenge between the two totalitarian organizations (the Church and the Regime) in order to reaffirm the right of jurisdiction on many aspects of people’s lives they both claimed. In the last part the author touches the most controversial polemics concerning the relationships among Mussolini, Hitler and the pope, and the attitude of the latter towards racism, anti-Semitism and the Italian racial laws.

As mentioned before, throughout the entire book the storytelling is corroborated by a clear definition of the characters and the description of the atmosphere that surrounded them and their actions. I would like to dwell in particular on the figure of Pius XI, to the depiction of his personality the author gives indeed an important contribution.

⁵ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini*, 41-50.

Achille Ratti's Catholic Brianza background is usually used to explain his temperament, and Kertzer follows suit.⁶ "Brianza people are concrete, serious, devoted to work," wrote Carlo Confalonieri, personal secretary of Pius XI.⁷ In XIX century Italy, religious fervor determined and dominated nearly every single aspect of Catholics' social lives as well as their intimate sphere. Above all in the Lombard-Venetian region the parish was not only a religious but also a civic landmark. Ratti grew within a traditional Catholic community and his education was obviously influenced by intransigent ecclesiology. His personality was affected by his Lombard roots, stimulating his strong work ethic, his concreteness and realism; his authoritative and impulsive nature also betrayed this kind of background. In his government of the Church, his personal commitment in matters dear to him is clearly evident, making pressure on his *entourage* to keep him always well informed on current affairs.⁸ As a strong-willed person, Pius XI often intervened in his own hand on the draft documents prepared by Curia, and he never completely trusted his collaborators.

These elements suggest a first consideration. Ratti's *cursus honorum* is marked by a high cultural level combined with a shrewd political skill. He never abandoned intransigent ecclesiology: his main aim was defending and preserving the rights and privileges of the Catholic Church, even at the cost to sign "pact[s] with the devil[s]." I think, as Kertzer demonstrates, that this primary intention of Pius XI should never be forgotten. Even if during his pontificate he had often realized and feared the incongruity of these "partnerships,"⁹ it was only at the end of his life that he definitely recognized that the costs had been, and kept on being, too high.

The diplomatic experience as nuncio in Warsaw saw Ratti struggling with Polish nationalism. Kertzer believes that he "could not help being affected by the deep anti-Semitism he encountered in Poland," where the members of the Catholic élite wrote him reports claiming their concern for the Jewish threat.¹⁰ In fact, he

⁶ Carlo Puricelli, "Le radici brianzole di Pio XI," in *Achille Ratti. Pape Pie XI. Actes du colloque organisé par l'École française de Rome et al. (Rome, 15-18 mars 1989)*, ed. Carlo Puricelli, (Rome: École française de Rome, 1996), 23-52; Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini*, 41.

⁷ Quoted in Puricelli, *Le radici brianzole*, 37.

⁸ Jean-Dominique Durand, "Lo stile di governo di Pio XI," in *La sollecitudine ecclesiale di Pio XI alla luce delle nuove fonti archivistiche. Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Studio, (Città del Vaticano, 26-28 febbraio 2009)*, ed. Cosimo Semeraro, (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2010), 44-60.

⁹ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini*, 152.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 59.

was especially struck by the charge that the Jews were responsible for the diffusion of Bolshevik ideology. So, what he would never stop considering the worst enemy of the Catholic Church (Communism) was believed by important segments of the Church to be strictly linked with the Jews. Accordingly, we can suppose that this might be the reason why, during his pontificate, he was acquiescent with the spread of anti-Semitic stereotypes in Catholic diocesan and national periodicals, even in one attached to the Holy See, such as the influential Jesuit periodical *La Civiltà Cattolica*.

Nonetheless when in Vatican, Pius XI was described as being “insufficiently exercised about the danger that Italy’s Jews posed. [...] Although the pope shared in the general Vatican view that the large numbers of Jews in central and Eastern Europe posed a threat to Christian society, he had always excepted Italy’s tiny Jewish community.”¹¹ The memory of the anti-Semitic prejudice toward Russian communists was recalled by Pius XI during his noteworthy meeting with Mussolini on the 11th of February 1932, when the pope still marked a difference between Eastern European and Italian Jews, the latter to be considered an exception. That however did not prevent the pope, in February 1929, to ask for the exclusion - from the list of 400 candidates’ for the Chamber of Deputies - of all men collusive with Freemasonry, Judaism and with all sorts of parties deemed anticlerical.¹² Again, at stake there were the Catholic Church privileges that had to be preserved. The long battle to raise an agreement with the Italian State was over, but another one had begun just the day after the Accords were signed: the struggle to make Mussolini and his government respect the pacts. Kertzer employs a proper expression to describe the new situation: both the Fascist regime and the Holy See “jealously guarded the rights they thought were theirs.”¹³

As previously recalled, Pius XI has always been obsessed by the communist threat.¹⁴ Nevertheless, in February 1937, when Jesuit superior general Włodzimierz Ledochowski insisted on the necessity of stressing the role of Jews as champions of communist propaganda in the encyclical against Communism, the pope jotted down on the margins of Ledochowski’s letter, next to the sentence concerning the Jews, the following order: “Verify.”¹⁵ The encyclical

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 187-8.

¹² *Ibid.*, 231.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 240.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 370.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 389.

Divini Redemptoris did not contain any reference to the Jews. If anti-Semitic prejudice had accompanied a large part of Pius's life, how was it possible that it had been excluded from the anti-Communist encyclical?

The question acquires a growing relevance if we consider that from 1933 until 1937, the year of the three encyclicals (*Divini Redemptoris*, *Mit brennender Sorge*, *Firmissimam Constantiam*), no voices had risen from the Vatican in defense of German Jews persecuted by the Nazi regime. What was then, in 1937, the position of Pius XI towards the Jews and anti-Semitism? Had something changed?

Actually, many things had happened in the meantime: the pope's trust in right-wing totalitarianisms had vanished, but the reason why was not (yet) their attitude against the Jews. Soon after Hitler's election and following the signature of the Concordat between the Holy See and the Third Reich, Nazi policy against the Catholic Church and against Catholic doctrine (such as the forced sterilization of individuals deemed defective) provoked the pope's protests. The nuncio in Berlin, scared by Hitler, tried to minimize the danger, and with regards to the anti-Semitic laws suggested the Holy See not to interfere with what was considered German internal affairs. What worried the pope most was the situation of the Church in Germany. In the meeting with the German ambassador von Bergen, in early 1936, Pius XI appeared visibly livid: "Shouting and waving his arms and becoming ever more agitated, Pius bemoaned all the ways the Third Reich was persecuting the Church."¹⁶ Despite the irritation and the displeasure, Pius XI did not despair and never came up with a condemnation of Hitler's regime until January 1937, when he gathered a delegation of the German episcopacy to discuss the question. Three months later released the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*.

The documents from the Vatican Secret Archives reveal a recurring dynamic within the Roman Curia during those key years. The pope seems to be more disenchanted and critical towards Mussolini and Hitler than his entourage (Pacelli, Tacchi Venturi, Pizzardo, Tardini). The famous speech to the Catholic nurses in August 1935, when he claimed that the Italian invasion of Ethiopia would have not been a "just war", a speech that was censored by *L'Osservatore romano*, is another example of a significant divergence of thought and sentiment between the pope and his collaborators. Yet, again, he let the written version of

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 441.

the speech to be altered and finally he promised he would have not spoken against the war. Later on he was convinced by Pacelli not to write a letter to Mussolini expressing his concern for the war. So where is the often praised willfulness of Pius XI? The pope was ill. From time to time Kertzer gives in his book a sort of medical journal, so we are constantly aware that all along the Thirties the disease advanced whereas the moral strength and the mental alertness never abandoned him. His entourage was the arm through which he could govern the Church, therefore even if he was suspicious of them he was forced to let them advise him and to allow them to mediate with the dictators.

What probably stroke the pope more than anything else was the growth of racism as an ideological engine of the Nazi and, afterward, of the Fascist political program. Despite the fact that in 1937 he stopped the Holy Office from finalizing the condemnation of nationalism, totalitarianism, and racism, the year after, the last of his pontificate, he started the final struggle against these doctrines.¹⁷

An apparently trivial fact brought to light by Kertzer in his biographical notes about Ratti is his habit to talk “at a painfully slow pace, struggling to find the right words, then constantly correcting himself when he thought what he had said wasn’t quite right.”¹⁸ While speaking he kept on looking for synonyms trying to properly convey what he had in mind. This distinctive trait of speaking is evident both in the video recordings of his public speeches and in the transcribed texts collected by Domenico Bertetto.¹⁹ Considering the outstanding three discourses pronounced in July 1938, in which Pius XI condemned “exaggerated nationalism”, the careful choice of words must be emphasized. For example, while admonishing the ecclesiastical assistants to take a distance from the spirit that preached “one or another form of racism and nationalism”, he recalled that “Catholic means universal, and not racist, nationalist, separatist,” adding that there was “something particularly odious, this spirit of separatism, of exaggerated nationalism, which was not Christian, not religious, and yet not human.”²⁰ Focusing on the repetitions employed in this renowned speech, one

¹⁷ I discussed this topic in several articles. I take the liberty to refer to two of them: Raffaella Perin, “Pio XI e la mancata lettera sugli ebrei a Mussolini (agosto 1938),” *Rivista di Storia del Cristianesimo* 10/1 (2013): 181-206; “La svolta di fine pontificato. Verso una condanna dell’antisemitismo,” in *Pio XI nella crisi europea*, 37-56. <http://doi.org/10.14277/978-88-6969-092-1>

¹⁸ Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini*, 54.

¹⁹ *Discorsi di Pio XI*, ed. Domenico Bertetto, 3 voll., (Turin: Società editrice internazionale, 1960).

²⁰ “Discorso agli assistenti ecclesiastici della gioventù di Azione Cattolica,” in *Discorsi di Pio XI*,

can wonder if while the pope was pronouncing it he was at the same time pondering in order to explain, to clear out even to himself the significance and importance of the terms used. Racism and anti-Semitism are two topics that become more and more a central preoccupation in 1938. In the speech of September 6, he talked about racism even if he had said that he did not want to face the issue.²¹ Pius XI improvised; he had been meditating on these topics for months, but the repetitions, the uncertain stride in his speeches, betray a certain discomfort with these race-based ideologies that he had so far underestimated. He gradually became aware of the insufficiency of the traditional tools he and his predecessors had employed to face the challenges that the new era was raising.

I would like to conclude recalling the content of the Prologue of Kertzer's book. In the Christmas speech to the College of Cardinals of 1938 Pius XI reminded that the following February 11 would have marked the tenth anniversary of the Concordat. But while defining Mussolini as the "incomparable minister, to whom credit is due if such an important and beneficial work was crowned by a good result and gratifying success,"²² it is clear that the adjective "incomparable" sounded ironic given what the pope said immediately afterward. In fact, he complained for the celebration made in Rome of "a cross that is the enemy of the Cross of Christ," for the wound recently inflicted on the Concordat and the persecution of members of Catholic Action. In an ascending climax of tension with the Fascist regime, in the last month of his life Pius XI reclaimed the draft of the encyclical he commissioned to John La Farge (the well-known hidden encyclical *Humani generis unitas*) and prepared the speech to be pronounced on February 11, 1939. The pages dedicated by Kertzer to the very last days of Pius XI, characterized by the exchanges between the Holy See and Mussolini in order to organize the celebration of the anniversary, convey the anxious climate of the moment.²³ Ratti wrote the last speech on his own and showed it to his secretary of State only three days before he had to pronounce it.²⁴ He only allowed Pacelli to quickly read it and then sent it straight to the typography. He did not trust anyone, since he was aware that his collaborators had not understood his very urgency to modify the relationship with the Fascist regimes. In fact, after Pius XI

vol. 3, 772-7.

²¹ "Ad insegnanti di Azione Cattolica," in *Discorsi di Pio XI*, vol. 3, 793-8.

²² Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini*, 629.

²³ *Ibid.*, 562 f.

²⁴ See the notes of Giovanni Vian, "Il ripensamento dell'antisemitismo da parte di Pio XI. Una chiave di lettura del pontificato?," in *Pio XI nella crisi europea*, 261-72.

death his successor decided to smooth the tense situation hiding both the encyclical and the speech.

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David I. Kertzer, *The Pope and Mussolini. The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 549

by Paolo Zanini

In September 2006, at the start of Benedict XVI Pontificate, the opening of the Holy See's archives relative to Pius XI's Papacy (1922-1939) was completed. This decision contributed to shifting the focus of research, which until then had been concentrated on Pius XII and the Second World War, on to the previous period. Numerous studies investigated the work of Pope Ratti, the salient features of his rule and the *modus operandi* of the Vatican Congregations, and especially the Secretariat of State during his Papacy.¹ In many of them, the principal focus was, even more than Pius XI himself, his second Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli, who took over from Pietro Gasparri in 1930, and who would become the next Pope in 1939 with the name of Pius XII. However, there is no doubt that from a general standpoint the opening of the Vatican archives for this period has reawakened interest in Pope Ratti, helping to put the spotlight on many aspects of a Papacy that coincided almost exactly with the period between the world wars, the rise of totalitarianism and of Fascist regimes in Europe.

Given this premise, it should be no surprise that there are two aspects of the Pius XI Pontificate most analyzed with reference to the Italian situation: 1. the relations between Holy See and the Fascist regime, and the related issue of the

¹ Among the numerous titles, see: Emma Fattorini, *Pio XI, Hitler e Mussolini: la solitudine di un papa*, (Turin: Einaudi, 2007); Hubert Wolf, *Il papa e il diavolo: il Vaticano e il Terzo Reich*, (Rome: Donzelli, 2008); Giovanni Coco, "L'anno terribile del cardinal Pacelli," in *Archivum Historiae Pontificiae* 47 (2009): 143-276; Lucia Ceci, *Il papa non deve parlare: Chiesa, fascismo e guerra d'Etiopia*, (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2010); *Pius XI: Keywords. International Conference Milan 2009*, eds. Alberto Guasco, Raffaella Perin (Berlin: LIT, 2010); *Pius XI and America. Proceedings of the Brown University Conference (Providence, October 2010)*, eds. David I. Kertzer, Charles R. Gallagher and Alberto Melloni (Berlin: LIT, 2012); *Diplomazia senza eserciti. Le relazioni internazionali della Chiesa di Pio XI*, ed. Emma Fattorini (Rome: Carocci, 2013); *Le gouvernement pontifical sous Pie XI: pratiques romaines et gestion de l'universel*, ed. Laura Pettinaroli, (Rome: Ecole française de Rome, 2013); Alberto Guasco, *Cattolici e fascisti. La Santa Sede e la politica italiana all'alba del regime (1919-1925)*, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013); Paolo Valvo, *Pio XI e la Cristiada: fede, guerra e diplomazia in Messico (1926-1929)*, (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2016); *Pie XI, un pape contre le nazisme? L'encyclique Mit brennender Sorge (14 mars 1937). Actes du colloque international de Brest, 4-6 juin 2015*, eds. Fabrice Bouthillon and Marie Levant (Brest: Dialogues, 2016); *Pio XI nella crisi europea. Atti del Colloquio di Villa Vigoni, 4-6 maggio 2015*, ed. Raffaella Perin (Venice: Ca' Foscari Digital Publishing, 2016); Lucia Ceci, *The Vatican and Mussolini's Italy*, (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2017).

Lateran Pacts of 1929 and the new status of the Catholic Church in Italy; 2. the reactions of the Vatican to the Italian “racial laws” of 1938 and, more generally, to the rise of racial anti-Semitism that spread through many European countries in the second half of the Thirties. Obviously, these are issues of great historical importance that have been investigated many times before 2006, but which have recently gained a new centrality thanks to the availability of Vatican documents.

These are the two main themes brought to light by David I. Kertzer in his book *The Pope and Mussolini. The Secret History of Pius XI and the Rise of Fascism in Europe*, first published in 2014 and later translated into Italian under the title *Il patto col diavolo. Le relazioni segrete fra il Vaticano e l'Italia fascista*. For at least two reasons, this approach does not come as a surprise in what consists of the first synthesis of the ecclesiastical policy adopted by the Fascist government – and of the “fascist” policy developed by the Holy See – published by an American scholar who takes into account the newly available Vatican documents. The first concerns the direction of Kertzer’s research. He is a careful scholar of Italian society and politics who had already examined the question of relations between the Catholic Church and the Jews in the contemporary age, underlining the responsibility of the Church in the development of modern anti-Semitism.² The second regards the centrality that totalitarianism, anti-Semitism and, lastly, the *Shoah* have assumed and continue to have in the contemporary historical debate.

Therefore, *The Pope and Mussolini* can be seen as a part of a consolidated historiography which is continuing to develop, as can be seen from the extensive bibliography referenced by the author. Much use is made of press sources and, mostly, of archival documents, which Kertzer cites, quotes and paraphrases throughout the text, as well as reconstructing dialogues. Extensive use is made of documents from the Vatican Secret Archive (especially from the Archive of the Nunciature in Italy), the Archive of the Secretariat of State (which contains the materials from the Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs), the Archive of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and lastly, the Roman Jesuit Archives, which contain the private papers of Pietro Tacchi Venturi, one of the major figures in the book, being the informal intermediary between Pius XI and Mussolini. Diplomatic material from the French and Italian Foreign Affairs

² On this issue see David I. Kertzer, *The Kidnapping of Edgardo Mortara*, (London: Basingstoke, 1997); *Pope against the Jews. The Vatican’s Role in the rise of Modern Anti-Semitism*, (New York: Knopf, 2001).

Ministries' archives also constitutes a key reference, together with the rich American diplomatic correspondence. However, the author's use of documents kept in the Central Archives of the State in Rome is even more interesting, and in particular the plentiful material from the Fascist political Police - and their trusted sources of information - which enabled the fascist command to gather reserved information from the Apostolic Palaces.

Extensive use of the latter source is one of the most innovative elements of Kertzer's work. It enables us to fully understand the extent of the control exercised by the Fascist regime and by Mussolini himself in their dealings with the Holy See, as well as a picture of the extreme susceptibility of the Holy See to outside influence and the real or perceived vulnerability to blackmail of many of the most influential prelates. The Italian documents, especially the reserved ones, help to reconstruct in detail a large number of minute episodes in the history of the relations between various protagonists of Vatican politics. Their central role in the overall construction of the book does, however, expose some passages in the reconstruction to the risk of assuming the biased standpoint of Police observers or spies: people who, by their very nature, are likely to pay more attention to rumor, gossip or scabrous details rather than to articulate a complex analysis of the situation or of the relations between cultural and political forces inside the Vatican.

If the wide range of sources used by Kertzer in his book may seem complex and far-reaching, the structure of the text is equally significant, favoring a biographical and episodic approach, even if everything is kept in strict chronological order. The result is a book that carefully describes the role and influence exerted by each person involved in determining Fascist Italian and Holy See policies. It depicts a rich spectrum of protagonists and players, with the main roles being held by Pius XI and Mussolini, both of whom came to power in 1922 and who, despite the many differences, seem to the author to have some character features in common. In addition to these two main protagonists, there are many other people to whom the book devotes some pages and whose stories are told: high prelates in the Vatican State Secretariat and the Roman Curia, but also lower-level players from Vatican or Fascist diplomatic ranks, such as Cesare Maria De Vecchi, long-serving Italian ambassador to the Holy See, and Francesco Borgongini Duca, the first Apostolic Nuncio to the Kingdom of Italy following the Lateran Pacts.

Notwithstanding this rather fragmentary approach, based on the description of various episodes and key events and the influence thereon of diverse characters, the underlying thesis emerges with great clarity. In Kertzer's analysis, Fascism and the Catholic Church, despite the deep theoretical and doctrinal differences, seem destined to come together because they have common enemies. First and foremost liberal democracy and any concept of lay liberalism in politics, but also Bolshevism, Socialism, the Freemasons and, equally important, Protestant proselytizing and the so-called "international Jewry." Similarly, common ground also lay in their favor for a hierarchical society, in established order and in a government that was openly reactionary and anti-democratic. This ideological common ground, despite all the cultural differences that the author certainly has no intention of overlooking, led Fascism and the Church or, rather, Pius XI and Mussolini, to follow a common path of mutual recognition from 1922 onwards, which brought long-term benefits to both. The nascent regime did, in fact, obtain the sacrifice of the Italian People's Party and of its leader don Luigi Sturzo himself, forced into a twenty-year long exile, whilst the Church would in just a few years reconquer much of the ground it had lost, in terms of public profile, after fifty years of liberalism. As has been noted, the highest point of this process of rapprochement consisted in the February 1929 Lateran Accords, which gave life to the Vatican State and favored Mussolini's victory in the subsequent June plebiscite, establishing the Regime definitively and signing the start of the "years of consensus."³ These accords, whose principal architects in the Vatican were the old Cardinal Pietro Gasparri and the Jesuit Tacchi Venturi, the unofficial ambassador of the Pope to Mussolini, are perceived by Kertzer as a triumph for Fascism. This they certainly were, at least in the short term and from the standpoint of consensus and image. However, from an overall standpoint, it is true to say that the Lateran Pacts allowed for the return of the Catholic Church to a public role in Italian affairs. The new centrality of the Catholic Church in the Italian public life contributed to reduce the absolute independence and sovereignty of the State: a principle which, although being part of the liberal political and theoretical doctrine, was also held high by many Fascists, in particular those belonging to the most radical circles.

It was just this necessity of Mussolini to prove that he was not capitulating to the Holy See that brought about the period of disputes which followed the signing

³ The definition of the "years of consensus," referred to the period 1929-1936, entered in the historiographical debate from the publication of the fourth volume of the monumental biography of Mussolini written by Renzo De Felice in 1974: *Mussolini il duce*, I, *Gli anni del consenso* (Turin: Einaudi, 1974).

of the Pacts and which ebbed and flowed in degrees of tension until the end of 1931. Only then, after bending the resistance of Pius XI on the crucial questions of youth education and the independence of Catholic Action groups, did Mussolini agree to many Vatican requests, starting with the issue of Protestant proselytizing. This topic has been the focus of some specific studies,⁴ but often tends to get pushed into the background in the more general reconstructions of Fascist-Church relations. The author rightly rectifies this attitude, analyzing Catholic opposition towards Protestant proselytism in Italy as it emerges in the only meeting between Mussolini and Pius XI, in 1932, when the Pope complained many times about the danger to Italy of evangelical Protestantism. Opposition to any non-Catholic presence in Italy was a priority of Pius XI and the Vatican high officials. After all, from the Catholic prospective religious freedom and, even worse, the possibility of unfettered religious propaganda, was one of the most poisonous outcomes of the deprecated liberal regime that Fascism had dismantled. From this standpoint, the new political climate was an unrepeatable opportunity to reaffirm the identification of Italianness with Catholicism and to repair the effects of religious indifference and laicism of the liberal governments.

If the fear of Protestant proselytism was rooted in the determined campaigns of evangelization carried out in Italy by the Evangelical Churches starting from the

⁴ On this aspect see, Pietro Scoppola, "Il fascismo e le minoranze evangeliche," in *Il fascismo e le autonomie locali*, ed. Sandro Fontana (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1973), 331-69; R. Moro, "L'opposizione cattolica al Metodismo tra anni Venti ed anni Trenta," in *Il Metodismo italiano*, ed. F. Chiarini (Turin: Claudiana, 1997), 131-80; Renato Moro, "Pregiudizio religioso e ideologia: antebraismo e antiprotestantesimo nel cattolicesimo italiano fra le due guerre," in *Le Carte* 3 (1998): 17-66; Renato Moro, "Antiprotestantesimo cattolico alla settimana sociale del 1928," in *Democrazia e cultura religiosa. Studi in onore di Pietro Scoppola*, eds. Camillo Brezzi, Carlo Felice Casula, Agostino Giovagnoli, Andrea Riccardi (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2002), 231-70; Renato Moro, "Cattolicesimo e italianità. Antiprotestantesimo e antisemitismo nell'Italia cattolica," in *La Chiesa e l'Italia. Per una storia dei loro rapporti negli ultimi due secoli*, Antonio Acerbi ed. (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 2003), 307-39; Renato Moro, "La Germania di Hitler come eresia protestante," in *Le due società. Scritti in onore di Francesco Traniello*, eds. Bartolo Gariglio, Marta Margotti, Pier Giorgio Zunino (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009), 303-21; Maria Antonia Paiano, "Contro 'l'invadente eresia protestante': l'Opera della Preservazione della Fede in Roma (1899-1930)," in *Chiesa cattolica e minoranze in Italia nella prima metà del Novecento. Il caso veneto a confronto*, ed. Raffaella Perin (Rome: Viella, 2011), 27-103; Raffaella Perin, "La Chiesa veneta e le minoranze religiose (1918-1939)," *ivi*, 133-223; Raffaella Perin, "Santa Sede e minoranze evangeliche in Italia durante il fascismo," in *Storia e problemi contemporanei* 62 (2013): 79-98; Paolo Zanini, "Il culmine della collaborazione antiprotestante tra Stato fascista e Chiesa cattolica: genesi e applicazione della circolare Buffarini Guidi," in *Società e Storia* 155 (2017): 139-65.

Risorgimento and Italian unification, the hostility of the Catholic hierarchy to “international Jewry” and the pretext of identification of Judaism with Bolshevism seem the product of ideology alone: the result of a long cultural process that even cultivated human beings like Pius XI were unable to detach themselves from. Of course, the Pope distinguished between Italian Jewry, which he understood and respected, and the Jewish communities in Eastern Europe, whom he regarded as closely tied to Communism: nevertheless, there is no doubt that in the only meeting he had with Mussolini he directed the dictator's attention to both questions, Protestant proselytism and Jewish influence, whereas in the subsequent years, the nuncio Borgongini Duca made various overtures to the Italian government with a view to limiting religious freedom for non-Catholic Christians in Italy.

In the first half of the book Kertzer mainly analyses the efforts of the Catholic Church under Pius XI to re-Catholicize Italy, starting with the public sphere and a direct and preferential relationship with the Fascist regime. A relationship that worked also through the formal and open adherence of the Mussolini family to the Catholic Church, a point the author makes on various occasions. The second half of the book looks at the development of relations between the Holy See and Fascism throughout the Thirties, when international questions became more important than domestic ones. This was a time when the “solitude” of Pius XI grew as he worried about the rise of National-socialism in Germany, about the Italian war of conquest in Ethiopia and, lastly, about the dispute with the Fascist regime in 1938 over the anti-Semitic race laws. A Pope who was, however, conditioned by an entourage he had largely put together himself. This entourage was irresolute and inclined to conform or even willingly comply with the Fascist position, either by calculation or conviction. Such was the case with leading prelates at the Vatican like Monsignor Pizzardo, the already-noted nuncio Borgongini Duca, and the Secretary of State himself Eugenio Pacelli, a shrewd and able diplomat who was, however, ever-ready to compromise rather than face a challenge. Not to mention other figures who could be blackmailed such as the previously mentioned father Tacchi Venturi or Monsignor Camillo Caccia Dominioni, whose embarrassing habits were well-known to the Fascist police.

The impression is that Pius XI, without the old guard of diplomats such as Gasparri and Bonaventura Cerretti, found himself surrounded by devoted but inadequate people: the result was he had to face one of the most dramatic periods in modern history from a particularly difficult position. His authoritarian character and autocratic style of leadership made his position weaker instead of

stronger and his isolation grew. This became especially evident in the second half of the 1930s, when the Pope's opposition to the growing anti-Semitism of the Nazis, and not only to racism as a general principle, was not backed up by the Vatican Curia which had been developing preferential relations with authoritarian regimes for the past fifteen years. Due to this established attitude, the Vatican Curia was also incapable of understanding the paradigm shift brought about by Nazism in developing a new kind of anti-Semitism, different in many aspects from the anti-Jewish prejudice of the Catholic tradition. In this situation, the Pope's decision to issue an encyclical explicitly condemning the Nazi version of racial anti-Semitism vanished. Such a decision was, indeed, obstructed by the resistance in the Church's high offices and from the Jesuits, and by the declining health and uncertainty of Pius XI himself.⁵

Written in a very lively style and full of engaging descriptive passages, *The Pope & Mussolini* belongs to the tradition of Anglo-American history books, particularly attentive to biographical and psychological detail. Whilst being a fairly hefty tome, containing an extensive bibliography and copious notes, it is nonetheless a pleasure to read, often appearing halfway between an erudite historical reconstruction and a fast-paced spy story. This engaging rhythm makes it accessible to a wide range of readers and matches the need of scientific rigor with that of narrative fluidity.

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⁵ On the "hidden" encyclical see, Georges Passelecq and Bernard Suchecky, *L'encyclique cachée de Pie XI: une occasion manquée de l'Église face à l'antisémitisme*, (Paris: La découverte, 1995); Giovanni Miccoli, "L'enciclica mancata di Pio XI sul razzismo e l'antisemitismo," in *Passato e Presente* 15 (1997): 35-54.

Stefan Vogt, *Subalterne Positionierungen. Der deutsche Zionismus im Feld des Nationalismus in Deutschland 1890-1933* (Wallstein Verlag, 2016), pp. 496.

by *Laura Almagor*

In 1931, the German Zionist publicist Robert Weltsch described the ambivalent relationship between German Zionism and German nationalism. Considering interwar realities, Zionism needed to distance itself from the growing intolerance, self-aggrandizement, and anti-Jewish character of modern nationalist movements, but it could also not be denied that Zionism and nationalism shared similar roots: both rejected liberalism and believed in the virtue of a creative national community. With his comprehensive study of German Zionism from the fin-de-siècle until the advent of the National Socialist era in 1933, Vogt offers a dense but legible overview of the main actors, ideas, and activities of the movement during the late German Imperial period until the end of the Weimar years. Vogt's main scholarly intervention is his claim that German Zionism should be understood in relation to German nationalist thought, not only in theoretical terms, but also by exploring how German Zionists positioned themselves within larger contemporary nationalist debates. At the same time, Vogt argues, it is equally important to study the way German nationalist thinkers and politicians, most notably those with openly anti-Semitic ideas, regarded and engaged with Zionism. Rather than offering a summary of the history of German Zionism, Vogt focuses on six political-ideological constellations: the Zionist debates about *völkisch* nationalism and "civilization" at the end of the nineteenth century, the Zionists' engagement with racial discourses and German colonialism, their position regarding the First World War, debates about the relationship between nationalism and socialism, the connection between Zionism and the German youth movement and the Weimarian conservative revolution, and, lastly, the Zionist dealing with antisemitism and the rise of National Socialism.

As a result, the image arises of a neoromantic, Fichte-inspired type of nationalism, which simultaneously propagated moderately national politics that were atypical for a "*völkisch*" national movement. According to Vogt, the growing anti-Semitic climate in which the German Zionists were active, and their often surprisingly respectful engagement with representatives of the increasingly illiberal German nationalist movements, nonetheless compelled the Zionists to formulate a version of their own nationalism that would not repeat the faults of German nationalism. By contrast, the German Zionists held on to a humanistic

and emancipatory version of nationalism that valued a Jewish cultural renaissance over territory and statism, with a strong focus on universalist ideals. This viewpoint developed into a *völkisch* nationalism that was free from the chauvinism of German nationalism. Eventually, their approach would turn the German Zionists into supporters of more liberal policies regarding the Palestinian Arabs, and to become the central proponents of a bi-national state in Palestine. In this light, it was no coincidence that the bi-nationalist Zionist movement Brit Shalom consisted for a large part of these very same German Zionists, the most famous of whom were philosopher Martin Buber, historian and later scholar of nationalism Hans Kohn, and Robert Weltsch, the editor-in-chief of the most important German Zionist periodical, the *Jüdische Rundschau*. The work and thought of these and other central German Zionists feature extensively in Vogt's exploration of the ideological and intellectual underpinnings of the movement.

Vogt also compellingly demonstrates how one way of positioning German Zionism is to reveal the ambivalent but undeniably close relationship between the Zionists and German colonialism. By pointing at such a connection, Vogt joins an ever-growing list of scholars who have sought to explain Zionism—and other forms of Jewish territorial politics—in the context of colonial and imperial history. Nevertheless, Vogt is indeed correct in pointing out that most of these studies focus exclusively on the colonial dimension of the Zionist project in Palestine, while failing to pay attention to Zionism in its original, European context. Here, Vogt introduces his second and most innovative intervention, namely his proposition to understand German Zionism as a form of “subaltern” politics. Originally a term developed within the field of postcolonial studies, Vogt posits that the subaltern framework is a crucial tool to help make sense of the seeming contradictions in German Zionism. Based on the work of postcolonial scholars like Stuart Hall, Partha Chatterjee and Homi Bhabha, the subaltern lens reveals a historical landscape in which formerly colonized peoples adopt many of the ideas and behaviors of their erstwhile colonizers. In effect, these subalterns waver between hegemonic and dominated positions. This “in-betweenness” (Bhabha) complicates a one-dimensional interpretation of subaltern groups, but, as Vogt ardently shows, also serves to disentangle their dual political identities. If we consider the German Zionists as subalterns we can make some sense of their active combatting of antisemitism in Germany, while also supporting German colonial aspirations and the German war effort between 1914 and 1918, as well as the fact that they enthusiastically engaged in debates over race and racialism. Moreover, as subalterns, the Zionists could strive for political

and territorial independence in Palestine and at the same time invest, at least ideologically, in peaceful cohabitation with the Palestinian Arabs.

Vogt consistently shows where and how he sees the subaltern dimension appear in the history of German Zionism. The racist thinking of famous Zionist sociologist Arthur Ruppin and of anthropologist Ignaz Zollschan, for instance, is reassessed as an attempt to reshape the dominant racial theories from a subaltern perspective. In a similar vein, Martin Buber's and Hans Kohn's orientalist tendencies are to be understood as an expression of a subaltern understanding of Jewish reality: German Jews could serve as a connector between German imperial rule and the (potential) colony. Even if at times the subaltern angle seems overly stressed and somewhat far-fetched—for instance in Vogt's description of the Zionist battles against German antisemitism as a form of postcolonial "identity politics"—thereby also risking unnecessary repetition and an idealization of liberal German Zionist attitudes towards colonial indigenes, the subaltern approach does prove an illuminating narrative thread. By terming the Zionists subalterns that were active between ostensibly opposite worlds, Vogt clarifies how in the Zionist imagination a reliance on nationalism could turn into an emancipatory strategy for Jews themselves, but also for the Arab population in Palestine. Moreover, by including the subaltern category, Vogt forges novel connections with other bodies of scholarship, thus latching onto the most recent trends in "post-post-Zionist" historiography.

As for the German-Zionist connection, by describing the different ways in which Zionists communicated with German nationalists and anti-Semites, the Zionist movement is situated within the specifically German context in which it was born and developed. However obvious this may seem, much scholarship has failed to write Zionism into European history in a comprehensive manner, mostly because of the political agenda of the older generations of scholars of Zionism, for whom presenting Zionism as an independent venture served larger state-building aims. Vogt's discussion of both older and recent scholarship is impressive in its depth and scope, and especially the introduction to the book provides the reader with an extensive historiographical overview of German and general Zionism, interwar antisemitism, and German politics.

For all its accomplishments, Vogt's excellent study does seem to have missed the opportunity of contrasting German Zionism with its counterparts in for instance Russia, Poland or even Western Europe. Differences in outlooks between the various national Zionisms were stark, especially when it came to

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relationships with “host” governments, methods of colonization in Palestine, and positions towards the Palestinian Arabs. In connection to this, Vogt’s statement that German Zionism combined Eastern and Western European Zionist approaches begs for a deeper exploration. Neither of these hiatuses, however, diminish the quality of Vogt’s study. In fact, they strengthen Vogt’s own suggestion that similar work remains to be done for other European national contexts. In this sense, and especially if the book finds its way to an English-speaking audience in (an abbreviated) translation, Vogt may have helped pave the way for a new body of exciting research projects during the years to come.

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Ewa Tartakowski, *Les Juifs et le Maghreb: Fonctions sociales d'une littérature d'exile* (Tours: Presse Universitaires François Rabelais, 2016), pp. 330.

by Giorgia Foscarini

This book by Ewa Tartakowsky is an original study on the emergence of a “littérature d'exil” based on the analysis of the life paths of various Jewish authors (both males and females) born in the Maghreb region and migrated to France, as well as on the critical analysis of their literary works (short stories, novels, poems and plays). Relying on the works of Guy Dugas on the literary production of writers living and ailing from the Maghreb region until 1990, Tartakowsky extends the time span considered, by examining all works written by the aforementioned group of authors between 1950 and 2010.

In her analysis, she deploys a multidisciplinary methodology, engaging with sociology, history and modern literature, with the aim to show how the exile determines different trajectories in the literary domain. Her study of the link between literature and exile wants to scrutinize the relationships between the fictional and the real life, by understanding the mechanisms and the function of literature in the social life of an exiled group of people, its relationship with the welcoming society, and the mutual relationships between these two groups. As a sociologist, she engages with the literary text to analyze and understand the social factors influencing the literary production of Jewish authors from the Maghreb. As shown in the literary works considered, the exile is located in between the place of origin and the place of arrival, and these works have precisely the aim of making sense of this “in – betweenness.”

The second chapter, “Conditions d'émergence d'une littérature d'exile,” discusses three key elements in the development of this exile literature: the evolution of a ‘Jewish conscience’ starting from the Six-day war; the change occurred in the way history was conceived during the 1960s, and the appearance of postcolonial literatures. Through various diagrams and graphs, Tartakowski shows, also in a visual manner, the link between the literary production of Jewish authors from the Maghreb, and the various steps in their social and migratory history. This allows her to present the case for how, the exile, its material conditions, and the almost impossibility of a return, have determined the main themes of this literary production. In particular, one of the factors influencing the works of these authors to a great extent, was the acculturation to French culture and language they experienced in their country of origin, either in

Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco, that made easy for them to emigrate to France after these countries' independence.

The third chapter, "Des auteurs nés de l'exile," is dedicated to the iconographical analysis of 441 books' paratext, including the title, cover and back cover. The author identifies four themes coming out from the paratexts examined: exile, nostalgia, memory/transmission, and history. This work of iconographical analysis supports Tartakowski's claim that this literature is committed to the issues "of exile, memory, uprooting and migration regarding Jews of North African origin (p. 132)." The study of the covers unveils also information about the target public of the publishers, made up of both by migrants from the Maghreb and local readership from the welcoming community/country.

"Mise en scène et transfiguration littéraires" deals with the social existence revealed by these literary works. The world emerging from these stories and novels is one of family life, where the writer plays the role of an "ethnologist" tracing "the daily life of the community and the details of the Jewish folklore from North Africa" (p. 134). The authors thus find themselves in between two different identities: "the Arab and Berber one, and the more western, French one" (p. 160). They are thus writing not only to preserve North-African Jewish memories and traditions in a country, such as France, which was quite assimilating; but they also tried to provide their French readership with some guides to understand their own Arab and Berber culture. In this chapter, Tartakowski also deals with the difference between literature written by male and female authors. The latter being characterized by its own traits, in particular considering exile and migration as emancipatory factors for women.

The fifth and final chapter, "Fonctions sociales de la littérature d'exile," discusses the social role played by literature for the writers themselves. In particular: the memorial role, the historiographical role and the adaptation role. The writings of these authors not only are the byproduct of a personal journey with the aim of recording memories of a past life, but also fill a void in the historiographical domain, as far as the Jews from the Maghreb are concerned. Finally, the author identifies also an "adaptation function," where the writer plays the role of "mediator" (p. 263) between two different worlds, groups and realities.

In conclusion, with her study, Ewa Tartakowski provides the reader with a useful theoretical and methodological framework to help comprehend the mechanisms of exile literature, even in different historical and geographical contexts. Through a sociological analysis of literary works, Tartakowski proves that, even if most of

the writers considered started their career in France, their writings are strongly influenced by exile. By linking the social experiences to the literary approaches and the themes preferred by the authors, she allows the reader to understand how Jewish writers from the Maghreb see their social environment within the framework of exile and resettlement in a new society.

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Michał Szulc, *Emanzipation in Stadt und Staat: Die Judenpolitik in Danzig 1807–1847* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2016), *Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Juden*, vol. 46, pp. 352.

by Manfred Jehle

In the nineteenth century, all the Central European governments made efforts to create equal rights and legal security for their citizens. Until then, the statutes of the principalities and the “free cities” had legal force. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna’s final document was agreed on; it contained the provision that the old laws and statutes would remain universally in force until the introduction of new binding legislation for all citizens throughout the various regions. However, conflicts frequently arose when governments tried to introduce legislation in newly acquired territories. The implementation of laws and decrees was a cumbersome process, even in an authoritarian state like Prussia. Conflicts often escalated around the question of the legal status of the Jews. Today, there is general consensus that legal equality and legal certainty for Jews are among the most important topics in nineteenth century European social history. Michał Szulc shows that what Reinhard Rürup has termed the “tortuous and thorny path to legal equality” was also watched over by upstanding liberal citizens and civil servants.

The city of Danzig (Polish: Gdańsk) is an interesting focal point for inquiries into the implementation of relevant laws during the nineteenth century’s first half. The city was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1793, when it was annexed by Prussia after the second partition of Poland. Between 1806 and 1814, under the rule of Napoleon, it had the status of a free city. In the following period, between 1814 and 1919, it was again part of Prussia and as such the capital of an administrative district (what was termed a *Regierungsbezirk*).

Michał Szulc has provided us with an impressive study of Danzig Jewry’s legal situation up to legislation of 1847. He has analyzed archival sources in Gdańsk, Berlin, Paris, and Jerusalem. He describes the Napoleonic period and the failed attempts of the French consul to enforce civic rights for Jewish citizens. Under Prussian rule, the municipal authorities and city council opposed implementation of the 1812 Prussian Edict, granting Jews citizenry. This resistance was also encouraged by governmental hesitation in Berlin. A royal decree only put an end to the ensuing state of uncertainty in 1832, after which the conflict was carried on in newspapers and pamphlets.

The municipal authorities offered formal objections to the 1812 edict's validity. They set up impediments to Jewish participation in trade, commerce, and both social and political life. Referring to archival sources, Szulc can demonstrate a well-functioning network at work in the city in this respect, including Christian elites and high-level civil servants, among them the Danzig *Oberpräsident*, Theodor von Schön, a liberal reformer who continues to enjoy a distinguished reputation. In 1819 and 1821, violent unrest threatened the Jews of Danzig, and on both occasions Schön and his local governmental subordinates held the Jews responsible. Together with the municipal authorities, *Oberpräsident* Schön trivialized the obvious role of the city's Christian elites in what was taking place and obstructed the efforts of the police president, Dagobert von Vegesack, to preserve law and order and protect Danzig's Jewry against the rioters. *Oberpräsident* Schön failed in an effort to discredit Vegesack in Berlin. By contrast, both Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg and Minister of the Interior Friedrich von Schuckmann approved Vegesack's measures and reproved Schön's behavior. Up to the present, historians have presented Schön's frequent conflicts with the government in Berlin as evidence of his liberal convictions. Szulc's description of the Danzig events of 1819 and 1821 points to a need for further consideration of this major liberal official's policies toward the Jews.

Although Szulc's account is centered on legislation in a nineteenth century city, he adds significantly to a broader understanding of his underlying topic. He presents the conditions prevailing at the time in Danzig clearly, enriching our knowledge of the long path to legal equality and security for all citizens in Central Europe. Moreover, he demonstrates that new knowledge concerning the history of German liberalism can emerge from research in the archives.

Manfred Jehle, independent scholar

Ethan B. Katz, Lisa Moses Leff and Maud S. Mandel (edited by), *Colonialism and the Jews* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), pp. 360.

by Nadia Malinovich

This collection of essays, which emerged out of a 2012 conference at Brown University, provides a far-reaching and timely overview of the thorny and often contentious issue of the relationship between Jews and colonialism. The book begins with the two central questions that its thirteen contributors address in the pages to come: where are the Jews in colonial history? Where is colonialism in Jewish history? The introduction, which functions as an excellent stand-alone essay, argues that the relative lack of engagement of scholars of Jewish history with these questions has stemmed from fear of engaging in polemics over the relationship between Zionism and colonialism, as well as from in between colonizer and colonized status that the Jews of the Middle East and North Africa so often occupied during the colonial era. That status, they argue, has also contributed to the relative absence of Jews in the wider field of colonial history, an absence that must also be understood as linked to the difficulty of situating colonialism in regards to the Holocaust and the still unresolved problem of the relationship between colonialism and Zionism. The volume is posited as part of an emerging corrective to this omission, as a move away from binaries in colonial scholarship has opened the door to interest in the role of Jews and other in between groups in the colonial story. Intended to highlight the benefits of mutual engagement between Jewish and colonial studies, *Colonialism and the Jews* is divided into three sections, each of which revolves around a central question meant to provoke conversation between these two fields.

The essays in part One, entitled “Subjects and Agents of Empire” center around the question “In their various roles in colonial empires, are Jews best understood as subjects or agents of empire?” In the first two essays, “The ‘Oriental Jews’ of the Maghreb: Reinventing the North African Jewish Past in the Colonial Era,” and “The Rise of Imperialism and the German Jewish Engagement in Islamic Studies” Colette Zytnicki and Susannah Heschel demonstrate that, as newly minted Europeans whose critics often pointed to their own alleged oriental roots, nineteenth century French and German Jews had skin in the game when writing about both Jewish and Islamic civilizations. While French Jewish and non-Jewish scholars of the Jews of North Africa shared a condescending view of this population as backwards, Zytnicki demonstrates, it was only the Jewish scholars who argued that these individuals were ripe for regeneration and could

play a mediating influence in the region. German Jewish specialists of Islam, Heschel notes, often drew parallels between Judaism and Islam and promoted a positive image of both as founded on scientific and philosophical rationalism.

In his article “Not the Retiring Kind: Jewish Colonials in England in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” Adam Mendelson compares the social integration of returnees to England from the settlement colonies and indigenous Indian and Iraqi Jews who built commercial empires in nineteenth century India and subsequently moved to England. Interestingly, Mendelson notes, wealthy colonial Jews from Asia were better able to integrate into London Jewish high-society, where their wealth and upper class status made them attractive to the Anglo-Jewish elite in a way that the European returnees, who hailed from much humbler social backgrounds, were not. Frances Malino’s article, “Oriental, Feminist, Orientalist: The New Jewish Woman” focuses on the first generation of French-speaking, North African and Ottoman born teachers of the schools of the *Alliance Israélite Universelle* (AIU). While undertaking the AIU’s “civilizing mission” was empowering for these women, Malino demonstrates, they did not blindly follow the directives, rule and regulations put forth by the AIU directors in Paris. This section closes with Israel Bartal’s essay “Jews in the Crosshairs of Empire: A Franco-Russian Comparison,” which challenges the accepted dichotomy between the emancipating French and persecuting Russian nineteenth century states. Bartal correctly notes that both governments introduced new forms of centralized rule and Enlightenment-based theories of modernization in attempts to remake their newly acquired Jewish populations. His argument falls short, however, in its failure to acknowledge the fundamental difference between France, where Jews were granted citizenship and an opportunity to integrate and acculturate to the mainstream society, and Russia, where they were subject to institutionalized discrimination that kept them a people apart.

Part Two, “Jews in Colonial Politics,” is focused on the question “Politically, how did Jews become defined and define themselves in colonial ventures and in anti-colonial struggles?”. The first chapter, “Crémieux’s Children: Joseph Reinach, Léon Blum and René Cassin as Jews of French Empire” by Ethan Katz, argues that each of these men’s commitment to liberal colonial politics was an intrinsic part of both their French and Jewish identities and their strong belief in France’s “civilizing mission.” This led them to both defend Muslim rights while at the same time articulate a strong belief that France’s colonial presence was a positive good for France, for the indigenous populations of France’s empire

(both Jewish and Muslim) and for humanity as a whole. Tara Zahra's thought provoking article "Zionism, Emigration and East European Colonialism," situates Zionism within the context of largely unsuccessful eastern European colonial project, and argues that it was, in fact, the only form of Eastern European "settler colonialism" that actually succeeded. David Feldman's "Zionism and the British Labor Party" argues that Labor's support for Zionism and for the State of Israel was always ideological and contingent, as it stemmed from an assumption that democracy and socialism went hand in hand Zionism. The Labor party became increasingly critical of Israel, Feldman contends, not because it embraced the postcolonial New Left, but because, in its view, Israel had departed from the original liberal, socialist ideals that it shared with Zionism.

Daniel Schroeter's chapter "Vichy in Morocco: The Residency, Mohammed V, and his Indigenous Jewish Subjects" explores the complex relationship between the French protectorate and the King of Morocco during the Vichy period, and looks at how that relationship affected policy towards Jews. Schroeter's essay reveals that the story of Mohammed V as having protected the Jews during the Vichy period is largely mythical. This myth has served an important ideological role for both Jewish and Muslim Moroccans, however, as it confirms Jewish identification with the country, and promotes an image of a tolerant, inclusive, and multicultural Moroccan society. Section Two closes with Maud Mandel's chapter "The Politics of Street Riots: Anti-Jewish Violence in Tunisia before Decolonization." Mandel compares reports on the riot by the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the World Jewish Congress (WJC), demonstrating the importance of analyzing conflict between Jews and Muslims in specific political context rather than relying on a trope of age-old conflict. Additionally, Mandel notes, while these two reports agreed on the facts of the riot, they put forth very different views on the causes and extent of anti-Semitism in Tunisian society, in keeping with AJC's desire to see the Jews remain in Tunisia and the WJC's desire to encourage immigration to Israel.

Part Three, entitled "Zionism and Colonialism," consists of a conversation between Derek Penslar, the author of the now-classic essay "Is Zionism a colonial movement?" reprinted in this volume, and Joshua Cole and Elizabeth F. Thompson, both scholars of European imperialism in North Africa and the Middle East. Rejecting attempts to establish "complete congruence or total separation" between Zionism and colonialism, Penslar's essay details the multiple ways in which the Zionist project was both historically and theoretically located between colonial, anticolonial and postcolonial discourse and practice.

His comparison of Zionism with Indian nationalism is particularly interesting, as he shows how both of these movements represented the transformation from a religiously oriented to a nationally oriented self-understanding. In his response to Penslar, Joshua Cole draws attention to the problematic nature of defining both colonialism and nationalism that Penslar's essay eludes. He also fleshes out some of the disagreements with post-colonial theory – namely that there is nothing intrinsically European about nationalist aspirations – that Penslar offers in his piece. Elizabeth Thompson challenges Penslar's rejection of the label "settler colonialism" to characterize Zionism: the link between Jewish settlement in Palestine and the British Empire, Thompson argues, indeed makes this label warranted.

In the penultimate paragraph to his response to Cole and Thompson, Penslar makes an important and often neglected point: attempts to equate Zionism with colonialism often ignore the particularities of the situation of world Jewry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which included very real security concerns that other European settlers did not have to content with. Penslar ends his essay, and thus the volume, with the very apt suggestion that "we would all do well to avoid employing the term 'colonialism' in an axiomatic and reflexive way." This is a conclusion that is very well taken vis-à-vis not only the issue of Zionism, but also in regards to the broader theme of "Colonialism and the Jews" that this volume plays a critical role in elucidating.

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Hannan Hever, *Suddenly, the Sight of War: Violence and Nationalism in Hebrew Poetry in the 1940s* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), pp. 271.

by Dario Miccoli

The volume *Suddenly, the Sight of War* by the Israeli scholar and literary critic Hannan Hever focuses on the Hebrew poetry of the 1940s and the ways in which issues of violence, victimhood and nationalism are portrayed. Drawing upon his extensive knowledge of Hebrew literature and thanks to a close textual reading of the works of renowned authors such as Leah Goldberg, Natan Alterman, Amir Gilboa and Haim Guri, Hever writes a rich study of the poetry produced in defining decades for the history both of Israel and of the European Jews, when events like the Second World War, the Holocaust and later on the Israeli War of Independence (1948) led to a profound reshaping of modern Jewish identity. The book – first published in Hebrew by *Ha-kibbutz ha-meuchad* a few years ago – is divided into three parts: part one is dedicated to Hebrew symbolist poetry during the Second World War; the second to the themes of historical analogy and national allegory, and the third and last to the representation of death around 1948.

In the first part, Hever illustrates the intellectual debate around symbolism that emerged in the early 1940s and in which authors such as Avraham Shlonsky, Leah Goldberg, Yocheved Bat-Miriam and others took part. He presents the figure of the living-dead as central in order to understand Hebrew symbolism and its ideological basis: an example of that is the poem *Tefillat naqam* (“Prayer for revenge”) by Natan Alterman, that discusses the figure of the dead who returns in order to observe the living and asks for revenge as the solution to persecution. Another interesting case is that of the renowned poet Leah Goldberg, who – Hever notes – refused to write about war openly, so as to try finding a more personal role for herself as woman poet and intellectual. Amir Gilboa instead is viewed as the author of a more realist poetry than that of Alterman, and a sort of trait d’union between the former and the expressionism of someone like Uri Zvi Greenberg.

The second part of *Suddenly, the Sight of War* opens with a detailed analysis of Alterman’s *Shirei makkot Mitzrayim* (“The poems of the plagues of Egypt”), where the poet describes revenge and violence from the point of view of the inhabitants of ancient Egypt suffering from the biblical Ten Plagues. Hever analyses in-depth Alterman’s masterpiece, published in 1944, and underlines the

poet's sensitivity "to the distress of members of the nation of [the anti-Jewish] persecutors" (p. 80). Whereas other scholars – for example Dan Miron – downplay the historical analogy between Pharaonic Egypt and Nazi Germany, Hever contends that this aspect is crucial for understanding *Shirei makkot Mitzrayim* and its allegoric stance, as well as Alterman's view on Jewish behavior and resistance during the Holocaust. For Alterman, that of the Jewish People is not "a linear story of the powerful and rosy future of the collective," as hegemonic (Zionist) Hebrew poetry seemed to imply, but "the story of those who seek to plant hope of an existence for both individuals and a collective with limited and modest aspirations" (p. 133). Similar non-hegemonic stances can be found in the work of Yocheved Bat-Miriam, with whom Hever ends the second part of the volume. Bat-Miriam's 1943-Shirim la-ghetto ("1943-Ghetto poems") continued the tradition of Hebrew symbolist poetry while, at the same time, introducing a double longing for Palestine and Russia. As opposed to the strictly territorialist principles upon which much of the modern Hebrew literature was based, Bat-Miriam created an alternative space that is not subject to nationalist needs but to her own identity as woman and post-Holocaust Jew.

In the third part, Hever investigates symbols of death in the poetry published at the time of the Israeli War of Independence. It is then that "the dead are once again brought back to life" (p. 175) and the figure of the living-dead, that is "the fighter whose material existence is lost but whose imagined national presence is thereby strengthened" (*Ibid.*), once again becomes central. Suffice to think of the famous 1949 poem *Hineh mut'alot gufoteynu* ["Here lie our bodies"] by Haim Guri. Hever focuses on Amir Gilboa – defined as a subverter of the poetic symbols then prevailing – and on other poets and writers that published journalistic essays and pamphlets about their war experience: from Guri himself to Moshe Shamir. Here, it becomes evident how by then symbolist poetry began to appear anachronistic. Hebrew poets had to find alternative forms of expression that suited the new national scenario and a much wider and more heterogeneous public of readers. Younger authors started to sublimate war and violence in their texts and – especially in the case of women poets like Anda Amir-Pirkenfeld – proposed new images of the fallen soldiers, turning their being distant from the front into a strength. This said, one should not overlook the still persistent and more traditional image of women as bereaved mothers, that appears in many popular poems of the 1950s. More generally, it seems that the figure of the living-dead is less central and that after 1948 – as one reads in the poem *Geshem bi-sdeh krav* ["Rain on the battlefield"] by Yehudah Amichai –

the Jewish soldier really is dead and cannot return to interfere with the living anymore.

Suddenly, the Sight of War is an erudite research that proposes an original reading of Hebrew poetry at a time of deep cultural and political reshaping. The Second World War, the Holocaust and the Israeli War of Independence prove to be defining moments in the history of modern Hebrew literature, prompting poetical and ideological responses destined to leave a mark on it and on the so-called Hebrew literary canon. This confirms the idea, put forward by Hever in *Producing the Modern Hebrew Canon* (2002), that Hebrew literature was – and, even though in a very different way, still is – inextricably linked to the Zionist project of national rebirth: either as expression of the political hegemony, or as a reaction to it. By following the representation of war and violence that emerges in 1940s and 1950s poetry, Hever is able to discern the complex and fascinating evolution of Hebrew literary symbols and tropes: from the figure of the Jewish victim to the ambivalent national allegory found in Alterman's work, up to the crisis of the living-dead in the aftermath of the Israeli War of Independence and the emergence of new, and more diversified, literary motifs – also thanks to the increased presence of women on the cultural scene. *Suddenly, the Sight of War* takes the reader on a poetic voyage that deeply helps understanding the impact that the Second World War and 1948 had on the formation of Israeli culture and confirms Hannan Hever as one of the most authoritative and original scholars of modern Hebrew literature.

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